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ABSTRACT
Manage the Margins: Three Essays on Effective Policymaking for Social
Inequality in Health. (August 2011)
Ling Zhu, B. A., Fudan University (Shanghai, China);
M.A., Purdue University
Chair of Committee: Dr. Kenneth J. Meier
This dissertation includes three studies devoted to trying to understand
inequality in health between people from different social groups in a democratic
society. In the U.S., social inequality in health takes various forms and the key to
understanding how democracy solves the problem of inequality lies in a complex
set of political and social factors. I take an institutional approach and focus on
examining how political and policy institutions, their administrative processes,
and the policy implementation environment are linked to social inequality in
health.
The first essay, Whose Baby Matters More, uses a theoretical framework for
evaluating heterogeneous group responses to public health policies and depicts
how racial disparities in health are rooted in group heterogeneity in policy
responses. The second essay, Anxious Girls and Inactive Boys, focuses on how
state-level policy interventions and social capital interactively affect gender
differences in health. The third essay, Responsibility for Equity, explores the link
between publicness of state healthcare systems and social equity in healthcare
access.
iv
In the first essay, I focus on racial disparities in infant mortality rates and pool
state-level data from 1990 to 2006. The empirical analysis suggests that enhancing
the capacity of state healthcare systems is critical to improving population health.
Blacks and whites, nevertheless, exhibit different responses to the same policy.
Racial disparities could be reduced only when policy interventions generate more
relative benefits for Blacks. In the second essay, I find that social capital conditions
the effect of public health policies with regard to managing childhood obesity.
There are gender differences, moreover, in health outcomes and behavioral
responses to state and local-level obesity policies. In the third essay, I find that
different institutional factors exhibit different impact on inequality in healthcare
access. While public finance resources may reduce inequality in healthcare access,
public ownership and the public healthcare workforce do not have significant
association with inequality in healthcare access. State Medicaid eligibility rules
exhibit moderate impact on inequality in healthcare access.
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11. INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN HEALTH
A prominent feature of almost all industrialized democracies is the social gradient
in health (Marmot 2003). Health inequality – broadly defined as group differences
in preventable health risks and access to healthcare – is a major form of social
inequality. It blights the lives of many people in both developed and developing
countries (Wilkinson and Pikett 2009), impedes democratization, and undermines
democracy (Tilly 2007). Charles Tilly writes in his book, Democracy, that:
To the extent that citizen-state interactions organize around categorical
differences also prevailing in routine social life, those differences
undermine broad, equal, protected, mutually binding consultation.
They block or subvert democratic politics because they inevitably
install large resource disparities in the political arena. They inhibit
coalition formation across categorical boundaries. Meanwhile they
give members of advantaged categories both the incentive and means
to invade outcomes of democratic deliberation when those outcomes
counter their interests (Tilly 2007, 110).
In recent decades, modern democracies have devoted massive efforts in
improving healthcare and using economic democracy as a means to tackle
inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Nowhere in the world emphasizes as
much as the U.S. does on improving health through heavy investment in new
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Political Science.
2medicines and healthcare technologies (WHO 2010).1 The quality of healthcare
facilities, doctors, and medical technologies in the U.S. has been deemed as one of
the best in the world. Ironically, American citizens do not benefit uniformly from
the quality and availability of healthcare resources.
Social gradient in health is evident in the United States (Barr 2007). For ex-
ample, African Americans have a disproportionate burden of various preventable
health risks, such as high infant mortality rates, teen birth rates, HIV (Human
Immunodeficiency Virus) infection rates, etc. (NCHS 2011). According to the
National Center for Health Statistics (NCSH), from 2004 to 2006, the average Black
infant mortality rate (IMR) was 13.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, and the average
IMR for all races was 6.8 deaths per 1,000 live births (NCHS 2011, 127). In 2006, the
average Black teen birth rate was more than 1.5 times the average teen birth rate
for all races (NCHS 2011, 107). According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), in 2006, the rate of new HIV infections among non-Hispanic
Blacks (83.7 per 150,000) was 7 times the rate of new infections among whites
(CDC 2008). Group differences in health also exist based on gender, age, income,
etc. (Marmot 2003). Studies found that in the U.S., women have significantly
lower self-reported health status, lower mean education, and income than men.
On average, women also use more healthcare services than men (Macintyre et
al.1996; Merzel 2000).
Despite the abundant documentation on health inequality, empirical evidence
on causes and remedies of health inequality is still lacking. Mary Douglas and
Aaron Wildavsky (1983) wrote in their seminal book, Risk and Culture, that in
1According to the World Health Organization’s report, in 2008, the U.S. ranked No.1 in the
world based on the per capita spending on health. In 2008, the U.S. spent about 16% of its Gross
Domestic Product on healthcare, which were about 1.5 times as high as the healthcare spending in
France and Germany, and twice as high as the healthcare spending in Japan (WHO 2010).
3the U.S., the process of making preventive risk policies has a peculiar feature –
“ knowledge and action are out of sync: whatever programs are enacted to reduce
risks, they conspicuously fail to follow the principle of doing the most to prevent
the worst damage (1).” They contend that such a policy failure occurs because
substantial disagreement remains over how to define risks, how to identify the
most disadvantaged group, and how to mobilize the majority group to support
policies when the most disadvantaged group belongs to the minority camp in a
democratic system.
The paradox of mobilizing public support for policies that benefit a minority
group in a majoritarian political system is not unique to the issue area of
healthcare. The paradox of increasing distributive justice and improving the
overall societal development is a generic problem existing in many policy areas.
Social inequality, moreover, takes various forms and the key to understanding
how democracy solves the paradox of equity lies in a complex set of political and
social factors. The absence of systematic studies on political causes and remedies
of social inequality prevents both scholars and practitioners from gaining useful
knowledge on how to provide best policies to the most deserved.
How do politics matter for social inequality? This is an important, yet under-
studied question in the political science and the public administration literatures.
Gooden and Portillo (2011) observe that the field of public administration and
public policy as a whole, needs to “strive even harder to press the value of social
equity in scholarship and practice (161).” They point out that, “despite its many
contributions, social equity research has grown quite limited in its methodology
and scope (69).” Pitts (2011) observes that “ it is problematic in research on
social equity that scholars tend to reiterate normative arguments instead of asking
4empirical questions about how these arguments operate in practice (77).” Absence
of empirical evidence collected from systematic studies, according to Pitts (2011),
leads practitioners to muddling through the policymaking process with only
anecdotal evidence as the guide for how to reduce social inequality.
This dissertation addresses the broad question on how democratic institutions
may solve the problem of social equity by focusing on health inequality as one
major dimension of social inequality. Using three studies on health inequality
in the U.S., I explore the links between provisions of public health policies,
the social environment of policy implementation, institutional characteristics of
public healthcare systems, and health inequality. The purpose of this dissertation
is two-fold: to recognize social equity as an important normative value in
the research area of public administration and public policy; and to develop
systematic studies that empirically investigate effective policy tools for reducing
social inequality. Though the empirical focus of this dissertation is health
inequality, the proposed theoretical frameworks and empirical analyses can be
useful for studying other topics in the area of social equity research.
1.1 Health Inequality: The Definition
It is important to clarify the definition of health inequality, because how to define
the term has important implications for measurements and policy solutions to the
problem. In this dissertation, “health inequality” is exchangeable with the term
“health disparity.”
Margaret Whitehead (1990) proposed a concise definition of health inequality,
which has been adopted by the World Health Organization and used by many
scholars in public health and epidemiology. According to Whitehead, health
5inequality refers to differences in health, which “are unnecessary and avoidable”,
and in addition, are “considered unfair and unjust (29).” Similarly, the U.S.
National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines health disparities as “differences in the
incidence, prevalence, mortality, and burden of disease and other adverse health
conditions that exist among specific population groups in the United States (NIH
2005, 81).”
Braveman (2006) provides a thorough review on 13 different definitions of
health inequality (or health disparity) and points out two important points for
clarifying the definition. Firstly, health inequality does not refer to individual-
level absolute differences in health status and health risks. Though affected by
biomedical and behavioral causes, health inequality is a society-level construct,
which refers to the group-based, systematic differences in health. Hence, to
explicitly identify the baseline group and the disadvantaged group is important
for both the research on health inequality and practice in making policies for
reducing health inequality.
Secondly, health inequality refers to avoidable differences in health caused by
“persistently experienced social disadvantages (Braveman 2006, 167).” This is an
important political meaning of health inequality. It implies that research on causes
and remedies of health inequality should incorporate socioeconomic and political
factors that are associated with cumulative social disadvantages. It also informs
that health inequality is potentially shaped by political and policy factors, and
may be reduced by political and policy means.
61.2 Political Determinants of Health Inequality
My theoretical focus is to conceptualize health inequality based on avoidable
group differences in health and access to healthcare. Based on this conceptual-
ization, I ask why some people in the same society are more vulnerable to certain
health risks and have less access to healthcare resources than others. Do social and
political factors cause differences in health? To addresses these questions, I focus
on identifying necessary conditions for making effective policies for reducing
health inequality.
In the literature on public health and health inequality, one can find a
growing number of studies focusing on socioeconomic determinants of health,
but very few indeed on the political determinants of health (Navarro 2008). Until
recently, scholars find some evidence, which suggests that political variables
may affect population health outcomes. In the U.S. context, scholars find that
population health, to a significant degree, is an outcome of government policies.
Governmental interventions in physical infrastructure, social protection, and
generosity of the welfare system have a significant impact on population health
status (Kaplan et al. 1996; Kennedy 2005; Kim and Jennings 2009). Less clear
evidence exists, however, on how administrative and policy accommodations add
success in reducing health inequality. This is remarkable, as scholars claim that
political and policy inputs do matter for improving population health, but not so
clear if they can reduce health inequality.
One reason for the deficit of studies on the link between politics and health
inequality is that politics is narrowly defined as political ideologies in the
policymaking process. Understanding how political ideologies shape the policy
7landscapes in a democratic system is essential to explaining why some policy
instruments are provided to the public but not others. It is, nevertheless, not
sufficient to link political decisions to the actual health outcomes. Powell (2006)
and Judge (2008) both observe that the absence of political factors in health
inequality research in a major concern. Policy design and policy implementation,
moreover, are even more neglected. The complex policy implementation process
shapes public health outcomes and affects how policy benefits are distributed
among citizens. In the literature, the missing link between political decisions on
health issues and the health inequality that scholars have observed is how these
programs are designed and implemented in the policymaking process. Hence, to
explore the link between politics and health inequality, a series of political and
institutional factors need to be examined.
Heterogeneous Policy Responses
Policymaking for health inequality takes place “in a fog of disagreement about
goals, controversy about causes, and uncertainty about means (Judge 2008, 356).”
In the process of using political means to reduce health inequality, different risk
perceptions need to be coped. Men and women might have different awareness of
their health conditions. Different racial and ethnic groups might concern different
types of diseases as major health risks. Effective policymaking, furthermore, often
requires collaboration among service providers (e.g. governmental agencies, non-
profit organizations, etc.) and different targeted populations. Surprisingly, very
little scholarly attention has been paid to understanding how different targeted
populations may have heterogeneous policy responses. If group differences in
health is partially shaped by the political and policy environment, then how the
8targeted groups respond to a policy program is a key to understanding whether
that policy can be effective in reducing group differences in health or not. In
sum, focusing on heterogeneous group responses to policy interventions could
add knowledge on the social equity implications of a particular policy design.
The Policy Implementation Environment
Public healthcare policies are implemented and managed through open, net-
worked systems and are sensitive to the external environment. The contingent
theory in public management suggests that organizations rely on their environ-
ment and effective policy implementation is constrained by the environmental
characteristics (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). The policy implementation environ-
ment are likely to affect how policy information is disseminated and how health-
care administrators and street-level professionals interact with citizens. Scholars
also find a positive association between mobilized communities (i.e. social capital)
and effective decision-making as well as service performance provided by public
organizations (Andrews et al. 2008; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Tam 1998; Uslaner
2000, 2004). How does the policy implementation environment affect policy
success in reducing health inequality? Can a committed government combined
with mobilized communities be effective in reducing health inequality? Is it
possible that health inequality is partially shaped by different access to social and
political resources that are available in the policy implementation environment?
Evaluating characteristics of the policy implementation environment can help to
add knowledge on how health inequality, as a complex social problem, may be
managed in a policy system.
9Institutional Characteristics of the Healthcare System
Effective policymaking does not happen in a vacuum. It needs government
commitment in healthcare resources, the effort in policy enforcement, and col-
laboration among different healthcare providers. Policy effectiveness in reducing
health inequality could be hampered by deficiencies in performance management,
deficits in human capital, insufficient integration between policy sectors, and
contradictions between health inequality and other policy imperatives. Institu-
tional characteristics of a healthcare system are linked to all these key imple-
mentation factors. More specifically, institutional arrangements of a healthcare
system determine whose health risks are covered, how healthcare is financed,
and how healthcare services are delivered. If health inequality is defined by
disadvantages in health that some groups systematically experience in a system,
then it is important to examine if these group disadvantages are linked to how the
healthcare system is designed and organized.
1.3 Three Essays on Effective Policymaking for Health Inequality
In this dissertation, the overarching goal of the empirical analyses is to examine
whether health inequality can be linked to heterogenous groups responses to
public health interventions, the policy implementation environment, and the
institutional characteristics of the healthcare system. In the U.S., the level of health
inequality, policy initiatives for reducing health inequality, and the institutional
arrangements of the healthcare system vary substantially across states. Hence,
state-level analysis can offer a comprehensive comparison on policy inputs, the
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social and community conditions for policy implementation, and the institutional
constraints on healthcare provisions.
To empirically measure the multifaceted construct of health inequality, I focus
on two key points: (1) health inequality can be measured across different group
identities; and (2) health inequality can refer to both unequal treatment (i.e.
different access to healthcare resources) and disparate outcomes (i.e. different
health risks). I conduct three empirical studies by operationalizing health
inequality based on different social group identities and by examining inequality
in health outcomes and healthcare access.
The first study, Whose Baby Matters More? Bureaucratic Capacity, Heterogeneous
Policy Responses, and Racial Disparities in Health, focuses on the link between
heterogeneity in policy responses and racial disparities in health. This study
investigates whether neutrally-designed policies generate differentiable group
benefits and how that may be linked to social inequality in health. Tracking
changes in the Black-to-white infant mortality rates across fifty states and in the
past two decades, I find empirical evidence that enhancing the capacity of state
healthcare system is critical to improving population health, but not necessary
a remedy for racial disparities in health. The health disparities between Blacks
and whites can be reduced only when policy interventions generate more relative
benefits for Blacks.
The second study, Anxious Girls and Inactive Boys: Social Capital, Public Health
Policies, and Gender Differences in Childhood Obesity, focuses on gender differences
in health. In this study, I examine how public health policies combined with social
capital, induce different changes in health risk behaviors among male and female
adolescents. Based on pooled-panel data analysis for forty-three states from 1991
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to 2009, I find that overall, state-level health policy interventions are ineffective in
reducing childhood obesity. The key reason for the policy failure is that social
capital (i.e. the policy implementation environment) alters the link between
policy interventions and group health outcomes. State-level childhood obesity
policy initiatives, combined with active communities, increase female students’
anxiety on their weight status and lead to unhealthy weight-control activities.
Although the adopted policies increase male students’ physical activities, they
fail to consider intra-gender dynamics and fail to prevent male students from
taking unhealthy weight-control activities. The mixed policy effects on students’
dietary and weight-control activities, which are generated by both the policy
interventions and community conditions, explain why in the past two decades,
increased policy initiatives on childhood obesity fail to solve this public health
crisis in the United States.
The third study, Responsibility for Equity: Can the Public Sector Reduce Inequality
in Healthcare Access, explores the link between publicness of state healthcare
systems and equal access to healthcare coverage. This study focuses on a central
question in the issue area of healthcare: how should a democratic system divide
government and individual responsibilities in covering health risks? Empirically,
this study focuses on assessing how different state healthcare systems incorporate
economically marginalized groups (the poor and the unemployed). Based
on a systematic assessment on four institutional factors – ownership of state
healthcare systems, the source of financial resources, the size of the governmental
healthcare workforce, and state Medicaid eligibility rules – I find that both public
financial resources and generosity of state Medicaid eligibility rules are negatively
associated with the percentages of the uninsured population. Public commitment
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in providing financial resources, moreover, have substantial impact on states’
abilities of providing healthcare access to the working poor. State healthcare
systems that have generous eligibility rules, in addition, have moderately lower
uninsured rates than states with tight eligibility rules.
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2. WHOSE BABY MATTERS MORE?
BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY, HETEROGENEOUS POLICY RESPONSES,
AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN HEALTH
2.1 Overview
Accounting for group heterogeneity to assess policy treatment effects is a major
development in both the economics and sociology literatures on policymaking.
Response heterogeneity as a key to understanding how various behavioral
reactions to policy produce different political implications at the population level,
however, has been understudied in political science. In this paper, I theorize how
heterogeneous policy responses generate political implications for social equity in
public healthcare. Focusing on racial disparities in health, I analyze under what
conditions state healthcare systems and policies produce different group benefits
for Blacks and whites. Pooling state-level data from 1990 to 2006, the empirical
analysis suggests that enhancing the capacity of state healthcare systems is critical
to improving population health. Blacks and whites, nevertheless, exhibit different
responses to the same policy. Racial disparities could be reduced when policy
interventions generate more relative benefits for Blacks.
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2.2 Introduction
Persistent social inequality has become a challenge to American liberal democracy.
In his book, Unequal Democracy, Larry M. Bartels (2008,1) describes that the
U.S. has entered the “New Gilded Age,” whereby the substantial escalation of
economic inequality can be observed. Income inequality, nonetheless, is not
the only aspect reflecting the “unequal democracy.” Public health scholars have
documented the persist racial disparities in health (Smedley et al. 2003; Williams
and Collins 2001).2 According to the Institute of Medicine’s report, Unequal
Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in healthcare, minorities had
lower health status after controlling for factors such as insurance coverage and
income. They were less likely to get heart medication, bypass surgeries, and
dialysis (Smedley et al. 2003).
While racial disparities in health in the U.S. have been well documented,
solutions for reducing them are less clear. The conventional wisdom attributes
racial and ethnic health disparities to individual-level factors such as social
economic circumstances, physical and genetic factors, personal management on
health, etc. (Braveman 2006; Williams and Jackson 2005). Less has been said in
terms of how public healthcare systems, their administrative and bureaucratic
processes, and healthcare professionals affect health disparities. In the U.S. federal
system, moreover, devolution or decentralization of national healthcare programs
is a common practice in the process of policy implementation, public health
management, and healthcare service delivery. As state governments are given
more responsibilities in policymaking and implementation, it is important to
2There are various ways to measure health disparities. For the purpose of this research, health
disparity is defined as “the quantity that separates a group from a specified reference point on a
particular measure of health that is expressed in terms of a rate (Keppel et al. 2005, 2).”
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evaluate whether they are capable of taking on these responsibilities (Honadle
2001). Efforts to reduce the disturbing level of racial disparities may fall to
pieces without addressing the complex interplay of political and organizational
influences (LaVeist 2005; Mechanic 2005).
The purpose of this research is to fill the gap in the literature by studying
how the characteristics of state healthcare policies matter for promoting minority
health and reducing racial disparities in health. I develop a policy theory to
capture heterogeneous responses to the same set of healthcare provisions. More
specifically, I contend that the demands of healthcare provisions are heterogenous
across racial groups depending on the different group attributes and context.
Different group attributes also generate different margins of improvement when
some policy measures are employed as interventions. When different group
responses occur to the same policy measure, health disparities can be reduced
only when the at-risk group benefits more from the policy intervention. Health-
care provisions, therefore, can generate redistributive effects that have profound
implications on social equity outcomes.
This essay is organized in the following manner. First I discuss the theoretical
framework that depicts heterogeneous policy responses. I then link the theoretical
framework of heterogenous policy responses to racial disparities in health. Next,
I pool data for fifty states from 1990 to 2006 and systematically assess how the
same set of public healthcare provisions affect racial disparities in health. Based
on the commonly used population health indicator – infant mortality rate (IMR),
I demonstrate how public spending on health and public health professionals
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interactively contribute to reduce health disparities between Blacks and whites.3
Last, I discuss both theoretical and practical implications of the empirical findings.
2.3 Heterogeneous Policy Responses and Health Disparities: Why We Have It
Public healthcare programs are often developed to solve population-level or
group-level health problems. Students in public administration and public
healthcare find that various factors can affect the effectiveness of public health-
care provisions: organizational and bureaucratic capacity (Latane et al. 1979;
Newhouse 1973; Manning et al. 1984; Donahue et al. 2000), access to care
(LeVeist 2005), government regulations and initiatives in healthcare (Kennedy
2005; Rothstein 1998; Matland 1995), etc. There is no consensus among scholars,
however, regarding why we see health disparities across different racial groups.
Less has been said, furthermore, in terms of how public healthcare provisions and
their administrative processes affect racial disparities in health.
Scholars who are interested in the politics of health disparities have focused
their studies on assessing how the unequal political system is associated with
racial disparities in health (Andrain 1998; Brown et al. 2000; Budrys 2003; Patel
and Rushefsky 2008). While it is compelling to think of health disparities as some
form of social inequality induced by the unequal political system (i.e. the political
sources), it is also worth evaluating whether differentiable health outcomes
across racial groups are generated by neutrally-designed policies.4 I theorize
that government interventions in healthcare might generate different relative
3The empirical focus of this essay is to compare Blacks with whites. The theoretical framework,
however, could be applicable to compare health disparities across other social groups (such as
gender groups, or different age groups).
4In this research, neutrality refers to policy programs that do not explicitly exclude particular
racial groups from the targeted populations.
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gains for different targeted populations. This redistributive effect has profound
implications for social equity outcomes in healthcare. Heterogeneous policy
responses (based on race) provide a theoretical perspective that is complimentary
to the existing literature on unequal political system and racial disparities in
health.
Heterogenous Health Risks and the Marginality of Improvement
I start from a few assumptions and definitions. First, define a healthcare policy as
some form of treatment Ti. Second, the population can be divided into different
groups based on their differentiable health risks, i.e. heterogeneity in health risks,
Ri (Heckman 2001). I use Rbase to denote the baseline group and Rrisk to denote
the at-risk group.5 Group differences in health risks can occur due to various
reasons, such as economic inequality (Mellor and Milyo 2001; Wilkinson and
Pickett 2009), perceived discrimination in care (William and Jackson 2005), social
and community conditions (Williams and Collins 2001), different cultural contexts
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983), and so on. Given a historical level of risk (for a
particular group), the margins for policy improvement are defined as changes in
health risks, ∆Ri. Hence, given a fixed policy goal, Rg, the margins for policy
improvement are different between the baseline group and the at-risk group:
Rbase < Rrisk
∆Rbase = Rbase −Rg
∆Rrisk = Rrisk −Rg
∆Rbase < ∆Rrisk
(1)
5The baseline group and the at-risk group are defined in a relative context. The at-risk group
faces greater health risk than the baseline group.
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Regardless of the factors that generate different group-level health risks, the
presence of heterogeneous health risks will lead to different demands on the
healthcare treatment that counters the health risks. Figure 16 illustrates the
heterogeneous health risks and different group marginality for improvement
based on health risks measured by infant mortality rates.7 In this empirical
example, Blacks and whites have different health risks measured by infant
mortality rates. Different group means show that on average, Black infants are
three times more likely to die before age 1 than white infants. Given a fixed policy
goal, e.g. to reduce the population infant mortality rate to 2 per 1,000 live births,
the margins for improvement for whites (∆Rw) are much less than the margins for
improvement for Blacks (∆Rb).
Figure 1: Group Heterogeneity in Health Risks and Different Margins for
Improvement: State-Level Black and White Infant Mortality Rates, 1990–2006
Mean=6.316, Std.=0.998
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15.009, Std.=3.139
Mean=15.009, Std.=3.139
2.0
2.0
argins of Improvement for Whites
Margins of Improvement for Whites
Blacks
Margins of Improvement for Blacks
0
0
.1
.1
2
.2
3
.3
4
.4
D nsity
De
ns
ity
0
5
5
1
10
5
15 20 25
Inf t M rtality Rates (Number of Infant Deaths per 1,000 Live Births)
Infant Mortality Rates (Number of Infant Deaths per 1,000 Live Births)
White Infant Mor lity Rates
White Infant Mortality Rates
Bl ck Infant Mort lity Rates
Black Infant Mortality Rates
6Data Source: Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention, Vital Statistics, State Mortality
Tables, 1990–2006.
7Infant mortality rate is defined as the number of infant dying before reaching one year of age,
per 1,000 live births.
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Heterogenous Treatment Effects and Health Disparities
I then proceed to theorize how certain policy treatment, i.e. the quantity of
healthcare policy provisions, Ti, may affect racial disparities in health. Policy
(treatment) effects can be defined by the health risk elasticity of policy interven-
tions. Substantively, it refers to the reduction in the health risk in response to the
supply of certain healthcare policies. Because the margins for policy improvement
are different between the baseline group and the at-risk group, I expect to see
different policy elasticities between the two groups (Meier 1999). Formally, the
elasticity (ERi,Ti) is defined as:
ERi,Ti =
∂Ri
∂Ti
· Ti
Ri
≈ %∆Ri
%∆Ti
(2)
Because ∆Rw < ∆Rb, (i.e. compared with Blacks, whites have lower demand
on health provisions and a smaller margin for policy improvement), when the
same amount of policy treatment is introduced, I expect to see different treatment
effects across the two groups. Figure 2 illustrates the differentiable policy
responses between Blacks and whites. Firstly, because the heterogenous risks,
at the policy node, T1, the level of health risks is higher for Blacks than what is
for whites. Secondly, as policy treatment increases (i.e. moving from T1 toward
T2), health risks for both groups decrease. However, the gap between two groups
will decrease only when ∆T (i.e. policy change) becomes sufficiently large and
generates more relative gains for Blacks.
20
Fi
gu
re
2:
G
ro
up
R
es
po
ns
es
to
H
ea
lt
hc
ar
e
Pr
ov
is
io
ns
 
 
 
Ri
sk
 (R
w)
 
        
   
  
 
    
R w
 
     
R g
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
T1
 
 
 
 
T2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Po
lic
y T
re
at
m
en
t (
∆ 
T)
 
∆ 
R w
 
(a
)
Tr
ea
tm
en
tE
ff
ec
ts
fo
r
W
hi
te
s
 
 
 
Ri
sk
 (R
b) 
       
R b
 
 
   
  
 
    
 
     
R g
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
T1
 
 
 
 
T2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Po
lic
y T
re
at
m
en
t (
∆ 
T)
 
∆ 
R b
 
(b
)
Tr
ea
tm
en
tE
ff
ec
ts
fo
r
Bl
ac
ks
21
Because of the heterogenous policy responses, public healthcare provisions
might generate different relative gains for the at-risk group, thus exhibiting
different implications for social equity outcomes in healthcare. I further illustrate
three possible theoretical scenarios for why we have health disparities, and when
we expect to see diminishing gaps between group outcomes.
Figure 3 refers to the first set of theoretical scenarios, which depicts changes in
health disparities.8 It characterizes situations when the policy treatment generates
more relative gains for the at-risk group (Blacks). Based on equation (2), this
means that when Eb > Ew given the same policy treatment, we could expect to
see a decrease in health disparities. Empirically, there are two possibilities: (1)
a policy only benefits the at-risk group, or (2) a policy benefits both groups but
more benefits will be generated for the at-risk group.
Figure 4 characterizes the second set of scenarios, which illustrates no changes
in health disparities.9 The normative implications of the two cases in Figure 4
are different. For the left-hand side figure, a policy treatment generates equal
improvement for both groups, hence, neither group becomes worse off. However,
because the treatment is not sufficiently large to generate more relative gains for
the at-risk group, we do not see changes in health disparities. The right-hand side
figure, in turn, represents situations when the policy treatment is ineffective. It
does not reduce health risks for both groups, thus it does not lead to changes in
health disparities either.
8In Figure 3, the left figure refers to the situation, in which both groups are better off and there
are decreases in health inequality. The right figure refers to the situation, in which only the at-risk
group is improved and there are decreases in health inequality.
9In Figure 4, the left figure refers to the situation, in which both groups are improved but
without changes in health inequality. The right figure refers to the situation, in which neither
groups benefits from the treatment and no changes in health inequality.
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Figure 3: Theoretical Scenario 1: Decreases in Health Inequality
 
 Risk 
Policy Treatment 
At-Risk Group 
Base-Line Group 
Risk 
Policy Treatment 
At-Risk Group 
Base-Line Group 
Figure 4: Theoretical Scenario 2: No Changes in Health Inequality
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Figure 5 characterizes the third set of scenarios, which shows that policy
interventions do not reduce health risks for the at-risk group.10 The left-hand side
figure refers to the situation, whereby there are policy failures for both groups and
there are relatively larger losses for the at-risk group. In such a situation, racial
disparities increase under policy interventions. The right-hand side figure refers
to unintended consequence, whereby health disparities are reduced artificially,
because the level of health risks for the baseline group is increased and the policy
treatment does not generate any improvement for the at-risk group.
In sum, the theoretical implications are political: there are policy tradeoffs
between obtaining more policy efficiency (to reduce the overall population health
risks ) and to generate more equal outcomes (to reduce the gap between different
social groups). While various public healthcare provisions are implemented
through different political and policy landscapes, they might have different
implications for health inequality. Heterogeneous policy responses across dif-
ferent racial groups can be one of the factors for explaining why we have racial
disparities in health. The heterogeneity in treatment effects is partly driven by
health differences generated historically, and partly driven by whether there are
sufficient public health provisions.
10In Figure 5, the left figure refers to the situation, in which the health risk increases for the
at-risk group and there are increases in health inequality. The right figure refers to the situation,
in which health disparity is changed in a unintended manner.
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Figure 5: Theoretical Scenario 3: Unintended Consequences
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2.4 State Healthcare Capacity and Racial Disparities in Health: An Empirical
Assessment
In this section, I use empirical data to evaluate the link between heterogeneous
policy responses and racial disparities in health. As Figure 3-5 demonstrate,
the key to reducing health disparities is to generate relative gains for the at-risk
group.11 In the context of racial disparities in health between Blacks and whites,
the key to policy success is to design policy instruments that can generate more
relative gains for Blacks.
11An intended policy outcome is to reduce inequality in health, and at the same time, to
generate some positive population gains. The last scenario in Figure 5 does not qualify to be the
intended case, because neither group becomes better off even when the disparities are reduced.
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In theory, two types of policy designs may be effective in reducing racial
disparities: (1) a neutrally-designed policy that can reduce more health risks for
Blacks than whites; and (2) a policy that is designed to specifically target Blacks.
Firstly, a neutrally-designed policy does not commit resources to either group
in an exclusive manner. When a policy is designed to benefit both groups, racial
disparities may be reduced only when the policy reduces more health risks for
Blacks than for whites. If a neutrally-designed policy improves health for both
Blacks and whites, but benefits whites more, then racial disparities in health will
increase. This implies that a policy design that generates positive population
gains might also generates greater health inequality. Secondly, a policy that is
designed to target Blacks may reduce health disparities. If a policy is designed to
improve health for Blacks, then resources are committed to Blacks in an exclusive
manner. When whites are not harmed by such a policy, racial disparities can
be reduced. Such a policy design recognizes the heterogeneity in health risks
and is constructed based on the rationality that allocating resources to promoting
minority health can help to reduce racial disparities. The intuition is simple, given
certain historical gaps, an effective policy for reducing health disparities should
“doing the most to prevent the worst damage (Douglas and Wildavsky 1986, 1).”
A systematic empirical analysis that inquires the distributive justice of various
health policies requires data that track major policy interventions over time.
Although racial disparities in health has been on the federal governments’
agenda since the Reagan Administration, no federal reforms have significantly
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reduced disparities (Stone 2006).12 State governments, in contrast, have great
influence on making public health policies. As Stone (2006) points out, state
governments have their own authority over education and licensing for the
healthcare professionals, defining eligibility rules for their own Medicaid and
Children’s Health Insurance programs. State governments operate their public
health departments, manage their community health centers, and collaborate with
non-governmental organizations in the process of delivering public health ser-
vices (129). At the state-level, there are also more variations in terms of when and
how policy programs are initiated for reducing racial disparities in health. These
all make it an appropriate choice to compare and analyze state-level policies.
Although states follow the federal government’s policy advice and budgetary
guidelines, state policymakers have their own political leverages on collecting
scientific information for policy-decisions, choosing specific policy programs, and
allocating financial and human resources for policy implementation. Hence,
state-level policy analysis not only adds empirical knowledge on what works
as effective policy choices, but also helps to understand what state governments
could do when effective policymaking is absent at the federal level.
12The first federal policy initiative on racial disparities in health was the creation of the Office
of Minority Health (OMH) in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) in 1985.
Two major federal programs on eliminating racial and ethnic health disparities were established
during the Clinton Administration. One is President Clinton’s Initiatives on Race, which created
Healthy People 2010, the 10-year national objectives on eliminating racial and ethnic disparities in
health. The second was the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Causes’
1999 Minority HIV/AIDS Initiative. Following these two national initiatives, OMH developed a
strategic implementation plan for eliminating racial disparities in health, which includes: (1)
to identify at-risk groups (needs assessment), (2) to develop social marketing campaigns, (3) to
enhance outreach to minority communities, (4) to increase access to treatment, (5) to provide
continuing education and training to health professionals across state (OMH 2000). The scope
of policy success, however, is very limited. Taking the infant mortality rate as an example, CDC
reported that the overall U.S. infant mortality rate was 6.68 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in
2006, but varies from 4.52 per 1,000 live births for Central and South America mothers to 13.35 for
non-Hispanic black mothers. To date, racial disparities in health are still persistent (Mathews and
MacDorman 2010).
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Scholars in public health administration contend that state governments’
capacities in providing healthcare provisions are key factors that affect the amount
of risk protections and the characteristics of policy interventions. The concept
of bureaucratic capacity has been discussed in a variety of ways in the public
administration literature. As such, capacity can be defined in a plethora of ways.
Polidano (2000, 808) describes the capacity as “the ability of an organization to act
effectively on a sustained basis in pursuit of its objectives.” The term can also be
defined as financial capacity, human resources, environmental capacity (Aldrich
1979), managerial capacity (Donahue et al. 2000), administrative, governance and
a variety of other ways. Bureaucratic capacity, furthermore, has been viewed as
an essential factor that can shape policy outcomes, affect benefits distribution,
and have profound implications for democratic governance and social equity. As
Derthick (1990,184) argues, “...the assumption that pervades policymaking is that
the agency will be able to do what is asked of it because by law and constitutional
tradition it must. It does not occur to presidential and congressional participants
that the law should be tailored to the limits of organizational capacity.”
Informed by the prior literature, I empirically evaluate two aspects of neutrally-
designed public healthcare provisions that are related to state capacity in health-
care: monetary commitment and available healthcare human resources. States
often use neutrally-designed policies to build the monetary capacity and to
develop human resources for public healthcare. Hence, these two capacity factors
are used for evaluating how heterogeneous policy responses are linked to racial
disparities when implementing the same policy treatment to both groups. State
governments, furthermore, also take different initiatives for promoting minority
health. These policy initiatives have explicit goals for generating favorable
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outcomes for racial and ethnic minorities. Hence, state initiatives on minority
health are used for examining how targeted policy programs are related to the
effectiveness in reducing racial disparities.
Public Healthcare Spending
Racial disparities in health are complex social problems, with no simple solution.
How to improve minorities’ access to healthcare and to build better community
infrastructures to support healthier life styles are essential to eliminate racial
disparities. Reducing racial disparities in health requires a substantial amount
of government inputs. Informed by the policy implementation literature, I
emphasize the importance of state capacity in implementing various public
healthcare programs. Hill and Hupe (2002) argue that public policymaking
is government in action, and very seldom are decisions self-executing. State
implementers stay at the nexus of a series of communication channels in the
intergovernmental networks for public healthcare. Hence, state-specific factors
such as financial capacity could affect both the quality of service delivery and the
policy outcomes that concern social equity (Goggin et al. 1990; Hill and Hupe
2002; Hjern and Hull 1982; Matland 1995).
Financial resources might constrain the ability to deliver quality services and
information to all citizens equally. Studies have found that monetary capacity
can affect public health outcomes. Meier and McFarlane (1994) find that publicly
subsidized family planning and funding for abortions generates positive health
benefits. Cremieux et al. (1999) find that in Canada, low healthcare spending is
associated with an increase in infant mortality and decrease in life expectancy.
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While state spending in public health may be positively associated with
population health outcomes, does it generate relative gains for racial and ethnic
minorities compared with whites? Some empirical studies suggest that it may be
helpful to deal with some major causes of racial disparities in health. According
to the resource deprivation theory, racial disparities in health exist because
minorities are more likely than whites to live in communities that are lacking in
the necessary infrastructure to support a healthy lifestyle (LaVeist 2005; Stadfford
and Marmot 2003). When individuals face resource deprivation, public healthcare
spending becomes an important source for social compensation. States and
local governments that have higher monetary capacity, can provide more social
compensation to minorities to reduce health disparities caused by resource
deprivation.
Another major cause of racial disparities in health is that access to care and the
quality of care are differentiable across racial and ethnic groups. Prior research
show that racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to have lower rates of
healthcare utilization than whites (LaVeist 2005). Drawing from NCHS’ survey
data in 2003, LaVeist (2005, 112) contends that more Blacks (16.4%) reported
that they had not had a single medical encounter in the preceding year than
whites (14.3%). There are several structural barriers, moreover, for minorities to
access good quality of care. These barriers include: lack of healthcare insurance,
more difficult transportation and scarcity of care providers in inner cities and
communities with large minority populations, and so on (Williams and Collins
2001; Zuvekas and Taliaferro 2003). Monetary resources are pivotal to building
state infrastructure and capacity to improve service quality and remove all these
structural barriers (Corrigan and McNeill 2009).
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The Role of State Healthcare Employees
Public healthcare spending could be important to provide more social compen-
sation to minorities, improving minorities’ access to healthcare resources, and
increasing their service utilization. Its effects on reducing health disparities,
nevertheless, are conditioned by human resources in the healthcare systems.
Donahue et al. (2000, 7) underscore the importance of capacity in terms of human
resources, suggesting that organizations “boil down to people.” Similarly, O‘Toole
and Meier (2009) explore the role of human resources within public organizations.
Through a systematic study of managers, they find that investing in internal
management of human resources plays a role in organizational performance.
A few empirical studies document the effects of human resources in effec-
tive policymaking in healthcare. Examining the link between human resource
management, work organization and patient care quality in the U.S. long-
term care settings, Eaton argues that improved front-line workforce in service
delivery consistently leads to higher quality care in nursing homes (Eaton 2000).
Bodenheimer and Grumbach (2005,176) explain that “the most valuable resource
in healthcare is not the latest technology or the most state-of-the art facility, but
the health professionals and others workers who are the human resource of the
healthcare system.” States with a larger portion of public health workers offer
more resources, knowledge, and personal interaction with citizens and thus could
provide better healthcare services to citizens and be more effective in reaching
the clients who need government support in healthcare. Successful policy
implementation in reducing health disparities relies on the effective interactions
between street-level bureaucrats, public health professionals, and the targeted
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populations. Low-level of human capacity in state healthcare systems may create
barriers for effective policymaking.
Beside conceptualizing both monetary capacity and human resources as
important factors for assessing state capacity in healthcare, I also ask how these
two components can increase policy effectiveness in eliminating racial disparities
in health. The literature has tended to treat human resources and monetary
capacity as separate entities; however, I contend that they could mutually
reinforce each other. Donahue et al. (2000, 411) explain that “how governments
translate resources into services is a question of long-standing significance to
public administration.” I argue that one way resources are turned into services
is through implementation by bureaucrats on the street-level. Human resources
within state agencies and in the state healthcare systems can not only constrain
effectiveness policy implementation, but also condition the distributive effects of
various public healthcare programs.
First, state healthcare professionals determine if healthcare programs are
carried out effectively. In their book, Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward
a Third Generation, Goggin et al. (1990) argue that organizational capacity in
human resources is an intervening variable that conditions policy effectiveness.
“The more personnel a state devotes to implement a program, the greater the
likelihood of prompt implementation without modifications (182).” One of the
longstanding problems in the U.S. healthcare system is its inadequate supply of
healthcare professionals, particularly minority healthcare professionals. Despite
the overall deficit in physicians and nurses, minority physicians only represent a
very small percentage of the total physicians in the country (LaVeist 2005, 123).
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Human resource deficits in the healthcare system could lead to delayed services
and thus affect healthcare outcomes.
Quality information and public health resources, moreover, are conditioned
upon the amount of human resources available. Eliminating racial disparities
in health is not only about providing healthcare services efficiently, but also
about improving the quality of healthcare services and to distribute healthcare
resources more equally. At the core of reducing health inequality is the fact that
the government could enhance its service delivery capacity or is capable of co-
ordinating policy implementation with the private sector and non-governmental
third parties (Hill and Hupe 2002). Human resources in state healthcare systems
become particularly important because they determine how government agencies
monitor the collaboration with the private sector and non-governmental third
parties, how the target populations are reached, and how healthcare information
is disseminated.
Federal and State Policy Initiatives
To this end, I have argued that both monetary capacity and human resources in the
state healthcare systems are important for addressing the issue of racial disparities
in health. Healthcare professionals, moreover, could exhibit a conditional role in
translating financial resources into a more equitable healthcare outcome. Both
capacity components, however, are only necessary conditions for addressing the
issues of racial disparities. Building state capacity in public health, moreover,
do not provide policy benefits to racial and ethnic minorities in an exclusive
manner. Needless to say, broad and neutrally-designed programs that focus on
increasing state capacity in healthcare are critical for making health services more
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accessible, improving the quality of healthcare, and benefiting citizens across
different social groups. Whether racial and ethnic minorities can gain more health
improvement than whites, nevertheless, may also be contingent upon if public
health services fall within the domain of the minority health entities. States not
only can implement neutrally-designed public health programs, but also can focus
on enhancing essential public health services for the minority communities.
Kennedy (2005) summarizes that efforts in eliminating racial disparities in
health were intensified under the Clinton Administration, after the introduction of
the Healthy People 2010, the federal government established several administrative
initiatives for reducing racial disparities in health. These programs include,
Health Disparity Collaboratives, Racial and Ethnic Approaches to Community
Health (REACH), Excellent Centers to Eliminate Ethnic/ Racial Disparities (EX-
CEED). Congress has advanced the agenda on minority health as well. For
example, “the Minority Health and Health Disparities Research and Education
Act (2000) created the National Center for Minority Health and Health Disparities
at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), mandated the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) to conduct research on minority health and health
disparities, and directed the National Academy of Sciences to examine and report
on the minority data collection practices of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) (454).”
To date, all fifty states have adopted the federal policy goal of eliminating
health disparities. State-level initiatives, nonetheless, vary substantially. First,
some states have been leaders in adopting federal goals and initiating plans for
improving minority health, while others have being slower. For example, Ohio
was the first state that initiated state plans for eliminating health disparities in
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1987. Other states, such as New Mexico, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, created
state plans just three to five years ago. According to NCSL’s (National Conference
of State Legislatures) report, “State Profiles: Minority Health and Health Equity
Offices”, Ohio created the commission on minority health to promote health
and the prevention of disease among members of minority groups in 1987.
New Mexico created its state office of health equity in 2005, North Dakota and
Pennsylvania created their minority health offices in 2007 (NCSL 2010). Different
states initiated their specific plans for improving minority health through different
channels. In some states, the efforts are more substantive, and in others the efforts
may have been more symbolic. For example, Arizona initiated its state plan for
eliminating health disparities with a specific implementation agenda on how to
target each racial group in the state. South Dakota, on the contrary, has only
appointed a minority health coordinator within the state health department as
a contact for the issue of health disparities.
Varying state policy initiatives and implementation plans that specifically
target the minority populations might reduce health disparities. Rothstein(1998)
contends that citizens’ interests are better enhanced, and unfairness is minimized
where entitlements are clear and thus rights are self-enforcing. Ingram and
Schneider (1990) point out that, clear and specific descriptions on bureaucratic
responsibility are essential to successful implementation. States that have adopted
the federal goal earlier and developed detailed implementation plans might
perform better in planning financial and human resources. States that have been
slow in adopting the federal goal or only initiated a symbolic policy for reducing
health disparities might not be able to solve the problem effectively because they
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could fail to solve the problems related to both ambiguity of goals and ambiguity
of means (Matland 1995).
2.5 Research Design
Based on the aforementioned theoretical framework and empirical discussion on
what constitute major policy treatments for reducing racial disparities in health,
I derive three hypotheses to empirically assess how characteristics of the state
healthcare policies affect racial disparities in health. Both monetary capacity and
human resources in the state healthcare systems are expected to decrease racial
disparities in health. Policy implementation in eliminating health disparities
should be enhanced if a state government has ample resources to devote to
health service delivery or to increase human resource within state health agencies.
State initiatives, moreover, matter because they could provide clarification on
both goals and means for reducing health disparities and may benefit racial and
ethnic minorities in an exclusive manner. The theoretical framework, in addition,
informs an interactive relationship between these two important components of
bureaucratic capacity.
H1 posits the effects of monetary capacity on racial disparities in health.
Monetary resources are expected to decrease health disparities, but conditioned
by the level of healthcare human resources. Effective policy implementation
in reducing health disparities not only relies on improving healthcare services,
but also depends on behavioral changes of the targeted population. Street-level
bureaucrats play a crucial role in interacting with the targeted population and
inducing their positive behavioral changes. Hence, I expect to observe significant
and negative marginal effects of public spending on racial disparities when there
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are sufficient healthcare human resources. When there is a deficit in public health
bureaucrats, only increasing monetary inputs might not lead to a decrease in racial
disparities.
H2 posits the effects of human resources on racial disparities in health.
Healthcare professionals are expected to decrease health disparities, but condi-
tioned by how much financial resources are available in different state healthcare
systems. Public health administrators, street-level bureaucrats, and healthcare
professionals are important for improving minority health and eliminating health
disparities. Their ability of enhancing service quality and improving minority
health, however, would be limited if there were no sufficient financial resources.
Hence, I expect to observe significant and negative marginal effects of human
resources on racial disparities in states with high monetary capacity. When states’
monetary capacity is low, increased human resources might not lead to a decrease
in racial disparities.
H3 refers to the relationship between state initiatives on improving minority
health and racial disparities in health. States that have been leaders in adopting
federal goals, might have devoted more resources in addressing the issue of health
disparity, developed state agencies to handle this particular policy issue, and have
more experiences in managing collaborative efforts in care delivery. Thus, states
that are leaders in adopting the federal goal of eliminating racial disparities might
exhibit less disparities than states that are laggards. 13
13Although I expect that government commitment in financial and human resources and policy
initiatives might work to reduce health disparities, they work through different mechanisms. As
discussed in the theoretical section, changes in disparities will occur only when a neutral policy
treatment benefits the minority (at-risk) group more. This is possible because of the heterogeneous
policy responses. State initiatives as policy treatments with specific targets, are expected to
generate more relative gains for the minority group by design.
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H1: Increased monetary capacity in healthcare in states with more human resources will
decrease racial disparities in health.
H2: Increased human resources in healthcare in states with higher monetary capacity
will decrease racial disparities in health.
H3: State initiatives in minority health are negatively associated with racial disparities
in health.
Variables and Measures
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, I pool state-level data on racial disparities,
state capacity in public healthcare, state policy initiatives on minority health, and
a series of socioeconomic indicators from 1990 to 2006.14
Racial Disparities in Health. In the public health literature, there is a lack
of consensus on how to measure health disparities (Braveman 2006; Keppel et
al. 2005; Scanlan 2006). Both health indicators and disparity indicators can be
measured by different quantities, such as rates, proportions, percentages, etc.
“Measurement choices can affect both the size and direction of disparity measured
at a point in time and conclusions about the size and direction of changes in
disparity over time (Keppel et al. 2005, 1).” Hence, it is important to be precise
in terms of what health indicators are chosen to measure health disparities and
how disparity measures are calculated.
The ability to protect the most vulnerable members of the population – infants
– is generally recognized as an indicator of a society’s competence. Following this
reasoning, “infant mortality rates are often used as one of the major important
14The panel data include fifty states. Washington D.C. is not included.
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indicators of the health and well-being of a society (Sullivan and Sheffrin 2003,
474).”15 Keppel et al. (2005) and Scanlan (2006) also contend that a reliable
measure of health disparities should be constructed by choosing a common
reference point.16 Therefore, I use infant mortality rates to calculate racial
disparities in health. In this essay, I choose whites as the reference group and
calculate disparity scores based on the Black-to-white ratios: 17
Disparity =
Rb
Rw
(3)
Based on the panel data, there are varying racial disparities across fifty states.
As for the Black-to-white ratios of infant mortality rates, the average disparity
score ranges from 1.91 to 3.04. 18
Public Healthcare Spending. The monetary capacity of state healthcare systems is
measured by per capita public spending on health and hospitals. Data for the total
spending are drawn from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
15Infant mortality rates are defined as the number of infant deaths (one year of age or younger)
per 1,000 live births.
16They also argue that if comparisons are made between two groups, the group with more
favorable outcomes should be used as the reference point.
17Keppel et al. (2005) provide a thorough discussion on methodological issues in measuring
health disparities and recommend three ways for measuring disparities in relative terms: simple
difference (Rb − Rw), ratio( RbRw ), and percentage difference (Rb−RwRw × 100). I calculate the racial
disparity measure by using the three equations. The correlation between the percentage difference
measure and the ratio measure is 1. The correlation between the difference measure and the other
two measures are both 0.89. Because the ratio measure is simple for calculation, takes a positive
value, and is easy to interpret, I choose to use the ratio measure.
18One concern of measuring racial difference based on outcome ratios is that, they do
not capture factors that might cause changes both in the numerator and the denominator
simultaneously (Yates and Fording 2005). Hence, it is important not to over analyze the relative
differences between two group outcomes and it might be better to examine how the same set
of social/political determinants affects each group separately, i.e. to compare differences in
marginal effects instead of to compare differences in outcomes. In the subsequent section for
empirical analysis, I first analyze how the state healthcare systems affect Blacks and whites
differently by estimating systems of regressions of Black and white infant mortality rates as two
dependent variables. I then provide additional analysis by using the racial disparity measure as
the dependent variable.
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Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services Expenditure Reports. I include three
components in the public spending measure: federal aid to state, state spending,
and local spending.19
Human Resources. I measure human resources for public healthcare by assess-
ing the size of the public sector in healthcare at two governmental levels: the
state and the local-level. I draw data from the Census Bureau Annual Survey on
Government Employment and Payroll.20
The human resource measure is calculated as a health professional-to-clientele
ratio:
Human Resources =
The Number of State and Local Public Health Employees
10,000 Residential Population
(4)
State Initiatives on Minority Health. I create a dummy variable to measure state
initiatives in promoting minority health. This variable is coded as 1 after any
form of the initiatives has been launched and 0 otherwise. For example, in May
1991, Alabama established the Minority Health Section within the Alabama State
Department of Primary Care and Rural Health to facilitate local and state-level
19The specific expenditure report I use is Annual Health Expenditures by State and Provider. The
annual total spending data are adjusted into 2000 constant dollars.
20The survey provides data on full-time and part-time employment, part-time hours worked,
full-time equivalent employment, and payroll statistics by governmental function. Data from 1992
to 2006 are accessed from the historical data archive. Data in 1990 and 1991 are coded from Census
Bureau Annual Statistical Abstract. Specifically, I use the state summary tables in Section 8: “State
and Local Government Finances and Employment ” and “State and Local Government Full-Time
Equivalent Employment by Selected Function and State.” Data in years before 1994 do not separate
hospitals from public health, data in years after 1994 have disaggregated information for these
two categories. I use the total number combining both categories. Community and social workers,
part-time employees, and professionals in the private sector are not included.
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partnerships for addressing health disparities in Alabama. State Initiatives, are
coded as 1 for Alabama from 1992 to 2006 and 0 in 1990 and 1991.21
Access to Other Healthcare Resources. Beside government spending on health
and public healthcare professionals, individuals might have access to other
healthcare resources, such as care and service provided by the private sector
or the non-governmental third party. Hence, I include two other indicators for
measuring access to healthcare resources. Health Insurance refers to the percent
of state population who are not covered by health insurance programs.22 The
variable Physicians refers to the number of active physicians per 100,000 residential
population. Shi et al. (2004) find that after controlling for state-level education,
unemployment, and population demographics, primary care physician supply is
negatively associated with infant mortality rates. Therefore, I control for physician
supply in all empirical models.23
21Although all fifty states have adopted the federal goal in eliminating health disparities,
they enforce the policy goals through various channels, such as executive orders, state
legislations, and bureaucratic reorganization. A common practice of bureaucratic reorganization
is to set a special office for minority health either within the state health department or as
an independent agency. Some states only appointed a state coordinator or contact within
their health agencies for minority health without providing a specific plan with time-lines
for implementation. I do not code these cases as 1. Coding decisions are based on a
comprehensive policy summary by NCSL(National Center for State Legislations),“State Profiles:
Minority Health and Health Equity Offices.” The accessed version is updated in September, 2010.
www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/DisparitiesStateProfiles/tabid/14299/Default.aspx.
22The span of health insurance is used as a measure of individuals’ access to healthcare
resources. Data for the span of health insurance are drawn from “The Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS).” The ASEC to CPS is
a Census Bureau survey of about 78,000 households and includes detailed health insurance
questions asked of the household respondent for every household resident. I access data from
1999 to 2006 from the ASEC Historical Tables (HIA Series), HIA-4 “Health Insurance Coverage
Status and Type of Coverage by State-All Persons: 1999 to 2008.” I access data from 1990 to
1999 from the ASEC Historical Tables (Original Series), “Health Insurance Coverage Status and
Type of Coverage by State-All Persons: 1987 to 2005.” All data are accessed from the webpage:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/historical/index.html.
23Data for physician supply by states and year are accessed from the Census Bureau Annual
Statistical Abstracts, “Health&Nutrition: healthcare Resources,” Table “Active Physicians and
Nurses by States.” The original data are collected by the American Medical Association, Chicago,
IL.
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Socioeconomic Controls. To isolate the impact of state capacity in healthcare
and state initiatives on racial disparities in health, I control for a series of
socioeconomic variables and demographic variables. Poverty is measured by
the percentage of the state population who are under the 100% poverty line.
Unemployment is measured by the annual state unemployment rates. These
two variables are included as proxies for state wealth and economic conditions.
Education is measured the percentage of the state population who at least have
a high school diploma. Aged Population is measured by the percentage of the
state population who are older than 65. Minority Population is measured as the
percentage of state population who are Black.24 I also include the Berry et al.
(1998) measure of State Liberalism.25
“Socio-environmental theories state that disparities in health exist because
of differences in race and ethnicity in the community context in which people
live (LaVeist 2005, 136).” As such, both socioeconomic conditions and state
political ideology can shape the socio-environmental contexts in which people
live. Racial disparities might be greater in states with poor socioeconomic
conditions. For instance, in states where the poor and less educated population
is large, and in states with poor economic conditions, state governments might
face resource constraints and less money can be spent on health disparity
issues. Political ideology can also affect social inequality. In the United States,
“ideology differences in economic philosophy and distributional priorities are
especially striking in the realm of taxation policy (Bartels 2009, 54).” Liberal
24Data for Poverty, Education, Aged, and Black Population are drawn from the Census Bureau
American Community Survey (ACS). Data for Unemployment are drawn from U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, “Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment.”
25I use the “Revised 1960-2008 State Ideology Series” from Richard Fording’s website,
http://www.uky.edu/ rford/stateideology.html.
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states might raise higher tax revenues and spend more on healthcare issues
than conservative states. Hence, it could be a reasonable expectation that state
liberalism is negatively associated with racial disparities in health. In addition to
the aforementioned socio-environmental controls, I also include teen birth rates
by race as a proxy for behavior risks. Teen birth rates are included as proxies
for behavior risks, because according to medical and health studies, teenage
childbearing is strongly associated with both infant mortality rates and low birth
weight infant rates (Corcoran 1998; Ventura et al. 2001).
Methods and Model Specification
Missing Data. I construct the dataset for the empirical analysis by pooling data
for fifty states from 1990 to 2006. Due to the presence of missing data, the pooled
dataset includes unbalanced panels. Some of the missing values are because of
incomplete archives. The missing values in infant mortality rates, however, are
due to suppressed data in the CDC archive.26 Conducting statistical analysis only
including observed values is problematic and could introduce bias, because data
are not missing in a random manner (Hocker and King 2010). For filling the
missing values I use both mean interpolation and the Multiple Imputation (MI)
procedure (King et al. 2001).27
Model Specification. The empirical assessment has two purposes: firstly, to
assess if there are heterogeneous policy responses across racial groups; and
26Missing data for Black infant mortality rates mainly occur in the following states: Alaska,
Maine, New Hampshire, Hawaii, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. Data are
suppressed by CDC because the reported events are less than 20 and are not reliable. In other
words, if these suppressed values were used for calculating racial disparities, both the direction
and the magnitude of racial differences will be changed.
27Table 12 in the Appendix reports details for data imputation. The reported MI values are
means based on five imputed datasets.
43
secondly, to evaluate the effects of policy treatments on health disparities between
whites and Blacks. Hence, I estimate two sets of models. First, I implement a
system of equations for Black and white infant mortality rates using the Seemingly
Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) (Zellner 1962). This statistical approach
is chosen for two theoretical considerations. One consideration is that the SURE
method can generate two sets of slope coefficients for each racial group, so that I
can compare the relative policy effects across the two groups. The second reason
is that some unmeasured factors affecting the infant mortality rates for one group
might also affect the other group. Estimating the two equations separately (e.g.
an OLS estimation) will generate inefficient estimation because cross-regression
error correlations are useful information for understanding the overall changes in
health outcomes. SURE is a more useful approach in situations, whereby changes
in the overall measure (of some outcomes) are driven by different changes in
sub-group measures (Martin and Smith 2005; Smith 2006). In the case of assessing
Black-to-white ratios of infant mortality rates, changes in both Black and white
IMRs will affect changes in the ratio measure, hence it is more helpful to use the
SUR estimator than to the OLS estimator.
To assess the overall policy effects on racial disparities in health, I estimate
a FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least Square) model for panel data. Given that
I include 17 years of data for each state, I first examine if the dependent
variables – Black infant mortality rates, white infant mortality rates, and the racial
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disparity index– are panel stationary. I find all the dependent variables are panel
stationary.28
Baltagi (2008) and Beck and Katz (1995) argue that if data have panel level
heteroskedasticity and panel unit-root is detected in the dependent variable,
using a lagged dependent variable with panel corrected standard errors is a
more efficient specification. According to Baltagi (2008), this model specification
is efficient only when spatial auto-correlation is present and there is no serial
auto-correlation. Hence, as a second step to specify the model, I perform
statistical tests on error structures. I perform Arellano and Bond Test (Arellano
& Bond 1991) for serial autocorrelation, the White Test, and the Modified Wald
Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity. Both serial autocorrelation and group-wise
heteroskedasticity are detected. Therefore, I use least squares with a lagged
dependent variable, panel-corrected standard errors, and an AR(1) correction for
serial autocorrelation.
The two key explanatory variables are public health spending and public
employees in healthcare. Both variables measure state capacities in providing
broad healthcare services. Given that government decisions in making spending
budgets and hiring decisions are made based on fiscal cycles, I take a one-year lag
for both variables. The theoretical framework, moreover, informs an interactive
model to determine how human resources and monetary capacity in healthcare
28I perform the Fisher Test for panel unit-root (Maddala and Wu 1999). Fisher’s test assumes
that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that at least one
series in the panel is stationary (Im, Pesaran, and Shin 2003). Hence, insignificant Chi-square
statistics indicate the presence of unit-root. I perform three variants of the Fisher Test: with
lag=2, with a Phillips-Perron specification, and with an Augmented Dickey-Fuller specification.
Test results consistently show that both Black and white infant mortality rates are not panel
stationary. The test statistics based on the Phillips-Perron specification with 1-period lag are as
follows: (1) for Black infant mortality rates, χ2(100)=549.449, p=0.000; (2) for white infant mortality
rates,χ2(100)=210.245, p=0.000; and (3) for the racial disparity index, χ2(100)=210.245, p=0.000.
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interactively influence implementation outcomes– changes in racial disparities
in health. Thus, I include interaction terms between human resources and
monetary capacity in the model specification.29 The model equation is specified
as following, in which i and t index the state and year observations.
Model Equation:
Racial Disparitiesit = B0 +B1Racial Disparitiesi,(t−1)+
B2Healthcare Spendingi,(t−1) +B3Public Health Insuranceit+
B4Human Resourcesi,(t−1) +B5Human Resourcesi,(t−1)
×Healthcare Spendingi,(t−1) +B6State Initiativesit+
B7State Liberalism(it) +B8Controlsit + it
(5)
2.6 Empirical Findings
Heterogeneous Policy Responses by Race
Table 1 reports the empirical results obtained from the SUR estimation.30 Overall,
Table 1 shows heterogeneous policy responses based on race. Firstly, findings
on how access to healthcare resources and economic conditions are consistent
29One concern of including an interaction term is that it leads to the problem of
multi-collinearity by adding correlated variance into the model. It is also possible that monetary
capacity and human resources in healthcare are positively correlated to each other as they both
indicate organizational capacity in the state healthcare systems. I checked for the variance inflation
factor (VIF) statistics after estimating an OLS model and not surprisingly, the highest VIF value
is associated with the interaction term. The VIF for the interaction term is 5.73 and for the two
corresponding linear terms are 4.60 (spending) and 2.22 (human resource). These, however, are
not abnormally high VIF values given the nature of the model specification (Kam and Franzese
2007). I also checked for the correlations between the spending measure and the human resource
measure by running a factor analysis. The purpose is to assess if these two indicators represent the
latent concept–organizational capacity– along the same dimension. I used principle factor analysis
and the results suggest that these two indicators do not load in the same factor (with an Eigenvalue
of 0.93).
30The model equation for the SUR estimation take the same specification, except that it includes
a system of two equations, one uses white infant mortality rates as the dependent variable and the
other uses Black infant mortality rates as the dependent variable. The variable Unemployment is
differenced because this variable is also panel non-stationary.
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with the existing literature. Physician supply is negatively associated with both
Black and white infant mortality rates. Lacking of health insurance coverage may
increase both Black and white infant mortality rates. Also, increases in the poverty
rates and unemployment rates will lead to an increase in white infant mortality
rates. Increases in unemployment rates are also positively associated with Black
infant mortality rates.
The magnitudes of how these variables affect the two groups, however, are
different. The coefficients of Physicians are -0.015 and -0.002 in the equations
for Black and white IMRs, respectively. This suggests that increasing physician
supply may reduce infant mortality rates for Blacks more than for whites. The
coefficients of Health Insurance are 0.032 (in the equation for white IMRs) and 0.139
(in the equation for Black IMRs), which mean that lacking of health insurance
coverage adds disproportionate health burdens on Blacks. The comparison of the
two coefficients is stark: a one-unit increase in the percentage of the uninsured
population leads to an increase in Black infant mortality rates by 0.139, and an
increase in white infant mortality rates by 0.032. A similar comparison can be
found in the coefficients of changes in unemployment: the coefficients are 0.050
(in the equation for white IMRs) and 0.209 (in the equation for Black IMRs).
This means that on average, increases in unemployment will add more burdens
on Blacks than on whites. A one-unit increase in the unemployment rate only
increases white infant mortality rates by 0.050, but may lead to an increase in
Black infant mortality rates by 0.209.
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Table 1: Heterogeneous Policy Responses to Public Healthcare Provisions in Fifty
U.S. States, 1990-2006
White Rate Black Rate
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
State Healthcare Provisions
Public Spendingt−1 -0.001** (0.0003) -0.002* (0.001)
Human Resourcet−1 0.003 (0.002) -0.010 (0.010)
Public Spendingt−1 3.82e-06 (3.57e-06) 0.00002 0.0001
×Human Resourcet−1
Healthcare Access
Physicians -0.002** (0.001) -0.015** (0.002)
No Health Insurance 0.032** (0.007) 0.139** (0.036)
Political and Policy Factors
State Initiatives 0.124** (0.016) -0.401** (0.214)
State Liberalism 0.002** (0.008) -0.011 (0.008)
Socioeconomic Controls
% White/Black Population 0.006 (0.002) 0.019 (0.013)
% Aged Population 0.034** (0.010) 0.122** (0.054)
Education 0.001 (0.003) 0.027* (0.014)
Poverty 0.037** (0.010) -0.255 (0.040)
∆Unemployment 0.050* (0.019) 0.209* (0.123)
Teen Birth Rates 0.028** (0.006) 0.025** (0.008)
Infant Mortality Ratet−1 0.424** (0.030) 0.309** (0.032)
Intercept 1.649* (0.904) 0.431 (3.033)
N 800 800
R2 0.5839 0.3143
Notes:
1. * p < .10, two-tailed t-test. ** p < .05, two tailed t-test
2. The dependent variables are Black and white infant mortality rates.
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Turn to the three key policy variables – per capita public spending in health,
public healthcare employees, and state initiatives on minority health –, Table 1
shows that both public health spending and state initiatives on minority health
impact Blacks and whites differently. As for the public healthcare spending, the
coefficient in the Black equation is as twice large as the coefficient in the white
equation, meaning that when human resources equal to 0, increases in public
spending lead to more reduction in the Black infant mortality rates than in the
white infant mortality rates. The values of both coefficients are small, because this
variable is scaled based on per capita spending. The effects of increasing states’
financial capacity are in fact meaningful if we consider greater increases in the per
capita spending.
To illustrate the policy effects substantively, I calculated the predicted infant
mortality rates for both Blacks and whites based on different levels of public
healthcare spending. Figure 6 shows the substantive impact of public healthcare
spending on infant mortality rates for both races.31 As Figure 6 suggests, Black
infant mortality rates can decrease substantively if the per capita public spending
on health is increased from $500 to $1,000. When states spend more than $1,500
per person, the mean-predicted Black infant mortality rates are less than 13 deaths
per 1,000 live births.
31In Figure 6, the predicted Black and white infant mortality rates are generated based on the
SURE analysis in Table 1. The variable, State Initiatives on Minority Health, is set to be 0. All other
variables are held at their means.
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Figure 6: Predicted White and Black Infant Mortality Rates with 95% Confidence
Intervals
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Table 2 further presents predicted infant mortality rates based on different
levels of public health spending and the corresponding number of infant deaths
in both racial groups. It is also worth to note the comparison based on different
ways to gauge the substantive policy effects. One the one hand, increasing states’
financial capacity in health decreases both Black and white infant mortality rates
in a significant way. One the other hand, we see that the same amount of public
financial commitment can save more white babies than Black babies with respect
to their population sizes. With respect to the group population sizes, the health
risk that each Black newborn faces is still higher than the health risk that each
white newborn has. This may also suggest that although programs on promoting
minority health may work more effectively in reducing racial disparities than
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those broader policies designed at the population-level, politically they may be
less viable if group competition exist between Blacks and whites.
Table 2: Predicted Infant Mortality Rates and Number of Infant Deaths Based on
Public Healthcare Spending
Per Capita White IMR Black IMR
Public Spending (# White Infant Deaths) (# Black Infant Deaths)
150 6.559 (15,262) 15.546 (9,697)
194 6.513 (15,031) 15.452 (9,672)
310 6.390 (14,776) 14.977 (9,394)
418 6.275 (14,522) 14.743 (9,239)
528 6.259 (14,474) 14.375 (9,016)
795 6.105 (14,118) 14.176 (8,892)
1200 5.946 (13,750) 13.282 (8,331)
1400 5.644 (13,051) 12.875 (8,076)
1750 5.315 (12,291) 11.544 (7,240)
Number of 2,312,473 627,230
New Borns(2007)
Notes:
1. Predicted Black and white infant mortality rates are generated based on the SURE
analysis in Table 1.
2. The variable for state initiatives on minority health is set to be 0 and all other
variables are held at their means and
3. Predicted number of infant deaths are reported in parentheses. They are calculated
based on the total number of Black and white new borns in 2007.
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Improving State Capacities vs. Focusing on Minority Health
Different from the policy inputs in building state capacities in healthcare, policy
initiatives on promoting minority health exhibit significant but substantively
different impacts on Black and white infant mortality rates. The coefficient of
State Initiatives in the white equation is positive (0.124), but in the Black equation
it is negative. It means that states with legislative mandates or executive orders
on promoting minority health have higher white infant mortality rates, but lower
Black infant mortality rates than state without these policy initiatives. Comparing
the two types of policy designs, the underlying mechanisms for how they may
reduce racial disparities are different. Policies that enhance state capacities in
healthcare do not explicitly target the minority group and could generate policy
benefits for both groups, but not necessarily decrease racial disparities. Policies
that explicitly target the minority group may be more effective in reducing health
risks for Blacks, but may not benefit whites.
The aforementioned findings also imply that in some states, relatively small
racial gaps might be caused by relatively high white infant mortality rates. Similar
patterns are also found in terms of how poverty affects racial disparities in Black
and white infant mortality rates. Table 3 reports the results of the FGLS estimation
for the racial disparity measure. As Table 3 shows, poverty has a negative and
significant association with the disparity measure. This might be counter-intuitive
at the first glance. Substantively, it means that health disparities are greater in
states with less poor people and are smaller in states with more poor people. It
is possible that, when there are more poor people in some states, both whites and
minorities are doing worse in health thus the racial differences become smaller.
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Policy Responses and Racial Disparities in Health: Black-
to-White Ratios of Infant Mortality Rates, 1990-2006
Variable Coefficient (PCSEs)
State Healthcare Systems
Public Spendingt−1 0.003** (0.001)
Human Resourcet−1 -0.001 (0.001)
Public Spendingt−1
× Human Resourcet−1 -0.0003** (0.00001)
Healthcare Access
Physicians -0.014** (0.005)
No Health Insurance 0.156** (0.071)
Political and Policy Factors
State Initiatives -0.178** (0.061)
State Liberalism -0.011 (0.015)
Socioeconomic Controls
% Black Population 0.003 (0.003)
% Aged Population -0.004 (0.009)
Education 0.004* (0.002)
Poverty -0.020** (0.007)
∆Unemployment 0.154** (0.032)
Minority Teen Birth Rates 0.001 (0.002)
Health Disparityt−1 0.164** (0.082)
Intercept 1.932** (0.339)
N 800
R2 0.150
ρ 0.108
Notes:
1. * p < .10, two-tailed t-test. ** p < .05, two tailed t-test.
2. The dependent variable is measured by Black-to-white ratios of infant mortality
rates.
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In relatively wealthier states, minorities are disproportionally worse off in
their health status, thus the disparity measures become bigger. This pattern
has been found in some of the state comparisons. For example, the average
poverty rate in Louisiana is 20.4% while the average poverty rate in Wisconsin
is around 9%. Based on the poverty measure, Wisconsin is much wealthier than
Louisiana. The average health disparity score (based on Black-to-white ratios) in
Wisconsin (2.97), however, is larger than it is in Louisiana (2.18). The average
white infant mortality rate in Louisiana (6.67) is higher than it is in Wisconsin
(6.00). Despite that Wisconsin’s overall infant mortality rate has been decreases
during the past decade, racial disparities have persisted. Wisconsin’s rank based
on Black infant mortality has fallen from among the best rates in the country
to among the worst (Wisconsin Department of Health Services 2010). Nor do
the unusually high racial disparity scores occur in states with large minority
populations. States with relatively small minority population and less capacity
exhibit greater health disparities. This suggests that the state healthcare systems
and how relevant policy programs are implemented might have some salient
effects on racial disparities in health.32
Findings on state minority health initiatives and the poverty measure provide
the similarly policy story: in some states, policymakers may need to cope with
very high level of Black infant mortality rates and relatively high white infant
mortality rates. In theory, a more effective policy design for reducing racial
disparities is to provide more protection for the most disadvantaged group. In
practice, nevertheless, this may not always be the adopted design.
32Another possibility to see this statistical relationship is that there might be some endogenous
relationship between poverty and health disparities. Given this consideration, I checked for
possible endogenous relationship and by assessing if the racial disparity measure can predict the
poverty rates. I did not find such an endogenous relationship.
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When Might Neutrally-Designed Policies Work?
Given that there might be policy tradeoffs in choosing between enhancing the
overall state healthcare capacities and adopting more specific programs that target
the minority population, it is necessary to further assess when these broader
policies may work for reducing racial disparities. The interactive relationship
between states’ financial and human capacities may offer additional information
on when these broader policies may have substantively significant impact on
racial disparities. Because I interact the two variables for state healthcare capacity,
it is best to use graphical illustrations to gauge both the substantive and statistical
significance of their marginal effects on racial disparities (Brambor, Clark &
Golder 1994).
Figure 7 shows the marginal effects of per capita public health spending on
racial disparities conditioned by state healthcare human resources. According to
Figure 7, when there are deficits in healthcare human resources (approximately,
less than 50 public health employees per 10,000 population), increased public
health spending is associated with racial disparities between Blacks and whites.33
When human resources are ample in the state healthcare systems, increased public
spending on health begin to decrease racial disparities between Blacks and whites.
The marginal effects of spending on Black-to-white ratios of infant mortality rates
33The distribution of the human resource measure is skewed toward the low end. Sample
density is much higher when the human resource measure is less than 100 than when it is larger
than 100. This might raise the concern that the findings are driven by outlier observations, i.e.
state/year observations, in which the measurement score is large. To examine how such a skewed
sample might bias the empirical analysis, I performed sensitivity analysis by incrementally
dropping cases at each threshold value defined by the human resource measure. Table 13 in the
Appendix reports the results of sensitivity analysis for the overall model. Table 13 shows that the
model estimation is very consistent. I also perform the other two robustness checks: to jackknife
the sample by levels of the disparities and by year. Table 14 and Table 15 in the Appendix reports
the corresponding results.
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become negative and significant only when there are about more than 130 public
health employees per 10,000 residential population.
Figure 7: The Conditional Marginal Effects of Public Health Spending on Racial
Disparities in Health (Black-to-white Ratios, Infant Mortality Rates)
DV: Infant Mortality Rates, Black-to-White Ratios
DV: Infant Mortality Rates, Black-to-White Ratios
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Marginal Effects of Public Spending on Racial Disparity in Health
Figure 8 shows the marginal effects of healthcare human resources on racial
disparities conditioned by available public healthcare spending.34 As Figure 8
demonstrates, when there is a decrease in per capita public health spending,
increases in public healthcare human resources do not reduce health disparities
between Blacks and whites (i.e., the marginal effects are statistically insignificant).
34Both figures present the 90% confidence intervals. The marginal effects of public healthcare
human resources are not significant at the 95% level. See Figure 16 in the Appendix for a
comparison with Figure 8.
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Public healthcare professionals, however, can reduce health disparities between
Blacks and whites when the per capita public spendings is more than $800.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 exhibit empirical support for H1 and H2. They show
that public spending and human resources in state healthcare systems condition
each other in terms of reduce racial disparities in health. Although, on average, an
increase in public health spending may reduce racial disparities, its policy impact
in contingent upon whether there is sufficient healthcare workforce. Figure 7
and 8 also demonstrate an intriguing comparison in terms of how deprivation
in different types of healthcare resources may affect racial disparities differently.
Figure 8: The Conditional Marginal Effects of State Healthcare Human Resources
on Racial Disparities in Health (Black-to-white Ratios, Infant Mortality Rates)
DV: Infant Mortality Rates, Black-to-White Ratios
DV: Infant Mortality Rates, Black-to-White Ratios
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According to Figure 7, insufficient financial commitment does not increase
racial disparities, nor does it change the existing level of racial disparities.
According to Figure 8, however, deficits in state healthcare human resources
may increase racial disparities. This comparison indicates that state healthcare
professionals may affect not only the quantity but also the quality of healthcare
services provided to both groups.35 Why can not healthcare professionals generate
more relative gains for Blacks when there are not sufficient financial resources?
It may be because that group competitions for healthcare resources could be
intensive when resources are extremely limited than when resources are sufficient.
When facing resource deprivation, deficits of minority healthcare professionals
may lead to disproportionate burdens for minorities.36
In sum, broad and neutrally-designed policies in building state healthcare
capacities might work more effectively in states where both financial and human
resources are relatively ample. It is likely that high levels of resource deprivation
may be associated with high levels of group competition and add excessive
burdens on minorities. Programs that explicitly target the minority group may
be politically more viable in states with diverse demographics or larger minority
populations. Policymakers and healthcare administrators, nevertheless, also
need to deal with health risks for white infants, because the average white
35Here, quality of care refers to both the quality of medical technologies and the quality of
healthcare service. Some aspects of the healthcare quality may not be improved simply by
increasing monetary inputs.
36According to the Census-EEOC data on the demographic characteristics of different
healthcare occupations, Blacks are underrepresented in most healthcare occupations. This
structural feature exists in both the public and private sector. There are large deficits in
Black physicians and Black healthcare administrators in the healthcare workforce. The deficits,
moreover, are across all fifty states. According to the 2000 Census data, the percentages of Black
healthcare administrators range from 0 (in states such as Vermont and Maine) to 26.3 (Maryland).
The percentages of Black physicians range from 0 to 12.4. In 37 states, in addition, the percentages
of Black physicians were less than 5 (EEOC 1990, 2000).
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infant mortality rate is still much higher than those in most developed countries.
These complex underlying policy paradoxes help to explain why in the U.S., the
substantial decline in the national infant mortality rate has not led to reductions
in racial disparities between Black and white infant mortality rates.
2.7 Conclusion
Despite that “the evidence of racial disparities in health is persuasive and
remarkably consistent across a range of health conditions and procedures,” the
existing literature does not suffice for an unambiguous account for how disparities
could be reduced (Smedley et al. 2003, 125). While the federal and state
governments have continued in devoting efforts to address the issue of racial
disparities in health, little research has been done in assessing what bureaucratic
and administrative conditions can contribute to promote minority health and
reduce racial disparities in health. The disconnection between theory and practice
is unsatisfactory. Theories in public administration and policy implementation
could inform a useful framework to understand how political factors are linked
to the persistent problem of health inequality. Most policy studies, however,
emphasize on gauging policy effects at the population-level. In this research, I
provide a theoretical framework that connects the bureaucratic characteristics of
the state healthcare systems to heterogeneous policy responses by race. The key
for understanding changes in racial disparities hinges on whether a policy design
could generate relative gains for the minority group in states.
I find that both monetary capacity and human resources in the state healthcare
systems matter for managing the issue of racial disparities in health. The
relationship between state capacity in policy implementation and policy outcomes
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is more complex than the existing literature describes. Different components
of bureaucratic capacity condition each other in terms of how they influence
healthcare outcomes. The effects of monetary capacity on healthcare outcomes are
conditioned by healthcare human resources. This interactive relationship occurs
because in a policy area such as public healthcare, solving policy problems not
only needs government spending, but also needs information and professional
knowledge carried out by public servants. Only improving the public healthcare
system on one dimension (such as only increasing financial resources, or hiring
more healthcare professionals) might not be sufficient to generate positive policy
outcomes.
The empirical findings also demonstrate that policy designs that specifically
target minority groups might work effectively for reducing racial disparities.
More broad and neutrally-designed policies, such as increasing the financial
inputs for the entire population, could be effective for reducing racial disparities
when resources are ample. When facing resource constraints, it is likely to be
ineffective in generating more relative gains for minorities. This raises a potential
paradox for public policymaking in healthcare: which policy designs should
policymakers choose to reduce racial disparities, the one is neutrally-designed or
the one that only targets minorities? While a policy that targets minorities might
be more effective in reducing health disparities, it is more difficult to gain political
support across race groups. A neutrally-designed policy may gain broad public
support, but such a policy does not always lead to a reduction in health disparities.
There are policy tradeoffs between the overall efficiency (to make improvement
for both groups) and the need to reduce racial disparities (to improve more for
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minorities). This policy paradox can become more challenging when states lack
the financial and human resources in healthcare.
The other possible challenge comes from how to deal with the persistent gap
across the races effectively. In the case of Black and white disparities in infant
mortality rates, while some policy treatments exhibit positive effects in reducing
racial disparities, substantively we still see more infant deaths among Blacks than
among whites with respect to their population sizes. This is a practical paradox
because it raises the question about how practitioners should empirically evaluate
racial differences in health status and health risks.
State initiatives on minority health, in addition, are found to be negatively
related to racial disparities in health. In this research, however, I only show
that states with these initiatives can do better in reducing racial disparities than
states that have not taken any substantive policy efforts. To date, all states have
established their minority health offices or entities, but they are organized and
managed differently (e.g. an office, commission, council, research center, or an
official contact within state health agencies, etc.). States also take their specific
ways of addressing most pressing issues among the needy populations. Do differ-
ent organizational forms and capacities matter for achieving the goal of reducing
racial disparities in health? Do these different organizational mechanisms affect
agencies’ ability in producing desired service performance? How do these state
entities on minority health coordinate their financial resources and human capital
in the administrative processes? Who manage these agencies and how they are
managed? Future studies that combine theories in policy studies and public
management are needed to extend both the theoretical and empirical scopes for
studying racial disparities in health.
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Last but not least, although race continues to be a salient factor that is
associated with health inequality, race might not be the only social source that
produces heterogenous policy responses and disparate health outcomes. The
theoretical framework of heterogeneous policy responses can be generalized
to other social dimensions including gender, income groups, age groups, etc.
Neutrally-designed policies might produce biased policy outcomes for some
groups in the society while benefiting others more if they fail to recognize the
heterogeneity in policy responses. In theory, it is necessary to consider group-level
diversity and use diversity as a causal variable for social inequality. In practice,
there are no simple solutions to social inequality. Both policy scholars and public
administrators should acknowledge the social heterogeneity that is associated
with various social equity issues. Public healthcare is one interesting issue area
to evaluate how diversity may be related to social inequality, but certainly, not the
only one.
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3. ANXIOUS GIRLS AND INACTIVE BOYS:
SOCIAL CAPITAL, PUBLIC HEALTH POLICIES,
AND GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CHILDHOOD OBESITY
3.1 Overview
There is a burgeoning literature on the concept of social capital and its influences
on population health. Numerous studies found that social capital is associated
with improvement in various population health outcomes. Improvement in
health outcomes, nevertheless, do not always occur uniformly across different
social groups. While social capital in general may improve public health, is it
also a key to understanding group differences in health outcomes?
In this research, I examine how social capital conditions the effectiveness of
public health policies, and its implications on gender differences in health. Taking
a timely policy issue – childhood obesity – as the empirical case, I explore the link
between state and local policy interventions, social capital, and health outcomes.
I combine three main concepts across U.S. states for the empirical analysis: health
outcomes data related to childhood obesity from 1991 to 2009, policy programs
designed to reduce and prevent childhood obesity, and measures for social capital.
I find that social capital conditions the effect of public health policies with regard
to managing childhood obesity. There are gender differences, moreover, in health
outcomes and behavioral responses to state and local-level obesity policies. The
empirical analysis also finds a mixed pattern in terms of how social capital and
public health policies interactively affect males and females.
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3.2 Introduction
Enhancing the effectiveness of government organizations and public policies has
captured increasing attention among scholars in both public administration and
health policy management (Boyne et al. 2005). Advocates of social capital and
communitarian theorists suggest that social capital is associated with effective
decision making and service performance by governmental agencies (Andrews
et al. 2008; Putnam 1993, 2000; Tam 1998; Uslaner 2004). The “social capital
thesis” has deeply influenced scholars in thinking about the effectiveness of
policymaking, substantive policy outcomes, and democracy. Empirical studies,
however, show that social capital might be a mixed blessing: on the one hand, the
concept encourages community support; on the other hand, it does not always
lead to better policy outcomes that benefit all social groups uniformly (Hero 2003).
There is little agreement, additionally, on if social capital is a key to understanding
different policy benefits across social groups.
This research fills the gap in the literature by linking social capital to public
health interventions and comparing their effects on different social groups. Using
gender as a lens to examine social strata, I provide a theoretical framework
that conceptualizes both the direct and indirect effect of social capital on health
inequality. I then use childhood obesity as an empirical case to test whether access
to social capital may explain the observed differences in health outcomes between
males and females.
I organize the subsequent sections in the following manner. First, I review the
literature on social capital and the effectiveness of public health policies. I then
layout a theoretical framework that posits the potential influence of social capital
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on health inequality. Based on this theoretical framework, I propose an interaction
model for testing the link between social capital, public health policies, and
gender differences in health. Finally, I analyze data on childhood obesity across
forty three states to test the proposed hypotheses. I conclude with a discussion on
the theoretical and practical implications of considering social capital as a key to
understanding effective policymaking for health inequality.
3.3 Social Capital and Health: The Literature
Social capital is an expansive concept that has received considerable attention
from social scientists in the past few decades (Lin, Cook & Burt 2008). The concept
of social capital stems from the sociology literature (Blau 1967; Bourdieu 1986;
Coleman 1988; Lin 2001) and is developed by Robert Putnam’s seminal work,
Making Democracy Work (1993). Putnam (1993, 1995) broadly defines social capital
as an asset that is inherent in social relations, trust, and networks. Putnam’s col-
lective approach of social capital emphasizes the community-level characteristics
such as civic engagement, network associability, as well as reciprocity and trust
among community members (Putnam 2000).37
37Lin (2001) offers a detailed comparison of individual and collective approaches of social
capital in the extensive sociology literature. According to Lin (2001), the individual approach of
social capital follows the Marxian tradition of taking capital as the theoretical foundation. Social
capital is deemed as individuals’ investment in social relationships and “how individuals capture
the embedded resources in the relations to generate a return (21).” The collective approach of social
capital, on the contrary, emphasizes the community and societal level features, such as social
structures, networks within and across social groups, etc. Lin, Cook, and Burt (2008) point out
that “one major controversy in the social capital literature is whether social capital is a collective
or an individual good (9).” Theoretically, it is essential to differentiate the individual and collective
approaches, because they inform different empirical measures of social capital. In this research,
I adopt the collective approach of social capital, because the theoretical focus is to investigate
how macro-level policy interventions and community conditions may interactively affect health
outcomes of different social groups.
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One recent theoretical development in the social capital literature leads to
a distinction between the cognitive (trust) and structural components (network
associability and civic engagement) of social capital (Bain and Hicks 1998; Song,
Son and Lin 2009; Wall et al. 1998).38 The literature on civic engagement and
network associability, in particular, substantiates the relationship between social
capital and effective policymaking. For example, Barnes and Walker (1996) argue
that public organizations that receive more public support, and engage citizens
in public service decisions can reap dividends for service quality. Rice (2001)
finds that civic engagement and community support are positively related to
administrative effectiveness. Coffe and Geys (2005) show that active citizens
(i.e. civic engagement) can positively influence financial management at the
local-level.
Adding to this body of research on social capital and effective policymaking,
is the growing literature on how active communities are associated with improve-
ment in public health. There is a well documented statistical association between
state-level measures of civic participation and various public health indicators.
Kawachi et al. (1997) find that community-level social capital, combined with
38Wall et al. (1998) contend that diverse conceptualization of social capital creates more
confusion than clarity and could weaken the theoretical power of the concept. In the social capital
literature, there is no consensus on how different social capital concepts can be integrated into
a unified framework. In practice, however, scholars tend to separate trust and reciprocity from
the other two components (network associability and civic engagement). The practical reason
for separating trust from network associability and civic engagement is that trust is one of the
most difficult concepts to measure directly (Blaxter 2004). The theoretical reason for separating
trust from network associability and civic engagement is that trust refers the cognitive component
of social capital and is largely driven by perceptions and norms of reciprocity, while network
associability and civic engagement refer to the structural components of social capital. Studies find
that trust, as a subjective measure of social capital, do not always correlated with less subjective
measures of social capital (e.g. civic engagement and participation) at both the individual and
aggregated level (Brehm and Rahn 1997). In a few empirical studies on social capital, trust is also
treated as a distinctive concept from civic engagement and participation (Hero 2001; Uslaner and
Brown 2005).
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income inequality, can explain state-level variations in population mortality. They
report a negative association between state-level civic participation and mortality
rates. Gold et al. (2002) find the similar link between state-level measures of civic
participation and behavioral health indicators, such as teen birth rates. Scholars
also find that a higher level of civic engagement is associated with better recall
of health messages and thus lead to more effective public health interventions
for cardiovascular disease (Viswanath et al. 2006), mental health and psychiatric
morbidity (Lauder, Kroll and Jones 2007), daily smoking and drinking (Carpiano
2007), as well as drug use (Winstanley et al. 2008), etc.
Though scholars have found consistent evidence for linking social capital to
favorable health outcomes, far less is known about whether different social groups
within the same community gain health improvement equally. Those scholars,
who use aggregated measures of social capital health outcomes in their empirical
analyses, often assume that social capital may affect various social groups in a
homogenous way.
Only a few scholars have acknowledged that the link between social capital
and favorable health outcomes may be altered by disaggregating health outcomes
based on different social groups. Albritton (1990) and Hero (1998) find that “the
relationship of social capital to minority infant mortality does not indicate worse
outcomes for minorities; but neither are the outcomes any better (Hero 1998, 78).”
Lochner et al. (2003) report mixed findings on how social capital affect different
race groups’ health outcomes. They find that civic participation decreases heart
disease rates only for whites, not for Blacks. In their study on social capital and
health risk behaviors (smoking and drinking), Chuang and Chuang (2008) report
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evidence from Taiwan that there are differential effects of social capital between
genders. Strong effects of social capital are found for women, but not for men.
Mixed findings across different social groups suggest that it is necessary to
develop a theoretical framework that conceptually differentiates health inequality
(i.e. group differences in health) from the overall population health outcomes.
Most prior studies conceptualize social capital as a plausible contextual determi-
nant of health (or other good policy outcomes), and do not consider the potential
link between social capital and inequality. It may be conceivable that resources
embedded in social structures can be mobilized to serve different group interests.
The extent to which social capital may generate different group returns is a critical
issue for pressing the research agenda on social capital and inequality. This
issue, nevertheless, is understudied in the theoretical literature and is unexplored
in the empirical literature. Empirical studies that find no significant statistical
relationship between social capital and group-based health outcomes, in addition,
indicate that the relationship between social capital and health outcomes may take
different forms: the relationship may be nonlinear or may not be there.
3.4 Social Capital, Policy Interventions, and Group Differences in Health:
An Integrated Framework
Although the literature on social capital and health is extensive, is dose not
provide an integrated framework that uses social capital as a causal variable
to explain health inequality. The literature, furthermore, is tenuous and less
informative on whether social capital has a direct or indirect impact on health
inequality across social groups. Limited theoretical exploration of the causal link-
ages between social capital, policy interventions, and health inequality diminishes
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the usefulness of social capital as a variable for research on effective policymaking
in public healthcare.
The Link between Social Capital and Health Inequality
Health inequality refers to the difference “in which disadvantaged social groups
such as the poor, racial/ethnic minorities, women and other groups who have
persistently experienced social disadvantage or discrimination systematically
experience worse health or greater health risks than most advantaged social
groups (Braveman 2006,167).” Whether social capital might be associated with
health inequality remains to be unclear in the empirical literature (Carlson and
Chamberlain 2003). Prior empirical studies, however, provide a foundation for
advancing the concept of social capital in relation to health inequality. Kennedy et
al. (1998) find that, after controlling for income inequality and average education
attainment, social associations in the community can benefit whites more than
Blacks. Raphael et al. (2001) and Cattell (2001) provide insights that “poverty
alone does not cause poor social relations (Carlson and Chamberlain 2003, 330).”
Variations in community norms and social interactions explain health differences
between comparable low-income neighborhoods.
These empirical findings suggest that group differences in health may be
partially caused by different social norms and community conditions. The
micro-level mechanism that links social capital to health inequality is that social
networks can provide resources and information to individuals who have access
to the networks. An individual who has stronger social ties and is more integrated
in community-based activities may possess more resources and information than
an individual who has less social capital. Hendryx et al. (2002) contend that
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well-connected individuals are more informed on health risks and how to find
access to local health services. Studies have shown that health information affects
individuals’ health behaviors, preventive actions, and their decisions in choosing
healthcare services (Dutta-Bergman 2004; Langlie 1977; Ronis 1992).
An alternative mechanism to health information seeking is the maintenance
of health behavioral norms through informal social control and the psychological
process that provides affective support (Kawachi and Berkman 2000). MuCulloch
(2001) contends that social capital applied is related to features of a community
that build cohesion, increase a sense of belonging, and enable community
members to cooperate. Therefore people with live in a well connected community
may have better mental and physical health than people who live with less
social capital. He finds that people in the lowest categories of social capital have
increased risk of psychiatric morbidity.
Muntaner and Lynch (1999) turn from the relational aspect of social capital
to its political implications. They assert that social interactions and networks can
also be a source of inequalities in power (e.g. class or gender relations). Social
networks and interactions create group memberships, which may benefit in-
group members rather than out-group members. This is an important extension
to the access-to-information argument and the social cohesion argument, because
powerlessness plays a role in health inequality (Hawe and Shiell 2000).
In sum, social capital may not only diverge individuals’ access to health
information and health services, but also create social powers for individuals in
the society. It could empower individuals who are with more social ties and who
participate more in community activities. When the consequences and benefits of
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social capital are not equally distributed among individuals in the society, it may
become a cause rather than a cure for health inequality.
Which Group Has More Social Capital? The Capital Deficit Argument
As aforementioned, social networks and civic engagement may not generate
equally distributed benefits (in terms of health promotion) at the individual level.
The micro-level mechanisms alone, however, are not sufficient to connect social
capital to health inequality between groups. If health inequality is driven by
comparative disadvantage of one social group to another, then it is necessary
to further theorize whether social capital can be linked to systematic differences
between social groups. French sociologist Bourdieu is the pioneer in theorizing
social networks as a source of social stratification. Bourdieu (1986) conceptualizes
that sources of social capital are embedded in durable networks, which produce
institutionalized relationships of mutual recognition (i.e. group membership). So-
cial institutions, according to Bourdieu (1986), motivate within-group exchanges
and benefit group members in an exclusive manner (249-251).
Empirical studies confirm Bourdieu’s social-stratification thesis. Hero (1998)
observes that in the U.S., racial diversity influences state politics and distributive
effects of various public policies. Using multiple policy cases (e.g. education,
health, and welfare), Hero finds that minorities are better off relative to whites
only in states with higher level of racial diversity. Focusing on health service
utilization, Lee (2008) finds differences in women’s and men’s social capital,
which in turn affect their utilization of health services related to HIV/AIDS
prevention. Gigengil and O’Neill (2006a, 3) substantiate that men and women
socialize themselves into different social organizations and networks. They note
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that ”men are much more likely than women to spend their leisure time in sports
activities...women, meanwhile, are more likely than men to undertake voluntary
work related to health, social services, and education.”
Though focusing on different social group identities, these studies produce
a common theoretical argument: both quantity (i.e. how much social capital)
and quality (i.e. what types of social ties and organizational memberships) of
social capital may be different across social groups. If social capital in general
produces positive social outcomes, then the group that has more social capital
may generate more social returns than the group that has less access to social
capital. Similarly, different types of social ties and organizational memberships
may produce different social benefits. Turning to the context of healthcare, if
members in group A are socialized more with healthcare organizations than
members in group B, then it is expected that group A may generate more positive
health comes than group B. To sum, it is the deficit in social capital for a particular
social group that puts this group in a socially disadvantaged position. This capital
deficit argument is applicable to different social group identities, it may help to
explain both racial and gender differences in health.
Would the Same Social Capital Generate Different Group Returns?
Prior studies suggest that social capital may channel individuals’ access to health
information, empower individuals in the society, and increase collective resources
that may benefit mental and physical health. These findings may support the
political imperative of building good and healthy communities. It is still unclear,
however, whether building social capital may generate equal returns for different
groups. Lin (2001) substantiates that, social capital is by no means always good.
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It is similar to physical capital, human capital, or any other forms of capital
in that it can generate different group returns. According to Lin (2001,100),
inequality may rise if given the same amount of resources, one group is capable
in generating more returns than another group. Lin’s return-deficit argument is
a complimentary mechanism to the power-resource argument in two ways. First,
this proposed mechanism takes account into the possibility that the same level
of social capital and similar types of civic activities may generate different group
returns.
It is well documented in public health and epidemiology studies that norms
and values regarding health and health-related behaviors vary across social
groups, such that some groups may be more resistant to the influences of their
social environment. Similar community conditions and social ties may coexist
with different social norms for men and women. For example, Chuang and
Christakis (2005) find that women are more likely to face high social penalty
for being overweight than men. Although social networks are found to have
protective effects on people’s health (Herzog et al. 2002; Michael et al. 2001),
they do not necessarily benefit social groups equally.
Second, the return-deficit argument implies that social capital may influence
collective efficacy and group differences in health through its linkage with other
mechanisms, such as social norms on health and health-related behavior, changes
in community stability, and policy-related mechanisms. In their study on sexually
transmitted infection (STI), Thomas and Thomas (1999) find that social capital,
combined with migration patterns, can affect racial disparities in STI. Hogben and
Leichliter (2008) find that healthcare provisions and use are critical to the effect
of preventive interventions. Social capital, however, can mediate the effect of
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policy provisions. It is easier to deliver health services and implement preventive
interventions in well connected communities.
Social capital may be linked to group differences in health through both
direct and indirect mechanisms. The direct link between social capital and
health inequality depends on both capital deficit and return deficit. The indirect
relationship between social capital and health inequality may hinges on how
social capital is related to other causal factors ( e.g. healthcare provisions).
As such, recognizing both direct and indirect effects of social capital allows
an examination of the interactive relationship between the policy environment,
public health interventions, and group differences in health. The aforementioned
theoretical conjectures can be summarized as follows. Firstly, social capital may
be directly linked to group differences in health. If group A has more access
to social networks and participated more actively in community activities than
group B, then social capital is expected to generate more positive health outcomes
for group A than for group B. Inequality may also rise if using the same social
capital, group A generates more health returns than group B. Secondly, social
capital may interact with other health promotion factors (such as public health
interventions) and exhibit indirect effects on group differences in health. Health
interventions implemented in more active communities may have stronger effects
on health outcomes than policies implemented in less active communities. Given
the same set of health interventions, in addition, the group that has more social
capital will benefit more than the group with less social capital.
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3.5 Empirical Assessment Using the Case of Childhood Obesity
Statewide Social Capital, Gender and Childhood Obesity: Hypotheses
Social networks and community engagement may be linked to group health
outcomes through direct and indirect mechanisms. Systematic empirical assess-
ment of the aforementioned theoretical conjectures requires data on a salient
public health issue, whereby group differences in outcome measures are well
documented. It also requires empirical measures for relevant public health
interventions and social capital in the systems, in which intervention programs
are implemented. Childhood obesity serves as an excellent interactive case of civic
engagement, networked associability, and effective policymaking for following
reasons.
Firstly, childhood obesity is a serious public health crisis now. Obesity, long
thought to be a private concern, has pushed itself on the national policy agenda
in the United States. The prevalence of childhood obesity has more than tripped
in the past a few decades, and this public health crisis now affects every state
(Ogden et al. 2008). The increasing issue salience and public attention on
childhood obesity lead to an increasing number of policy interventions adopted
at the state-level and implemented through public school systems. Changes
in the number of policy interventions over time would allow an evaluation of
policy effectiveness by examining the association between obesity outcomes and
variations in policy interventions.
State-level analysis is chosen for two reasons. On the one hand, states are
primary policy adopters in the case of childhood obesity. Federal agencies, such
as Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), have provided guidelines
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for reducing or preventing childhood obesity. More policy efforts, however,
are initiated at the state-level. To date, public schools are deemed as the
major battle field for childhood obesity. School programs vary considerably
according to different state-level legislative initiatives. Hence, a state-level
analysis incorporating both variations in legislative initiatives and school-based
programs could generate a comprehensive policy comparison. On the other hand,
longitudinal empirical data that track obesity prevalence rates and health risk
behaviors based on gender groups are more comprehensive and much better
documented at the state-level than at the local-level.39
Secondly, the current policy development for combating childhood obesity
focuses on implementing nutrition and physical education policies through state,
local, as well as public school systems, screening children’s Body Mass Index
scores, and promoting active life styles. All these intervention programs are
implemented through a decentralized and networked-environment and require
successful co-production with service users and communities. It is conceivable
that state social capital such as civic engagement and public mobilization may
affect policy effectiveness. Kim et al. (2006) argue that in the case of preventing
obesity, statewide social capital are very important, social capital in larger
geographic scales can affect both policy mechanisms and directly influence
local-level collective policy efforts (1046).
Hence, the policy case of childhood obesity, can be used to test following to
hypotheses:
39Because different states enacted legislative bills for preventing childhood obesity in different
years, it is necessary to use longitudinal data on both health outcomes and policy interventions.
The Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention maintain the most comprehensive data archives
for obesity trends. County-level estimates are available for adults older than 20 years old. As for
CDC’s local-level estimates on childhood obesity, only a few counties and metropolitan areas are
sampled in their health risky surveillance surveys.
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H1: Social Capital will be positively associated with health outcomes related to childhood
obesity.
H2: Obesity policies in states with more social capital will generate more positive health
outcomes than in states with less social capital.
Hypothesis 1 posits how social capital may be directly linked to better health
outcomes. This is to evaluate the general “social capital thesis” that better health
outcomes are associated with more active communities. Hypothesis 2 posits that
social capital may interact with public health interventions and condition the
effect of health intervention programs. States with more supportive community
conditions may implement their obesity prevention programs more effectively.
Childhood obesity, furthermore, is also an excellent policy case to examine
the links between social capital, policy interventions, and health inequality.
Gender, in this policy case, is a key identity for assessing systematic differences
in health across social groups. Boys and girls are different systematically based
on their group distributions in Body Mass Index (BMI) scores, risk-perceptions,
and weight-control activities. Wisniewski and Chernausek (2009) conduct a
comprehensive literature review based on peer-reviewed, published studies on
childhood obesity from 1974 to 2008. They examine relevant studies on children
aged 0 to 18 and conclude that “boys and girls are different in body composition,
patterns of weight gain, hormone biology, and the susceptibility to certain social,
ethnic, genetic, and environmental factors (76).” Girls have greater fat mass
than boys. Boys in all race groups except non-Hispanic Blacks, however, have
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higher obesity prevalence rates than girls.40 Gender differences in biomedical
conditions, risk-perceptions, perceived body-images, and health behaviors may
help to test the deficit-in-return argument. Because women may have greater
social punishment than men for being overweight (Chuang and Christakis 2005),
it is arguably possible that boys may be more resistant to their social environment
than girls. As such, social capital may generate more health returns for girls than
for boys.
Comparing gender differences in childhood obesity may also help to test the
power-resource mechanism, i.e. those who have much access to social capital may
have favorable health outcomes than those who have less access to social capital.
It is documented in empirical surveys that men and women socialize themselves
with different types of civic organizations and in general women pay more
attentions to healthcare issues than men (Gigengile and O’Neill 2006b). There
are also gendered differences in terms of children and adolescents’ access to social
capital. Hooghe and Stolle (2004, 1) analyze anticipated political participation
among American adolescents (fourteen-year-olds) and find that “girls at this age
mention more actions they intend to engage in than boys do.” They also find
“distinct patterns with regard to the kinds of action favored, with girls being
drawn more toward social-movement related forms of participation (15-16).” If
in general, girls have more access to health-related social capital than boys, then it
is possible that social capital is linked to gender differences in health, with females
benefit more from their access to social capital. Thus, the third testable hypothesis
is:
40The empirical focus on gender does not mean that gender is the only way to examine group
differences in the case of childhood obesity. The prevalence of obesity among children in the
United States also varies across race/ethnic groups and is based on family income levels. Gender,
however, is a more salient identity.
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H3: Obesity policies in states with more social capital will generate more favorable health
returns for girls than for boys.
3.6 Data, Measures, and Method
To operationalize the theoretical concepts with the case of managing childhood
obesity, I examine policy outcomes by using policy objectives, and focus on
evaluating both obesity prevalence measures and youth weight-control activities.
The concept of social capital is operationalized by focusing on the structural
components – social networks and civic engagement. To empirically test the
aforementioned hypotheses, I pool data for forty-three states from 1991 to 2009.41
Dependent Variables: Obesity Prevalence Rate and Dietary Behavior
I operationalize policy outcomes by using three indicators: Childhood Obesity
Prevalence Rate, Physical Inactiveness, and Risky Weight Control Activity. Data
for health outcomes are drawn from the CDC’s longitudinal studies – Youth
Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) (CDC 2009). YRBBS includes a
national school-based survey conducted by the CDC and state education agencies.
YRBSS monitors primary health-risk behaviors that relate to the childhood obesity
41California, D.C., Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington are not included in the
sample because no data are available for health outcome measures related to childhood obesity.
Hawaii and Alaska are not included in the sample because no data are available for social capital
measures for these two states.
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epidemic. I use survey items from the Module on Dietary Behaviors. All health
outcomes variables are calculated for both genders.42
Childhood Obesity Prevalence Rate is measured by the percent of students
who are obese or overweight.43 Figure 9 illustrates distributions of state-level
childhood obesity prevalence rates based on gender groups. On average, 22.01%
female students are above overweight and 29.35% male students are above
overweight.
Childhood obesity prevalence rates also vary considerably across states. From
1991 to 2009, Utah has the lowest average female and male prevalence rates
(15.64% and 24.47%, respectively). Mississippi has the highest female and
male prevalence rates (30.36% and 33.37%, respectively). At the national level,
both male and female prevalence rates vary from year to year, but only with
incremental changes. For example, the average female prevalence rate in 1999
was 19.8%. It increased into 20.25% and 21.51% in 2001 and 2003, respectively.
The average male prevalence rate was 28.1% in 1999. It became 28.6% in 2001 and
29.22% in 2003. At the state-level, changes in childhood obesity prevalence rates
are more dynamic. For example, in Arizona, both female and male prevalence
rates were increased from 1991 to 1996, decreased from 1997 to 1999, and increased
42The survey has been conducted every other spring semester from 1991 onward, with random
school-based samples based on K-12 students. state-level surveys are coordinated through state
education and health agencies and based on in-classroom self-administrated questionnaire with
local parental permission procedures. All regular public, Catholic, and other private students were
included in the sampling frame. The sample size in each wave is larger than 10,000 and the overall
response rate for each was larger than 60%. Mean interpolation is used to convert biannual survey
data into annual data.
43Students, who participated in the surveys, reported their own weight and height. CDC use
self-reported weight and height to calculate individual BMI scores and the percent of students
who are obese or overweight. For children and adolescents (aged 2-19 years), their BMI values are
evaluated based on the CDC growth charts for the corresponding age-adjusted BMI percentiles. A
child is overweight if he or she has a BMI at or above the 85th percentile and lower than the 95th
percentile. Obesity is defined as a BMI at or above the 95th percentile adjusted for the same age
and sex (CDC 2009).
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again from 2006 to 2009. The magnitudes of changes in childhood obesity also
vary across states. For example, from 2007 to 2009, the female prevalence rate
was increase by 2.9% in Louisiana, but decreased by 1.2% in New York. The
male prevalence rate was increased by 2.9% in Maine, but decreased by 1.5% in
Wisconsin.
Figure 9: Obesity Prevalence Rates by Gender Groups: Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (1991-2009)
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Notes:
1. Obesity prevalence rates are measured by the percent of students who are obese or
overweight. Overweight is defined as a BMI at or above the 85th percentile and
lower than the 95th percentile. Obesity is defined as a BMI at or above the 95th
percentile for children of the same age and sex.
2. As for female students, the sample mean is 22.01% and the range is 11.3%-33.6%. As
for male students, the sample mean is 29.35% and the range is 9.2%-41.8%. Group
means are statistically different.
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I also create two behavioral indexes to measure youth weight control practices.
Various school policy programs on childhood obesity are designed to target the
youth population and induce sound weight control practices, such as exercise
and healthy diets. Hence, behavioral change can be viewed as an indicator
of policy outcomes. Specifically, these behavioral indicators are measured as a
percentage of students who engage in a particular type of activities in the past 30
days. All data are coded along the risky direction, i.e. not helpful for reducing
or preventing childhood obesity. Two behavioral indexes are created based on a
principal-component factor analysis of five weight control activities: (1) students
who did not exercise to control their weight in the past 30 days; (2) students who
did not eat less food, fewer calories, or low-fat foods to lose weight or to keep from
gaining weight during the past 30 days; (3) students who fasted (went without
eating more than 24 hours) to lose weight; (4) students who took diet pills to lose
weight; and (5) students who took laxative pills to lose weight. Factor analysis
renders two factor indexes: Physical Inactiveness and Risky Weight Control Activity.
Table 4 reports summary statistics for each behavioral index.44
As Table 4 shows, each factor index takes a mean value around 0 and a
standard deviation around 1. A positive value refers to a riskier behavioral trend
and a negative value refers to a healthier behavioral trend. For example, as for the
overall index of Physical Inactiveness, the observation with the maximum value
is New Jersey-1991. Based on students’ self-reported dietary behavior (in New
Jersey, 1991), 54.6% students did not exercise to lose weight and 71.8% students
44For each behavioral indicator I extract from the survey data and use the aggregated
percentage at the state-level. To construct the factor index, I conduct principal-component factor
analysis. The first two indicators load in one factor and the other three indicators load in one
factor. The first factor-index is used to measure physical inactiveness and the second factor is used
to measure risky weight control activities.Table 16 in the Appendix reports Eigenvalues and factor
loading scores for each behavioral index.
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did not eat less to lose weight. Figure 10 further illustrates behavioral trends based
on the overall sample means and by gender groups. In Figure 10, subfigure (a)
shows gender differences in being physically inactive and subfigure (b) shows
gender differences in taking risky weight control activities. Gender differences in
weight control activities are salient. From 1991 to 2009, there is a behavioral shift
in terms of what activities are taken by male and female students to control their
weight. Before 2001, more male students are reported to be physically inactive
than female students, and the group trends are reversed after 2001. Before 2004,
more female students are reported to take risky weight control activities than male
students, and the group trends are reversed after 2004.45
Table 4: Factor Indexes of Students’ Weight Control Activities: Summary Statistics
Behavior Index Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Physical Inactiveness
Overall -0.001 1.033 -4.220 5.450
Female 0.021 1.029 -3.373 3.750
Male -0.028 1.028 -3.486 4.403
Risky Weight Control Activity
Overall -0.016 1.046 -3.750 5.063
Female -0.002 1.044 -3.733 5.237
Male -0.002 1.052 -3.553 6.555
45Note that the group comparisons are drawn based on across-state means, hence, it only refers
to the overall national trends.
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Figure 10: Behavioral Trends of Students’ Weight Control Activities: Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (1991-
2009)
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Obesity Policy
I measure obesity policy by focusing on state-level legislative initiatives for re-
ducing and preventing childhood obesity and policy programs that are mandated
or recommended through the school systems. Data on state-level legislative
initiatives are drawn from the CDC database, State Legislative and Regulatory Action
to Prevent Obesity and Improve Nutrition and Physical Activity (CDC 2011). I extract
information on the number of newly enacted legislative bills that are relevant
to improving children’s nutrition, enhancing physical education, promoting
physical activities, mandating or recommending BMI screening at schools, and
sharing children’s BMI information with parents. From 2001 to 2009, there are 103
new legislative bills enacted to improve nutrition, 64 new bills enacted to promote
physical activity, and 14 new bills enacted for BMI screening.
As for implementing childhood obesity policies, states mainly require or
recommend public schools to adopt school-based policies in health education,
nutrition development, and physical education. To incorporate information on
school programs for reducing childhood obesity, I draw data from the CDC
database on School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS) (CDC 2006). SHPPS
is a national survey periodically conducted to assess school health policies and
practices at the state, district, school, and classroom levels. More specifically,
I use policy survey items for following programs: (1) restricting junk food in
schools; (2) incorporating topics on healthy nutrition and dietary behavior in
nutrition education; (3) enhancing physical education; and (4) mandating fitness
test. There are substantial variations across states in terms of how these programs
are introduced in schools and how many of their schools have implemented
these programs. For example, some states only recommended their schools to
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use these programs for obesity prevention, while others mandated all their k-12
schools to implement these programs. According to the CDC’s data summary,
the percentage of schools that included deep-fried food in school meals decreased
substantially, from 40% (in 2000) to 18.8% (in 2006). In 2006, however, near half of
the schools did not offer low-fat salty snacks (46.7%) and low-fat yogurt (49.7%)
to students (O’Toole et al. 2007).
I combine information on state legislative actions and school-based programs
and create a policy index based on principal-component factor analysis.46 Table
5 reports specific policy indicators that are used to construct the obesity policy
index as well as their factor loadings. The estimated policy index scores ranges
from -1.554 to 1.118. Higher values mean that more policy initiatives are taken by
a state to reduce and prevent childhood obesity. Figure 11 summarizes the mean
trend of changes in state-level childhood obesity policies. Overall, there has been
an increasing effort in adopting more childhood obesity policies. Policy initiatives
have increased dramatically in years after 2000.47
46The most recent SHPPS survey was conducted in 2006. SHPPS was also conducted in 1994
and 2000. I used all three waves to construct the policy index. Years between 1991 and 1994
are coded based on the 1994 survey items. Years between 1994 and 2000 are coded based on 2000
items. Years after 2000 are coded based on the 2006 items. I firstly compute a policy index based on
available information on state legislative and regulatory actions (annual data from 2001 to 2006).
I then compute another policy index based on school-policy surveys (1996, 2000, and 2006). The
Pearson correlation between the index for legislative actions and school-policies in 2006 (r=0.991,
p=0.000) is used to impute combined policy index scores across all the years.
47The policy index is estimated partly based on newly enacted state legislative bills on
childhood obesity and partly based on school-based obesity prevention programs. Decreases in
index scores are driven by the fact that fewer new legislative bills were enacted in a given year
than in the previous year. For example, the index score drops from 1994 to 1995, from 1999 to
2000, and from 2004 to 2005.
86
Figure 11: Estimated Policy Index for Reducing and Preventing Childhood
Obesity, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1991-2009)
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Dynamic Social Capital Index
Though the theoretical literature on social capital is rich, fewer studies have
developed empirical measures for social capital that are comparable across all
states in the United States. Robert Putnam quantifies a state-level comprehensive
social capital index (Putnam 2000). Putnam’s state-level social capital index
is constructed based on five components: participation in public activities,
participation in community organizations, community volunteerism, informal
sociability, and social trust (291). One limitation of this empirical index, as Putnam
points out in his book, Bowling Alone, is that it does not capture changes in social
capital over time (415-17). Hawes and Rocha (2010) contend that theories that
explore the link between social and policy changes and social inequality often
have dynamic elements, thus a dynamic measure of social capital is needed
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to better reflect the cross-time changes. Hawes, Rocha, and Meier (2006) and
Hawes and Rocha (2010) use state-level consumer survey data to construct a
dynamic measure of social capital, which varies across states and time. The social
capital measure is operationalized based on three major components: community
organizational life, engagement in public affairs, and community volunteerism
(Hawes and Rocha 2010, 6). According to Hawes and Rocha (2001, 4), the overall
correlation between their dynamic social capital measure and Putnam’s index is
high (r=0.742, p=0.000).
Table 5: Factor Loadings for the Index of Obesity Policy
Survey Item Factor Loadings
State Legislative Actions1
Nutrition law 0.859
Physical education law 0.894
BMI law 0.549
Eigenvalue 1.838
School-Based Obesity Programs2
Restricting junk food on campus 0.120
Teaching healthy nutrition 0.924
Enhancing physical education 0.920
Mandating fitness test 0.238
Eigenvalue 1.77
Notes:
1. As for state legislative actions, each item are coded based on the number of newly
enacted legislations in the policy category.
2. As for school-based obesity programs, each item is coded as 1 if schools are rec-
ommended to implement relevant policies, 2 if schools are mandated to implement
policies, and 0 otherwise.
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I replicate Hawes and Rocha’s dynamic social capital index (from 1986 to
2000) and expand the index to 2009.48 Data for computing the dynamic social
capital index are drawn from Survey of the American Consumer, conducted by the
GfK MediaMark Research & Intelligence (GfK MRI), LLC. GfK MRI conducts
annual consumer surveys based on approximately 26,000 in-home, face-to-face
consumer interviews. They implement a randomly stratified sampling procedure
to select households and the face-to-face interview method generates response
rates approximately from 60% to 70%.49 Individual-level data on public activities,
leisure activities, media usage, and political outlook are aggregated by state
clusters in the original GfK MRI data. Table 6 present details on main theoretical
components used for constructing the dynamic social capital index, selected GfK
MRI indicators for each theoretical component and their corresponding factor
loading coefficients.
The concept of community organizational life is measured by six survey items
that based on group membership of fraternal orders, civic clubs, veteran clubs,
local governments, and country clubs. The concept of engagement in public
affairs is measured by seven items, including writing to an editor of a magazine
or newspaper, writing to a radio or television station, writing to an elected official,
writing something that has been published, working for a political party or
48Data for years after 2000 are critical for analyzing the linkages between obesity policies, social
capital, and policy effectiveness for two reasons. Firstly, as shown by the data on state-level
childhood obesity legislations and school-based obesity programs, more policy initiatives have
been taken in years after 2000. Including data in more recent years is critical to capture major
policy changes. Secondly, CDC’s YRBSS studies show that there are behavioral shifts in terms of
what weight-control activities are taken by females and males. Without data in more recent years,
it is impossible to empirically assess whether these behavioral shifts are associated with changes
in policies and social capital.
49More details on data reliability, survey samples, and data collection can be accessed via the
GfK MRI website:
http://www.gfkmri.com/ProductsServices/TheSurveyoftheAmericanConsumer.aspx.
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candidate, engaging in fund-raising, and state-level voter-turnout for national and
congressional elections. The concept of community volunteerism is measured by
average contribution to public television or radio stations.50
To assess measurement reliability, I check Pearson correlations between Put-
nam’s social capital index, the dynamic social capital index constructed by Hawes
and Rocha (2010), and the dynamic social capital index computed by adding data
from 2000 to 2009. The overall Pearson correlation between the dynamic social
capital index (with data from 1990 to 2009) and Putnam’s index is 0.565 (p=0.000).
The Pearson correlation between the new social capital index and Hawes and
Rocha’s (2010) social capital index is 0.930 (p=0.000). When adding more data
in recent years, the correlation between the new dynamic social capital index
and Putnam’s index becomes smaller than what is reported in Hawes and Rocha
(2010). It drops from 0.742 to 0.565. This is because Putnam’s index does not
change over years. To cross-validate the measurement reliability, I also assess the
correlation between Putnam’s index and the new dynamic social capital index
based on state-means. The Pearson correlation between the mean dynamic social
capital index and Putnam’s index is 0.751(p=0.000).51
50I include fewer survey items than what are included in Hawes and Rocha’s index, because
GfK MRI dropped some of their old survey items from 2004 to 2009. For example, in the category
of engagement in public activities, they excluded the question on whether respondents addressed
a public meeting or not. I only include survey items that have data from 1990 to 2009. The Gfk MRI
survey data, moreover, are coded based on state clusters, thus, states in the same cluster (e.g. South
Carolina, North Carolina) take same item values. Hawes and Rocha (2010) acknowledge that
this is less problematic since state clusters are creased based on similar consumer demographic
characteristics. Also, I replicate their dynamic index by adding the same voter turnout data.
State-level voter turnout data are drawn from Michael McDonald’s United States Elections Project
(McDonald 2010). I use the Voting-Age Population (VAP) turnout measure in the dataset.
51Figure 17 in the Appendix presents correlations between Putnam’s social capital index and
the state-means calculated based on the dynamic social capital index.
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Control Variables
To isolate the effects of obesity policy and social capital on health outcomes
related to childhood obesity, I include a set of control variables that are related
to childhood obesity and children’s health.
Characteristics of State Healthcare Systems. I include three indicators to reflect
monetary resource and bureaucratic capacity available in the public health sector.
Healthcare Spending is measured by total state and local spending on hospitals and
healthcare as a percentage of Gross State Product. Public Health Employment is
measured by full-time equivalent state and local public employees in healthcare
and public hospitals per 100, 000 residential population.52 I also include Children’s
Access to Health Insurance, measured by the percentage of children under 18
who are not covered by health insurance.53 The Berry et al. (1998) measure of
Citizen Liberalism, in addition, is used as a control for the health policymaking
environment. Liberal citizens will support more governmental interventions in
public affairs than citizens who are political more conservative. Hence, in a state
52To calculate the percentage measure, I use data for the total state and local health spending
as the numerator. Public health spending data are drawn from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services Expenditure Reports. The specific
expenditure report I use is Annual Health Expenditures by State and Provider. The denominator is
State Gross Product. Annual GDP-by-state (based on all industries) statistics are drawn from the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The annual total spending data and state GDP data are
adjusted into 2000 constant dollars. Data on state and local full-time equivalent employment in
health and hospitals are drawn from Census Bureau Annual Survey on Government Employment
and Payroll.
53The original data for children’s health insurance coverage are collected by the American
Medical Association, Chicago, IL. Data for the span of health insurance are drawn from “The
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS).” The
ASEC to CPS is a Census Bureau survey of about 78,000 households and includes detailed health
insurance questions asked of the household respondent for every household resident. I access
data from 1999 to 2006 from the ASEC Historical Tables (HIA Series), HIA-4“Health Insurance
Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by State-All Persons: 1999 to 2008.” I access data from 1990
to 1999 from the ASEC Historical Tables (Original Series), “Health Insurance Coverage Status and
Type of Coverage by State-All Persons: 1987 to 2005.” All data are accessed from the webpage:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/historical/index.html.
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where the majority of citizens hold a liberal political stand, there might be more
policy interventions in healthcare in general.
Socioeconomic Variables. Based on the public health literature, socioeconomic
conditions are associated with population health (LaVeist 2005). I control for three
socioeconomic variables in the empirical models: (1) Poverty Rate, measured by
the percentage of residential population who are under the 100% federal poverty
line; (2) Unemployment Rate, measured by the percentage of residential population
who are unemployed; and (3) Population Education Attainment, measured by the
percentage of the population who have a high school diploma and above.54
Health Risk. I include two variables to reflect the health risk of being obese.
Overweight Infant Rate is included as a control for weight conditions in infancy
and is used as an objective measure of the health risk of childhood obesity. I
also included students’ risk perception as a subjective measure of health risk.55
The objective measure of health risk is included in models for childhood obesity
prevalence rates. In addition to the overweight infant rate, the subjective risk
measure is included in models for weight-control activities, because perception
54Data for poverty and education attainment are drawn are drawn from the Census Bureau
American Community Survey (ACS). Data for unemployment are drawn from U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, “Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment”, 1990-2009.
55Data calculating the overweight infant rate are drawn from the CDC Vital Statistics, the Birth
Data. Overweight infant rate is measured as the number of infants, whose weight is higher than
4,000 grams, per 1,000 live births. I use the CDC YRBSS data on students’ self-perceived weight
status as a proxy of their risk perception of being obese. The survey item used is % students who
think themselves to be overweight and obese.
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of overweight is a key determinant of children’s dietary habits and weight
management activities (Brener et al. 2004).56
Method
The focus of the empirical assessment in the research is to evaluate the links
between social capital, public health policies, and policy outcomes both gender
groups. Empirical analyses are designed to compare if social capital, combined
with public health interventions, affect the two gender groups differently. To
assess the overall effects of obesity policy and social capital on gender-based
policy outcomes, I implement a system of equations for female and male health
outcomes using the one-way random effect estimation of seemingly-unrelated
regressions (SUR) in a panel data set. SURE (seemingly-unrelated regression
estimation) produces two sets of slope coefficients, one for each gender group.
Using SURE, I can compare the relative policy effects across the two groups. When
some unmeasured factors that affect the health outcomes for one gender group
may also affect the other group, SURE produces unbiased and more efficient
estimation than estimating the two equations separately (e.g. Ordinary Least
Square or Generalized Least Square estimation) (Martin and Smith 2005; Zellner
1962).
56I did not include the perception measure in models for obesity prevalence rates, because
studies show that the correlations between children’s perception of overweight and their actual
BMI scores are very low (Brener et al. 2004). Based on the panel data for this research,
the correlation between female perception on overweight and the % female students who are
overweight or obese is -0.273, and the correlation between male perception on overweight and
the % male students who are overweight or obese is 0.180. Figure 18 in the Appendix presents the
sample distributions of male and female perceptions of overweight. Comparing Figure 18 with
Figure 9, misperceptions of overweight are found for both gender groups. Overall, more female
students describe themselves to be overweight than male students, yet the actual female obesity
prevalence rates are lower than the male prevalence rates.
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State-level panel data, furthermore, are used for the empirical analysis. Panel
data combine information of both spatial and temporal dimensions, which allow
researchers to use repeated observations of the same units and can increase
both quantity and quality of the empirical information. However, panel data
may introduce challenges to obtaining consistent and efficient estimation due to
features of data variations along the spatial and temporal dimensions. Based
on post-regression diagnostic analysis and comparison between data variations
along both spatial and temporal dimensions, I implement a one-way random-
effects estimation of SUR in the panel data framework (Biorn 2004; Nguyen and
Nguyen 2010). Specific considerations on model specification are as follows.
Firstly, I include 19 years of data for 43 states, thus it is necessary to assess
panel unit-root for all the dependent variables. Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and
Baltagi (2008) point out that, if the dependent variable is panel non-stationary,
regression analysis based on pooling cross-section time series data will generate
spurious estimation. I perform both the Augmented Dicky-Fuller Test and the
Phillips-Perron Test for all the dependent variables (Maddala and Wu 1999).
Test results show that the series for childhood obesity prevalence rates, the
female index of physical inactiveness, and the male index of risky weight control
activity are panel stationary. Panel unit-root is discovered for the index of female
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risky weight control activity and the male index of physical inactiveness.57 A
one-period lag of the dependent variable is included in each empirical model
because of the detection of panel unit-root. Inclusion of lagged dependent
variables, moreover, also allow an assessment on long-run effects of health
policies and social capital on childhood obesity outcomes.58
Secondly, a combination of fixed-effects by spatial units and a lagged de-
pendent variable can be problematic, especially when more data variations are
generated by the spatial dimension than the temporal dimension. If data vary
much less along the temporal dimension than along the spatial dimension,
spatial unit-dummies will absorb cross-sectional variations and lead to results that
favor null findings (Plumper, Troeger and Manow 2005). After estimate a base
model (OLS) for the panel data, I find that the between-unit R2 (cross-sectional
57Test statistics based on the Augmented Dicky-Fuller Test are as follows: (1) for the female
obesity prevalence rate, χ2(86) = 122.109 (p = 0.006); (2) for the male obesity prevalence rate,
χ2(86)=121.639 (p=0.069); (3) for the female index of physical inactiveness, χ2(86) = 590.177 (p =
0.000); (4) for the male index of physical inactiveness, χ2(86) = 123.651 (p = 0.000); (5) for the female
index of risky weight control activity, χ2(86) = 90.390 (p = 0.352); and (6) for the male index of risky
weight control activity, χ2(86) = 114.6035 (p = 0.021). Test statistics for the Phillips-Perron Test
with lag=1 are as follows: (1) for the female prevalence rate, χ2(86)=127.771 (p=0.002); (2) for the
male prevalence rate, χ2(86)=179.539 (p=0.000); (3) for the female index for physical inactiveness,
χ2(86)=195.830 (p=0.000); (4) for the male index of physical inactiveness, χ2(86)=63.786 (p=0.965);
(5) for the female index for risky weight control activity, χ2(86)= 66.579 (p=0.000); and (6) for the
male index for risky weight control activity, χ2(86)=126.710 (p=0.000). Both tests assume that all
series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that at least one series in
the panel is stationary. Hence, insignificant Chi-square statistics indicate the presence of unit-root.
58In addition to including the lagged dependent variables, I also take a one-year lag for the
obesity policy index in all empirical models, because the goal is to assess how policy changes at
time t influences health outcomes at a future time. The two variables measuring public healthcare
resources (public health spending and public health employment) are also lagged by one-year,
because budgetary decisions on government spending and hiring are made based on fiscal year
cycles. Also, I take a first-order difference for the variable of the unemployment rate, because this
variable is tested to be panel non-stationary.
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variance) is much larger than the with-in unit (time-series variance) R2. Hence,
random-effects estimation is favored than including state fixed-effects dummies.59
Thirdly, three potential threats to inefficient estimation need to be considered:
(1) autocorrelation along the time and cross-sectional dimensions, and (2) non-
constant variance caused by heterogeneity across states; and (3) non-constant
variance caused by extreme-value observations. Post-OLS diagnostic analyses
detect all three problems.60 To deal with the first two problems, I implement the
SUR estimation for panel data using the STATA Module XTSUR (Nguyen and
Nguyen 2010), which fits a many-equation seemingly-unrelated regression (SUR)
model. The estimation procedure is based on constructing a multi-step algorithm
combining Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and the Maximum Likelihood (ML)
procedures, developed by Erik Biorn (2004). In general, this is a two-step
method using simultaneous equations. The overall GLS estimator is obtained,
and then the second step is to minimize the usual sandwich form with respect
to unstable parameter estimates caused by autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
(Brion 2004).
As for the outlier cases, I perform residual analysis based on the Cook’s
distance. Using the 90th percentile of the Cook’s distance as the threshold.
Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Carolina,
Texas, and Tennessee are deemed as outlier state cases. Not surprisingly, most of
59I perform this diagnostic analysis by estimating an OLS model for the panel data, taking
the overall obesity prevalence rate as the dependent variable. With a random-effects model
specification, the between-unit R2 is 0.751 and the within-unit R2 is 0.298.
60Using the overall obesity prevalence rate as the dependent variable and OLS specification
as the base model, I tested for heteroskedasticity, serial autocorrelation, and evaluated
model residuals for the influence of outlier states. Breusch-Pagan test is used for testing
heteroskedasticity, the test statistics are χ2(1) = 11.83 (p = 0.006), hence the Null Hypothesis of
constant variance is rejected. Arellano and Bond (1991) test is used for serial auto-correlation. The
test statistics are Z = 20.57 (p = 0.000), hence the Null Hypothesis of no-serial autocorrelation is
rejected.
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these states are southern states with extremely high childhood obesity prevalence
rates. In all the reported models, I include dummy variables to control for these
states.61
Last, both Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 inform an interactive relationship
between the obesity policy index and the social capital index. To empirically
assess whether social capital actually mediate the effect of policy interventions,
I estimate all models with and without including an interaction term.
3.7 Empirical Findings
Table 7 presents empirical results for the models that use male and female
childhood obesity prevalence rates as the dependent variables (with and without
an interaction term).62 As for specific explanatory variables, after controlling
for the obesity prevalence rates in the previous year, the three socioeconomic
indicators are significant predictors for both male and female obesity prevalence
rates. Both poverty and average education attainment are positively associated
with the male and female childhood obesity prevalence rates. The unemployment
rate is positively associated with the female prevalence rates and negatively
associated with the male prevalence rates.
61Table 17 in the Appendix reports the model for childhood prevalence rates estimated without
controlling for these outlier cases. The robustness analysis shows that the aforementioned states
exhibit influences on coefficients stability. Hence, empirical findings discussed in the subsequent
section are all based on models controlling for these state dummy variables.
62The CDC conducts YRBSS biannually. I use mean interpolation to convert biannual survey
data into annual data. State participation rates were not ideal in some years before 2000. In 1991,
only 26 states participated in the YRBSS. 38 states participated in the 1997 survey, and 37 states
participated in the 1999 survey. Trend extrapolation by state is used for filling missing values
before 1999. To assess data reliability of mean-interpolation and trend extrapolation, I estimate
the model only based on data from 1999 to 2009. The robustness analysis is reported in Table 18
in the Appendix. The coefficients of the policy index and social capital index are larger in both
the female and male equations. Their signs, however, remain unchanged. Because I do not find
substantively different results, I report models based on the full sample.
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Poverty is one of the major determinants to childhood obesity prevalence rates,
and have a greater effect on girls (coefficient = 0.175 in the full model) than on boys
(coefficient = 0.120 in the full model). The different statistical associations between
unemployment and obesity prevalence suggest that deprivation in economic
resources may add more burdens on females than on males. The findings on
education are opposite to what is expected, which is caused by multi-collinearity
between education and access to health insurance.63 Empirical results show that
access to health insurance is negatively associated with both male and female
obesity prevalence rates, but the coefficient sizes are relatively small. Meaning
that providing health insurance to children may only slightly reduce childhood
obesity. This is possible because health insurance is only a ticket to getting
healthcare services. It may increase utilization of healthcare services, but may
not always lead to significant improvement in health.
63After estimating the OLS base model, I checked the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics.
Although the VIF statistics after-centering for education and %uninsured children are small,
the un-centered VIF for these two variables are greater than 20. Dropping education or the
%uninsured children from the model, the coefficient sign of the other variable is flipped. I
did not exclude these two variable from the model for two reasons. First, both of them are
socioeconomic indicators that are widely used in the empirical literature on childhood obesity.
Second, multicollinearity does not reduce the overall predictive power or reliability of the model
as a whole. Given that the coefficients of these two variables are statistically significant, I choose
to include them in the empirical models.
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Table 7: Obesity Policy, Social Capital, and Childhood Obesity Prevalence Rates
for Female and Male Adolescents
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
1.Female Prevalence Rate
Obesity Policyt−1 0.362∗∗ (0.073) 0.362∗∗ (0.073)
Social Capital -0.104∗ (0.045) -0.116∗∗ (0.044)
Policyt−1× Social Capital 0.097 (0.068) – –
Public Health Spendingt−1 -0.200 (0.123) -0.209† (0.124)
Public Health Exployeet−1 0.003† (0.002) 0.003† (0.002)
% Uninsured Children -0.051∗∗ (0.009) -0.052∗∗ (0.009)
Education 0.032∗∗ (0.004) 0.033∗∗ (0.004)
Poverty 0.175∗∗ (0.015) 0.177∗∗ (0.015)
∆ Unemployment 0.064† (0.035) 0.071∗ (0.034)
Overweight Infant -0.003† (0.002) -0.004† (0.002)
Obesity Prevalencet−1 0.807∗∗ (0.014) 0.807∗∗ (0.014)
2. Male Prevalence Rate
Obesity Policyt−1 0.288∗ (0.138) 0.310∗ (0.137)
Social Capital -0.091 (0.077) -0.086 (0.075)
Policyt−1× Social Capital -0.054 (0.120) – –
Public Health Spendingt−1 -0.299 (0.248) -0.290 (0.246)
Public Health Employeet−1 0.012∗∗ (0.004) 0.012∗∗ (0.004)
% Uninsured Children -0.042∗ (0.018) -0.041∗ (0.018)
Eudcation 0.030∗ (0.013) 0.030∗ (0.013)
Poverty 0.120∗∗ (0.030) 0.119∗∗ (0.030)
∆ Unemployment -0.162∗∗ (0.057) -0.164∗∗ (0.057)
Overweight Infant 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
Obesity Prevalencet−1 0.646∗∗ (0.029) 0.648∗∗ (0.029)
N 807 807
Notes:
1. Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%, two-tailed t- test.
2. The dependent variables are childhood obesity prevalence rates by genders.
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Turning to the findings on the key explanatory variables – social capital and
obesity policy, Table 7 offers support for Hypothesis 1 that social capital may have
a direct impact on childhood obesity prevalence rates. Comparing model results
based on the linear equation and based on the equation with an interaction term,
the coefficients of both the policy index and the social capital index do not change
much from one equation to another equation. Based on the linear equation, the
social capital index is negatively associated with the female obesity prevalence
rate, and does not have statistically significant impact on the male prevalence rate.
A one unit increase in the social capital index may lead to a decrease in the female
prevalence rate by 0.116%. This coefficient, however, only reflects the short-run
effect of social capital. Taking account into the long-run effects, captured in the
coefficients of the lag-dependent variable (0.807), social capital has a greater long-
run effect on females than on males. The long-run effect of social capital on the
female obesity prevalence rate is approximately -0.601. The long-run effect is more
substantively meaningful.
Figure 12 plots the marginal effects of obesity policy on male and female
prevalence rates based on the values of the social capital index. As Figure 12
shows, obesity policy has different influences on boys and girls. Increased policy
efforts on childhood obesity has been ineffective for reducing the male prevalence
rate.
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Policy interventions, combined with more active communities, lead to in-
creases in the female obesity prevalence rate.64 Comparing the coefficients size
when social capital is high versus when social capital is low, Figure 12 confirms
findings in Table 7 that policy and social capital affect the childhood obesity
prevalence rate in a direct way.
Table 8 reports how the obesity policy index and the social capital index
affect children’s physical inactiveness.65As Table 8 shows, both objective and
subjective health risks affect children’s physical inactiveness. The objective risk
(i.e. being overweight in the infancy) is positively related to physical inactiveness
in childhood. Both boys and girls tend to take more physical activities when they
perceive themselves to be overweight. Table 8 also shows that deprivation in
economic resources (poverty and unemployment) is negatively related to boys’
physical activities. Obesity policy and social capital, moreover, interactively affect
boys and girls’ physical activity. In the female equation, the coefficient of obesity
policy is positive and the coefficient of social capital is negative.
64The coefficients of the obesity policy index are positive, which are opposite to the theoretical
expectation. One suspicion might be that obesity policy is an endogenous variable to childhood
obesity prevalence rates. This is less likely a case with the estimation based on the XTSUR module.
The one-way random-effects estimation, obtained by SUR in the XTSUR module, considers each
explanatory variable as an endogenous variable in its first-step of estimation, then a multi-step
estimation procedure is implemented to minimize the estimation bias by converging the ML
estimator with the GLS estimator. I also checked a dynamic linear specification for each equation
by treating obesity policy as an endogenous variable (including both the one-year lag and the
first-order differenced measure of obesity policy as explanatory variables), both the one-year
lag and first-order differenced policy measures are positively associated with childhood obesity
prevalence rates. Hence, the positive coefficients of obesity policy indicate that adopted policies,
so far, are ineffective in altering the increasing trends of childhood obesity.
65The coefficients of all the state dummy variables are not reported in Table 7 – Table 9. As for
the model of male and female indexes of physical inactiveness, I also include a dummy variable to
control for years after 2000. As for the model of male and female indexes of risky weight control
activities, I include a dummy variable to control for years after 2003. These two year-dummy
variables are included because the observed behavioral shifts based on gender comparisons (See
in Figure 10).
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Table 8: Obesity Policy, Social Capital, and the Indexes of Physical Inactiveness
for Female and Male Adolescents
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
1.Female Index
Obesity Policyt−1 0.145∗∗ (0.024) 0.150∗∗ (0.023)
Social Capital -0.044∗∗ (0.013) -0.044∗∗ (0.013)
Policyt−1× Social Capital -0.035† (0.021) – –
Public Health Spendingt−1 0.055† (0.033) 0.068∗ (0.032)
Public Health Employeet−1 -0.002∗∗ (0.001) -0.002∗∗ (0.001)
%Uninsured Children 0.006† (0.003) 0.007∗ (0.003)
Education -0.037∗∗ (0.003) -0.039∗∗ (0.003)
Poverty 0.007 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
∆ Unemployment -0.006 (0.010) -0.005 (0.010)
Overweight Infant 0.003∗∗ (0.001) 0.003∗∗ (0.001)
Risk Perception -0.120∗∗ (0.004) -0.118∗∗ (0.004)
Physical Inactivenesst−1 0.414∗∗ (0.015) 0.397∗∗ (0.015)
2.Male Index
Obesity Policyt−1 -0.112∗∗ (0.022) -0.076∗∗ (0.021)
Social Capital -0.058∗∗ (0.013) -0.028∗ (0.012)
Obesity Policyt−1× Social Capital -0.066∗∗ (0.020) – –
Public Health Spendingt−1 -0.009 (0.031) -0.050† (0.030)
Public Health Employmentt−1 -0.002∗∗ (0.001) -0.001† (0.001)
%Uninsured Children 0.005 (0.003) 0.0003 (0.003)
Education -0.040∗∗ (0.002) -0.043∗∗ (0.002)
Poverty -0.014∗∗ (0.005) -0.016∗∗ (0.005)
∆ Unemployment -0.027∗∗ (0.010) -0.015 (0.009)
Overweight Infant 0.019∗∗ (0.001) 0.021∗∗ (0.001)
Risk Perception -0.194∗∗ (0.006) -0.182∗∗ (0.006)
Physical Inactivenesst−1 0.332∗∗ (0.016) 0.285∗∗ (0.016)
N 807 807
Notes:
1. Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%, two-tailed t- test.
2. The dependent variables are the indexes of physical inactiveness by genders.
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This means that when the social capital equals to 0, obesity policy increases
female students’ physical inactiveness. Social capital, however may mediate
the positive effect of obesity policy on female students. In the male equation,
the coefficients of obesity policy, social capital, and the interaction term are
all negative. This means that obesity policy decreases male students’ physical
inactiveness and social capital reinforces the policy effects on male students.
Figure 13 further illustrates how obesity policy and social capital interactively
affect children’s physical activities. Firstly, the interactive effects of obesity policy
and social capital are different across gender groups. Obesity policy has positive
marginal effects on girls, but negative marginal effects on boys.
Because these policy interventions are designed to promote students’ physical
activities, the policy effects on girls are opposite to the policy goal. Social
capital, furthermore, conditions the effect of policy interventions on children’s
physical activities. As Figure 13 shows, the obesity policy produces greater
unintentional policy effects in states with less social capital, than in states with
more social capital. In states, where the social capital index scores are larger than
1 (approximately), the marginal effects of the obesity policy on the female index
of physical inactiveness are not differentiable from 0.66 Substantively, this means
that, social capital mediate the unintentional consequences of policy interventions
for female students. In states with more social capital, policy interventions do not
produce negative outcomes to female students, while in states with less social
capital, policy interventions are associated with more female students who did
not exercise or eat less to manage their weight.
66There are 106 state-year observations in the sample take social capital scores that are larger
than 1.
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The picture on how obesity policy and social capital interactively affect male
students’ physical activities is totally different. As Figure 13 shows, policy
interventions do not have significant effects on male students in states with low
social capital. As the social capital index increases, the marginal effects of policy
interventions become negative and significant. Obesity policy interventions work
more effectively for male students and could induce healthy behavioral change
when they are implemented in more mobilized states.
Table 9 and Figure 14 present how obesity policy and social capital interac-
tively affect children’s risky weight control activities. Table 9 shows that more
female students are taking risky activities for weight management in years prior
to 2004 than in years from 2004 to 2009.
On the contrary, more male students are taking risky activities for weight
management in years after 2004 than in years before 2004. Obesity policy
interventions, combined with social capital, exhibit different influences on female
and male students. As Figure 14 shows, policy interventions do not have
significant effects on girls’ risky weight control activities. Male students, however,
do respond to policy interventions. The marginal effects of obesity policy
interventions on male students, however, are positive. Substantively, it means
that more policy interventions, combined with more social capital, are associated
with a greater proportion of male students, who took risky activities to manage
their weight.
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Table 9: Obesity Policy, Social Capital, and the Indexes of Risky Weight Control
Activities for Female and Male Adolescents
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
1. Female Index
Obesity Policyt−1 -0.032 (0.033) -0.064 (0.043)
Social Capital -0.149∗∗ (0.021) -0.071∗ (0.028)
Policyt−1× Social Capital 0.041 (0.032) – –
Public Health Spendingt−1 0.106† (0.060) 0.110† (0.063)
Public Health Employeet−1 -0.001 (0.001) -0.002∗ (0.001)
%Uninsured Children 0.004 (0.005) -0.002 (0.006)
Education -0.029∗∗ (0.003) -0.031∗∗ (0.006)
Poverty 0.020∗ (0.008) 0.006 (0.010)
∆ Unemployment -0.042∗∗ (0.015) -0.060∗∗ (0.021)
Overweight Infant 0.002 (0.001) 0.0004 (0.002)
Risk Perception 0.046∗∗ (0.006) 0.044∗∗ (0.009)
Risky Activityt−1 0.574∗∗ (0.019) 0.595∗∗ (0.026)
2. Male Index
Obesity Policyt−1 0.170∗∗ (0.040) 0.065 (0.053)
Social Capital -0.120∗∗ (0.024) -0.071∗ (0.035)
Obesity Policyt−1× Social Capital 0.071∗ (0.036) – –
Public Health Spendingt−1 0.185∗∗ (0.071) 0.215∗∗ (0.082)
Public Health Employmentt−1 -0.001 (0.001) -0.002† (0.001)
%Uninsured Children -0.005 (0.005) -0.008 (0.007)
Education -0.040∗∗ (0.003) -0.019∗∗ (0.007)
Poverty -0.014∗∗ (0.009) 0.004 (0.012)
∆ Unemployment 0.020 (0.018) -0.013 (0.026)
Overweight Infant 0.002∗ (0.001) 0.002 (0.002)
Risk Perception -0.001 (0.009) -0.021 (0.014)
Risky Activityt−1 0.686∗∗ (0.020) 0.716∗∗ (0.028)
N 807 807
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%, two-tailed t- test.
108
Fi
gu
re
14
:O
be
si
ty
Po
lic
y,
So
ci
al
C
ap
it
al
,a
nd
th
e
In
de
x
of
R
is
ky
W
ei
gh
tC
on
tr
ol
A
ct
iv
it
y:
G
en
de
r
D
iff
er
en
ce
s
-.4
-.4
-.4-.2
-.2
-.20
0
0.2
.2
.2.4
.4
.4.6
.6
.6Ef
fe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
on
 R
isk
y 
W
eig
ht
 C
ou
nt
ro
l A
ct
ivi
ty
Effects of Obesity Policy on Risky Weight Countrol Activity
Ef
fe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
on
 R
isk
y 
W
eig
ht
 C
ou
nt
ro
l A
ct
ivi
ty
-4
-4
-4-2
-2
-20
0
02
2
24
4
4So
cia
l C
ap
ita
l In
de
x
So
cia
l C
ap
ita
l In
de
x
So
cia
l C
ap
ita
l In
de
x
Ma
rg
ina
l E
ffe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
On
 Fe
ma
le 
St
ud
en
ts
Ma
rg
ina
l E
ffe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
On
 Fe
ma
le 
St
ud
en
ts
Ma
rg
ina
l E
ffe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
On
 Fe
ma
le 
St
ud
en
ts
95
%
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 In
te
rv
als 95
%
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 In
te
rv
als
95
%
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 In
te
rv
als
-.4
-.4
-.4-.2
-.2
-.20
0
0.2
.2
.2.4
.4
.4.6
.6
.6Ef
fe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
on
 R
isk
y 
W
eig
ht
 C
ou
nt
ro
l A
ct
ivi
ty
Effects of Obesity Policy on Risky Weight Countrol Activity
Ef
fe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
on
 R
isk
y 
W
eig
ht
 C
ou
nt
ro
l A
ct
ivi
ty
-4
-4
-4-2
-2
-20
0
02
2
24
4
4So
cia
l C
ap
ita
l In
de
x
So
cia
l C
ap
ita
l In
de
x
So
cia
l C
ap
ita
l In
de
x
Ma
rg
ina
l E
ffe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
On
 M
ale
 S
tu
de
nt
s
Ma
rg
ina
l E
ffe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
On
 M
ale
 S
tu
de
nt
s
Ma
rg
ina
l E
ffe
ct
s o
f O
be
sit
y 
Po
lic
y 
On
 M
ale
 S
tu
de
nt
s
95
%
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 In
te
rv
als
95
%
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 In
te
rv
als
95
%
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 In
te
rv
als
109
Findings on how policy interventions and social capital interactively affect
children’s weight control practice help to explain why increasing obesity policy
interventions are in general ineffective. The empirical results show that increasing
obesity policy interventions combined with social capital are positively associated
with the female childhood obesity prevalence rate and the proportion of female
students who are physically inactive. One possible micro-level explanation to
girls’ behavioral pattern might be that adopted policies do not change female
students’ misperceptions on their weight status, and therefore, could not decrease
their risky weight control activities. If a large proportion of female students con-
tinue to be anxious about their BMI scores and take incorrect weight management
practice (e.g. using diet pills or laxative pills to control weight), then it is less
likely for them to exercise more. If policy interventions fail to induce healthy and
active life styles for female students, it is also likely to be a failure in reducing the
obesity prevalence rate.
As for male students, policy interventions combined with social capital
do produce positive policy outcomes in promoting physical activities. Males
students, meanwhile, also have changed their weight management practice by
taking more risky weight control activities. The mixed pattern of male weight
control activities may be a reason why obesity policies cannot decrease the male
childhood obesity prevalence rate.
Why has the proportion of male students, who take extreme weight control
activities, increased along policy interventions and their physical activities? One
possible explanation may be that, there could be a negative policy feedback that an
ineffective policy intervention may increase children’s awareness on their weight
status, but fail to reduce their BMI scores. As a result, anxiety about being
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overweight may lead to aggressive and extreme weight control activities. In
their study on health behavior and pediatric psychology, Boutelle et al. (2002)
find that “in comparison to non-overweight youths, overweight adolescents were
less likely to eat breakfast and less likely to engage in vigorous physical activity
than non-overweight youths (531).” They also point out that “higher prevalences
of unhealthy weight control behaviors were evident among overweight youths
(531)” and partly driven by low self-esteem and dissatisfaction with their bodies.
Another possible explanation may be that children’s eating behavior may be
affected by their peers. Increased unhealthy weight control activities among boys
may be a spillover effect from their female peers. It a policy fails to correct female
dietary behaviors, over time, it may generate some negative impact on males as
well. Meyer and Gast (2008) survey boys and girls (12-16 years old) and find
a strong positive correlation between peer influence and disordered eating. The
policy implication of this behavior shift is that policy success for one gender group
is not sufficient to induce healthy weight control activities and reduce childhood
obesity from a long run. Hence, health interventions designed for large scales
need to consider different gender dynamics and different group responses.
In sum, the empirical results find mixed patterns in terms of how public health
interventions, combined with social capital, produce different health outcomes for
gender groups. Empirical findings provide some support to Hypothesis 1 that
social capital may exhibit direct impact on children’s health outcomes. Social
capital is negatively associated with both male and female childhood obesity
prevalence rates, suggesting that in childhood obesity is less serious in states with
high social capital than in states with low social capital. Hypothesis 2 is supported
by models for children’s weight management activities, but not by the model for
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childhood obesity prevalence rates. In terms of how policies may affect children’s
health behaviors, social capital may mediate the effectiveness of adopted policies.
Empirical findings do not have conclusive support for Hypothesis 3. Although
I find that policy interventions combined with social capital generate different
health returns to boys and girls, but they do not always benefit girls more than
boys. Using the child obesity prevalence rate as an indicator of health, social
capital has more long-run effects on females than on males in a direct manner.
Using children’s weight control activities to measure health outcomes, social
capital and policy interventions could not induce healthy behavioral changes
among females, but increase both healthy and unhealthy weight control activities
among male students. Though these mixed findings confirm the theoretical
conjecture that social capital may be linked to gender differences in health, they do
not provide conclusive evidence for verifying both the power-resource argument
and the deficit-in-return argument.
3.8 Conclusion
In this research, I use a timely policy issue – childhood obesity– to illustrate how
social capital may be a source rather than a cure to group differences in health.
Active communities and civic participation may not generate social benefits for
all groups in a uniform manner. If social capital is associated with different policy
benefits for different social groups, increasing social capital alone, may not be a
cure for health inequality. In the case of childhood obesity, social capital in states
are associated with different health outcomes for two gender groups. This partly
explains why many of the current policy interventions are ineffective in reducing
and preventing childhood obesity. Most state-level legislative initiatives and
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school-based policies are proposed and implemented without fully considering
the gendered nature of this policy issue. If the same set of community conditions
may benefit gender groups differently, policy interventions implemented in these
communities are likely to be ineffective in increasing the overall policy benefits.
Intervention programs that are neutrally-designed (i.e. do not differentiate female
and male risk perceptions and behavioral patterns), moreover, are likely to be
ineffective, because it may incorporate wrong intervention goals for boys and
girls. More effective policy designs should consider the gendered behavioral
patterns and incorporate different intervention goals for boys and girls.
Findings in this research also suggest that effective policymaking for reducing
health inequality may be challenging. Policy interventions are unlikely to
reduce group differences in health without considering the heterogeneous policy
responses from different social groups. Effective policymaking for reducing
health inequality needs to balance the design of policy interventions and the
community conditions, under which the policies are implemented. It is also
important to be aware that active government combined with mobilized com-
munities, may not always be a blessing for public health interventions. In
the case of childhood obesity, increased government interventions in mobilized
communities are associated with more female anxiety on their weight status, and
in turn lead to extreme weight control practices rather than healthier life patterns.
Although policy interventions induce healthy weight control activities among
male students, they also produce negative spillover effects – an increase in the
proportion of male students who take risky weight control activities.
Though my empirical focus is the case of childhood obesity, findings in this
research may be generalized to different policy cases, whereby group differences
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in outcome measures are systematic, such as gender differences in the HIV/AIDS
prevalence rates, behavioral risks related to reproductive health, etc. Gender, fur-
thermore, may not be the only group identity that can be theoretically informative
to examining group differences in health. The proposed theoretical framework
may also be applicable to other social identities, such as race/ethnicity and class.
Findings in this research, however, do not provide a conclusive support
to the theoretically conjecture that social capital, combined with more policy
interventions, will benefit the group with more access to social capital than the
group with less access to social capital. In the case of childhood obesity, I find
mixed findings in terms of how policy interventions and social capital affect males
and females differently. Although females pay more attention to public health
issues and associate themselves more with civic organizations related to public
health, female students do not benefit more than male students from the current
policy efforts in obesity prevention. Though in the long-run, females are better
off than males in mobilized communities, social capital has more positive effects
on males’ weight control activities. The mixed findings suggest that, there may
be some unobserved inter-group dynamics, whereby female and male students
could affect each other’s risk perceptions and health behaviors. Empirical analysis
using state-level aggregated data is less informative to studying the inter-group
dynamics. This is also a major limitation of macro-level ecological models that
link community-level measures (i.e. policy interventions and social capital) to
aggregated measures of health outcomes (overall health outcomes or group-based
health outcomes). Future studies that use multilevel ecological models and
incorporate individual-level health outcome measures could render more helpful
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inferences on how policy interventions and community conditions interactively
affect group difference in health.
Last, but not least, this research provides some empirical evidence to the
theoretical conjecture that social capital may not be a bless to all community
members in an equal manner. Although empirical findings are not conclusive,
they demonstrate that it is important to advance the theory of social capital by
conceptualizing it as a group asset rather than a public good. In this research,
social capital is empirically measured based on state-level indicators of public
participation, civic voluntarism, and network associability. The aggregated
measure of social capital is likely to mask the unequal access to social capital
by different social groups. Future studies that using group-specific measures
for social capital may produce more consistent empirical findings that link social
capital to health inequality.
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4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR EQUITY:
CAN THE PUBLIC SECTOR REDUCE INEQUALITY IN HEALTHCARE
ACCESS?
4.1 Overview
In this essay, I explore the link between the institutional characteristics of state
healthcare systems and inequality in healthcare access. I compare four insti-
tutional arrangements of the state healthcare systems: ownership of the policy
implementation system, the source of financial resources, the size of public
healthcare workforce, and state medicaid eligibility rules. I then discuss how these
institutional characteristics may affect inequality in healthcare access. The anal-
ysis of the link between the state healthcare system and inequality in healthcare
access draws on a few literatures in the field of public administration and political
science, including the framework of dimensional publicness, social policy and risk
privatization, as well as bureaucratic capacity.
I then empirically assess how the institutional characteristics of a state health-
care system affects its ability of reducing inequality in healthcare access. Pooling
data for 50 states from 1990 to 2006, I find that the four institutional factors exhibit
different impact on inequality in healthcare access. Public financial resources may
reduce inequality in healthcare access depending on different spending venues.
Increasing the total level of public health spending has a substantial impact on the
size of the uninsured population. State responsibilities in financing Medicaid and
Medicare programs also matter for reducing inequality in healthcare access. State
eligibility rules exhibit moderate impact on the uninsured rates. Public ownership
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and the public healthcare workforce, however, do not have statistically significant
associations with the uninsured population.
4.2 Introduction
Comparisons between public and private organizations have received increasing
attention in the field of public administration (Anderson and Jorgensen 1997;
Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994; Frederickson 1996; Perry and Rainey 1988;
Moulton 2009). While many students in public administration and public man-
agement continue to debate to what extent public and private organizations differ
(Kurland and Egan 1999; Rainey 2003), a few scholars have proposed moving
the theoretical discussion in a different direction: assessing and comparing the
relative effectiveness, in terms of outputs and outcomes, of public and private
organizations (Meier and O’ Toole 2011). I commend this emphasis on public
outcomes and contend that there is more to the publicness puzzle than evaluating
the blurring lines between organizations. The puzzle is not simply about how
we can categorize different organizations and policy systems. Instead, it is about
determining to what extent our knowledge of organizations and policy systems
can “lend insights to understanding and managing public outcomes (Moulton
2009, 889).”
What are desirable public outcomes? As Frederickson (1990) summarizes, both
in the theory and the practice of public administration, scholars and practitioners
have long emphasized management science, rationality, policy efficiency, and
making economical decisions. A few decades ago, social equity “began as a
challenge to the adequacy of concepts of efficiency and economy as guides for
public administration (Frederickson 1990, 228).” Frederickson (1990, 228-229)
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further contends that social equity, defined as “equality in government services,
responsibility for decisions and program implementation for public managers,
and responsiveness to the needs of citizens,” is an important pillar for public
organizations. The argument behind this third pillar of equity is the basis for a
just and democratic society (Frederickson 2005). The american political system,
however, is characterized with contradictions between democracy and social
inequality. Scholars have depicted the U.S. as a separate and unequal democracy
(Bartels 2008; Patel and Rushefsky 2008).
The issue area of healthcare particularly shows the devastating paradox
between liberal democracy and inequality– the prevalence of health disparities
are strongly linked to racial divide, gender differences, and people’s income.
Beside inequalities in health status and preventable health risks, “one of the
major problems confronting the American healthcare system is the large number
of uninsured people (Patel and Rushefsky 2008, 15).” Inequality in access to
healthcare is deemed as one major cause of disparities in health outcomes (LaVeist
2005). Studies show that the lack of health insurance coverage may delay or
prevent utilization of healthcare services (Smedley et al. 2003). What factors
may help to reduce the social inequality in healthcare access and produce more
equitable public outcomes in healthcare? Do different institutional arrangements
in the healthcare system matter for reducing inequality in healthcare access?
In this research, I exam the link between the institutional characteristics of
state healthcare systems and organizational effectiveness by focusing on social
equity as an organizational outcome. I outline a framework for assessing how
a state healthcare system is organized and how its institutional arrangements
may affect its ability of reducing inequality in healthcare access. I then proceed
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with an empirical analysis of main determinants of the uninsured rates in the
United States. I seek to identify what institutional arrangements may help states
to better incorporate the uninsured population. The empirical analysis draws on
comparing the healthcare systems across fifty states from 1990 to 2006. Empirical
findings demonstrate that after controlling for socioeconomic factors and race,
public financial resources and generous health insurance eligibility rules have
substantive influences on reducing the size of the uninsured population.
4.3 What Institutional Arrangements May Reduce Inequality? The Publicness
Puzzle and Beyond
Linking Dimensional Publicness to Equity Outcomes
The traditional approach to theorizing about organizational publicness relies on
assessing how organizational activities are controlled, i.e. government authority
and market rules for public and private organizations, respectively (Bozeman and
Bretschneider 1994).67 Bozeman (1984, 1987) proposed a dimensional approach to
publicness as an alternative to the core approach. According to his conceptualiza-
tion, all organizations are to some extent public. The publicness of an organization
is independent from its legal status (Bozeman 1984).
Bozeman identifies three main dimensions of organizational publicness: goal
and agenda publicness, resource publicness, and communication publicness
(Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994). Using this basic framework, scholars have
agreed on three predominant criteria for measuring publicness and examining
67Bozeman and Bretschneider (1987) refer to this traditional approach as “the core approach”
(200), which focuses on distinctive legal types (government-owned vs. private/market-owned) of
organizations.
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how levels of publicness affect organizational behaviors (Rainey and Bozeman
2000). The three criteria are: ownership (defined by some public-oriented
purposes and goals), financial resources, and the model of social influence.
The dimensional approach to organizational publicness has fostered various
empirical studies that compare organizational behaviors in the different pub-
licness dimensions. Although there is consensus in the literature that public
organizations have more complex goals, more red-tape rules, and more goal
ambiguity (Baldwin 1987; Boyne 2002; Chubb and Moe 1988; Nutt and Backoff
1993; Solomon 1986), very few systematic studies link publicness and orga-
nizational outcomes (Anderson and Jorgensen 1997; Emmert and Crow 1988;
Kurland and Egan 1999; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Scott and Falcone 1998).
Among the few studies that do explore how organizational publicness affects
organizational behaviors and outcomes, the empirical focus is on how managers
and organizational members behave in public versus private contexts. The
existing empirical literature has not focused on outputs or whether these outputs
realize some public values or serve certain public purposes.
A recent development in this literature is that a few scholars try to link
publicness to policy outcomes, and they find that equity outcomes are valued
more by the public sector than the private sector. For example, Amirkhanyan
et al. (2008) compare how the public sector differs from the private sector in
their performance of nursing home management. They use both quality and
access to care as performance measures and find that public and non-profit
nursing homes out-perform their for-profit counterparts in providing care to
economically marginalized citizens. Defining equity outcomes based on “the
extent to which service departments are distributing services to disadvantaged,
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underrepresented, and hard to-reach groups (686),” Andrews and Entwistle
(2010) find that public-public partnerships in the U.K. local-service delivery
systems are positively related to the outreach of medicaid recipients. The public-
private partnerships, however, are negatively associated with equity outcomes.
Though using data from different countries, the common theoretical impli-
cation of these empirical studies is that publicness of a service-delivery system
is a key institutional factor determining how the system could incorporate
marginalized social groups and address the need for citizens who are politically
underrepresented. These findings also provide empirical support for considering
publicness as an institutional variable for explaining social inequality.
Another theoretical implication of Bozeman’s dimensional framework and
these empirical studies is that public outcomes are often attached to particular
values. While profits or efficiency may be primary concerns of more private
organizations or systems, equity may be emphasized when organizations or open
systems of networks are more public. We might see the distinctiveness of values
in services and products provided by public organizations or service systems that
focus on incorporating underrepresented citizens. The public-private division,
therefore, is not about legal types of an organization, but about distinctive
institutional arrangements, goals for producing public outcomes, and preferences
on whose needs should be addressed. In sum, it is a plausible theoretical
expectation that a more public-oriented service system may emphasize more on
reaching socially disadvantaged groups than a service system that is for-profit and
more market-oriented.
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Public Responsibility vs. Privatization of Social Risks
The dimensional-publicness framework provides some theoretical support for
linking organizational and institutional characteristics to equity outcomes. This
framework, however, is not the only way to examine the institutional causes
of social inequality. The question on how a public-oriented service system
may produce equity outcomes for citizens is ultimately about to what extent
the government should be responsible for managing various social risks (e.g.
economic risks, health risks, etc.) for citizens and how these risks should be
distributed among citizens. Inequality may rise if some citizens systematically
bear more social risks than others in a society.
Creating a risk-free society by expanding the scope of government interven-
tions is neither efficient nor realistic (Meier 1988). The institutional arrangements
designed for how to counter social risks for the most vulnerable groups, however,
may have profound social equity implications. Formal and informal policy
institutions, according to Hacker (2004), “delimit the scope of shared risk– the
degree to which potent threats to income are spread across citizens of varied
circumstances (risk socialization) or left to individuals or families to cope with
on their own (risk privatization) (249).” Shifting economic and social risks to
individuals and families may affect low-income citizens (such as the working poor
or other disadvantaged groups) more than high-income citizens. The problem of
social inequality may become extremely serious when both individual sources
and governmental protection are absent for socially disadvantaged citizens.
The institutional arrangements on risk-sharing could not only widen social
gaps based on people’s income, but also generate inequalities in access to
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public services based on other social identities, such as race, gender, or people’s
occupations. For example, in the U.S., women’s mean incomes are lower than
men’s, but on average, women need more healthcare services than men (Green
and Pope 1999; Patchias and Waxman 2007). When the responsibilities for care are
shifted more to individuals, it may lead to the result that women need to spend
more of their out-of-pocket resources for healthcare than men.
Hacker (2004) observes that one major trend of managing social risks in the
U.S. is the contemporary celebration of market mechanisms as best means in
improving policy efficiency and shifting governmental fiscal burdens. When
the privatization of social risks shifts different economic and social costs to
individuals and their families, however, it may increase social gaps in access
to needed services and care. As such, how to design and deliver public
compensations to individuals would have profound implications of social equity.
The policy institution that defines the scope of public responsibilities may affect
which citizen groups are qualified for getting how much public services. It
is conceivable that a more generous policy institution may be associated with
less social burdens on the poor and socially disadvantaged groups than a less
generous policy institution.
Can a Public System Deliver? The System Capacity of Reducing Inequality
As aforementioned, a service system with public orientations may emphasize
more on equity outcomes and take more responsibilities for serving socially
disadvantaged citizens than a private-oriented system. An additional factor
that may affect how a public-oriented systems addresses inequality concerns is
whether the public system can actually deliver public outcomes. Granted that
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adopting policy goals for reducing social inequality and taking responsibilities
for protecting the vulnerable groups are critical, how these values and preferences
are operationalized in the practice of service delivery and policy implementation
is equally indispensable. After all, social inequality will not be decreased unless
public outcomes are produced for citizens who are in need.
Meier (1988) contends that bureaucratic resources should be considered as an
important institutional factor, because they have greater influence on public policy
when policy issues are complex and when specialized skills are needed for solving
policy problems (140). Frederickson (2010) asserts that bureaucratic decision-
making (especially at the street-level), “is complexly moral and contingent rather
than rule-bounded and static (82).” Street-level bureaucrats make normative
judgements on how policies are applied and how services are delivered. As
such, “... in much of social equity, there is democratic rhetoric but aristocratic
assumptions. We search still for versions of social equity that are truly bottom up
(83).” The key message is that bottom-up forces such as bureaucratic knowledge
and resources are likely to affect how a public system may effectively produce
desirable public outcomes. Formal institutional arrangements may set distinctive
goals for public services, but are not self-executing. A public system combining
equity goals and high capacity in service delivery may be more effective in
reducing social inequality than a system that only adopts equity goals but has
low implementation capacity.
4.4 The State Healthcare System and Inequality in Healthcare Access
Provision of healthcare services is an excellent policy issue area to examine how
various institutional arrangements in the healthcare system may affect inequality
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in healthcare access. In many developed countries, it becomes challenging to
balance efficiency and equity in the delivery of public healthcare and health
services (Coulter and Ham 2000; Scott 2001). In the United States particularly,
the challenge arises from concerns about both reducing healthcare costs and
improving the equality of access. Among other things, the existence of a large
uninsured population in the U.S. is a serious public concern linked to inequality
in healthcare access.68
Inequality in access to healthcare has been well documented in the scholarly
literature, most discussions of healthcare inequality have tended to ignore or
rarely touched upon the organizational goals and characteristics of the service
delivery systems. Discussions about healthcare inequality in the U.S. tend to focus
on socioeconomic conditions, such as income inequality (Mellor and Milyo 2001),
education (Wilkinson 1996), class, and race (Kawachi et al. 2005; LaVeist 2005).
The role that system characteristics play in influencing equal access to healthcare
has not received a lot of attention. While the market system and the private sector
focus on improving profits, government organizations will be pressed to be more
responsive to the public by having healthcare equity as a primary policy goal
(Scott 2001). The complexity of healthcare arrangements means that there may be
different or competing goals for healthcare provisions, such as market efficiency
versus equal access to healthcare. Strategies for improving healthcare may also be
different between the public and the private sector.
68The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2009, 18.8% of Americans did not have health
insurance. A lack of access to healthcare is am extremely serious problem among people who
are under the poverty line. For example, in 2009, approximately 10% of children under the age
of 18 did not have health insurance. The percentage of uninsured children who are below the
poverty level, however, is 31.7%. Data are from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC), Health Insurance Table HIA4 and HIA8.
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In the U.S., although healthcare provisions operate through a regulated-
market system, whereby both private and public sector organizations take part
in the provision of health insurance and service delivery, state healthcare systems
differ substantially along all the aforementioned institutional dimensions. In
the U.S., states have great political discretion on deciding how to allocate their
resources to meet the needs of their citizens, defining what services to provide,
and to whom they provide public outcomes such as equity.
Firstly, governmental involvement in the primary care systems differs across
states. In some states, such as Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont, there are no state and local government-owned hospitals. In other
states, such as California and Georgia, a large proportion of community hospitals
are owned and managed by state and local governments.69 Secondly, the insti-
tutional arrangements for incorporating the uninsured people are very different.
According to the Census Bureau’s 2009 Current Population Survey, at the national
level, about 49% of the health insurance coverages were sponsored by employers
and 28% were provided through governmental programs (primarily the Medicare
and Medicaid). Thirdly, states’ involvement in Medicare and Medicaid varies
substantially, from 16% (Utah) to 35% (West Virginia) as percentages of the
total healthcare provisions. States have very different criteria for defining their
risk-pools for public health insurance. As of 2011, the state income eligibility
limits for working adults vary from 17% of the federal poverty level (FPL) to 215%
of the FPL. All these different institutional arrangements make state-level analysis
69According to the American Hospital Association’s (Chicago, IL) 2006 data, there were 146
community hospitals in Georgia and 54 of them were managed by state/local government.
In Georgia, there were less for-profit and investor-owned hospitals than government-owned
hospitals. In California, 72 hospitals (out of 361)were owned by the government (Morgen and
Morgen 2006).
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suitable for comparing how the characteristics of the healthcare systems affect the
level of inequality in healthcare access.70
Institutional Determinants of Inequality in Healthcare Access
Publicness of the State Healthcare System. Although in theory, it is expected that
public organizations to be concerned about equity, the ability of a state healthcare
system to achieve its goal of reducing inequality also depends on how public the
system is. I contend that there is a relationship between the publicness of the
healthcare system and equal access to healthcare. Specifically, because public
organizations include equity as a goal, the level of publicness of the healthcare
system will affect equal access to health care. Starr (1993) points out that, “the
politics of a health system that is 90 percent public and 10 percent private is very
different from a health system that is 90 percent private and 10 percent public
(23).” One difference is that the more public a system is, the higher priority would
be placed on providing care and services to all citizens. It is also possible that
when the majority of people’s healthcare is provided by the private sector, the
market system may not lead to political support from the middle and the upper
classes for redistributing resources to the poor. Conversely, if more people, such
as those in the middle class, are covered by public sector programs, “they are
more likely to be more generous and not begrudge the poor for getting equal
access to health care (Patel and Rushefsky 2008, 23).” Thus, how well a system
addresses the issue of equal access to healthcare largely depends on how much
70Although local governments also play a critical role in service delivery and share
public responsibilities in financing healthcare coverage and services, the broad institutional
arrangements are less likely to be determined at the local-level. State governments, in
addition, are primary authorities for licensing healthcare providers (e.g. physicians, physician
assistants, nurses, etc.). Hence, state-level analysis is suitable for exploring the link between the
characteristics of healthcare systems and public outcomes, which are related to health inequality.
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it incorporates the poor and the middle class through public venues. Therefore,
I expect public ownership to be negatively related to the inequality of healthcare
access.
H1: As the public ownership of a state healthcare system increases, inequality in
healthcare access will decrease.
According to Bozeman’s framework, the source of financial resources matters
in terms of differentiating public and private organizations. The key aspect of
public finance in healthcare is how many healthcare services are funded through
public venues and distributed to economically or socially disadvantaged groups.
Public healthcare provisions not only include access to hospitals and care, but also
include social protections through the insurance system (Davidson 1993; LaVeist
2005; Oliver and Paul-Shaheen 1997; Thorpe 1993). Both public involvement in
healthcare insurance and direct spending on healthcare programs are important
aspects of public finance that may reduce inequality in healthcare access. Hence,
I expect that:
H2: A state healthcare system with greater public financing has lower level of healthcare
inequality than a state with less public financing.
State Responsibilities in Covering Health Risks. As aforementioned, state health-
care systems vary substantially in their social policy eligibility rules. As for both
the Medicare and Medicaid (including Children’s Health Insurance Programs),
state eligibility rules determine how generous a state healthcare system is to its
citizens in need. These institutional arrangements set political definitions on who
deserve publicly funded care and services, affect the scope of state responsibilities
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in sharing health risks, and have profound impact on the working poor. The
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports that in 2004, half of the
uninsured people worked full time, and more than a quarter of the uninsured
people had part-time jobs.71 They do not have equal access to healthcare either
because their employers do not cover their health insurance, or because they do
not have private resources for covering the cost. A healthcare system with more
generous social policy rules may compensate more low-income citizens with the
public health insurance coverage. Thus, I expect:
H3: A state healthcare system with generous social policy eligibility rules has lower level
of healthcare inequality than a state with tight eligibility rules.
The Public Healthcare Workforce. Street-level healthcare professionals, who work
within a state healthcare system can carry public-oriented values of social equity.
In order to reduce inequality in healthcare, policy makers may need expertise
and knowledge for the effective and equitable provision of care and services.
The capacity of bureaucrats to obtain more accurate information on who have no
access to healthcare and whether they are medically needy is essential for making
effective policies for reducing healthcare inequality.
Healthcare is an issue area in which bureaucrats and healthcare profes-
sionals have great discretionary power in the design and implementation of
various public health policies. Healthcare professionals may have considerable
discretion power because there are no detailed institutional policies to guide
their actions in health services delivery. In her study on federal social secu-
rity disability programs, Kaiser (2001) finds that street-level bureaucrats have
71See ASPE (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, the U.S. HHS)
Issue Brief, Understanding Estimates of the Uninsured: Putting the Differences in Context,
http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/hiestimates.htm.
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substantial influences on social program enrollment due to their administrative
powers. Weiner et al. (2004, 306) find that front-line professionals in healthcare
organizations can act as “gate-keepers” of access to care, “caught between
administrative responsibility–which includes collecting revenue– and service to
the client/patient–who sometimes cannot pay.” They find that when there are less
detailed policy guidelines for access eligibility, front-line professionals can make
decisions based on their individual values on whether the uninsured patients
deserve the same care as people who can afford the service. Thus, it is arguable
that provisions of public healthcare programs might be delivered more effectively
in a state system with sufficient public healthcare workforce than in a state
without enough bureaucratic resources.
H4: In a healthcare system with more bureaucratic resources, there will be less inequality
in healthcare access.
4.5 Determinants of Inequality in Healthcare Access: An Empirical
Exploration
To test the aforementioned hypotheses about the relationship between the institu-
tional characteristics of state healthcare systems and equal access to healthcare, I
employ a pooled cross-sectional design. The dataset includes state-level informa-
tion about healthcare coverage, demographics, and characteristics of state health
care systems for each of the 50 states from 1990 to 2006.72
72Washington D.C. is not included. There are missing data for some of the explanatory
variables. For example, I include education as one of the socioeconomic controls. There are year
gaps in 1995, 1997, and 2001 for this variable. I do not detect a particular selection pattern for
missing data. Hence, I implement a mean-interpolation procedure to replace the missing values.
Specifically, if there is a missing value for variable A at time t in state i, I use the mean between
A(t−1), i and A(t+1), i to fill in the missing value. I do not interpolate any missing values based on
cross-sectional information.
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Data and Measures
The Dependent Variable: Inequality in Healthcare Access. I measure inequality in
healthcare access by gauging insurance coverage, i.e. if the existing healthcare
system in a state successfully provides care to all citizens. Specifically, I measure
inequality in healthcare access by the percentage of the population who are
without health insurance. A state with a large uninsured population reflects a
system, in which more citizens are excluded from healthcare access. Thus, such
a system remains separated and unequal. Figure 15 presents each state’s average
percentage of uninsured population from 1990 to 2006.
As Figure 15 shows, there are variations across the fifty states in the average
percentages of uninsured population. Based on the 17-year average, Texas, New
Mexico, Louisiana, Florida, and Arizona rank highest among the fifty states.
Conversely, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Hawaii have the smallest percentages of
uninsured population.73
Publicness of a State Healthcare System. Based on the aforementioned theoretical
arguments, the publicness of a state’s healthcare system matters for reducing
inequality in healthcare because in the public sector reducing social inequality
is an essential policy goal. I use three empirical measures to assess how public a
state healthcare system is.
73Figure 15 mainly shows average uninsured rates across states. Based on the sample, the range
of the dependent variable is from 6.7 (Hawaii 1992) to 28.3 (New Mexico 1995), with a standard
deviation of 4.46.
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Figure 15: Average Percentages of the Population without Health Insurance in the
Fifty States, Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement Survey, 1990-2006
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Firstly, I measure public ownership of the implementation structure by exam-
ining the characteristics of the community hospital systems in each state. At
the state-level, primary care is provided through three main types of medical
facilities: state and local government-owned hospitals, non-government/not-
for-profit hospitals, and investor-owned (for-profit) hospitals. I measure public
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ownership as the percentage of community hospitals that are owned by the
government.74
Secondly, I use two empirical indicators to measure public financing in
healthcare: (1) public finance in Medicare and Medicaid, and (2) government
spending in healthcare and hospitals. The U.S. healthcare system is a two-
tier system, in which neither the public or the private sector monopolizes the
health insurance market and the service delivery system. Hence, I measure the
state spending on Medicare and Medicaid programs as the percentages of total
spending on personal healthcare. Substantively, a higher percentage represents
more publicness in financial resources. Data for this empirical measure are drawn
from the U.S. department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicaid
and Medicare Services Expenditure Reports.
In addition to the span of state Medicare and Medicaid programs, I also
measure total government spending in healthcare and hospitals as the second
indicator of financial publicness. I calculate this measure based on total state and
local spending on healthcare and hospitals as a percentage of the state GDP. Data
for this measure are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State
Government Finances.
Generosity of the State Social Policy. I use state Medicaid eligibility rules as a
proxy measure of the generosity of the state health insurance provision. The
specific eligibility measure is Medicaid income eligibility limits for working
74I use the categorization of healthcare organizations based on the American Hospital
Associations standards (AHA). Community hospitals are primary healthcare facilities in state
healthcare systems. They refer to all non-federal, short-term, general, and special hospitals
that provide care services to the public. Because the American healthcare system is essentially
a pay-for-service system, I operationalize the ownership measure by focusing on the major
healthcare organizations.
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adults, calculated as a percent of the federal poverty level (FPL). Eligibility rules
define who are qualified to be covered by public healthcare and directly affect
the size of medicaid enrollment. The state medicaid income eligibility limits
also directly affect the scope of public health insurance provisions. Data for this
variable are drawn from the Kaiser Family Foundation’s policy report on state
Medicaid eligibility rules (Heberlein et al. 2011).
Street-Level Bureaucratic Resources. I use the size of the public healthcare work-
force to measure street-level bureaucratic resources. This variable is calculated by
assessing the size of public healthcare workforce at two governmental levels: the
state-level and the local-level. I draw data from the U.S. Census Bureaus Annual
Survey on Government Employment and Payroll. This variable is computed
as a health professional-to-clientele ratio based on the number of public health
employees per 10,000 residential population.
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics for the four institutional variables. As
Table 10 shows, overall, there is a wide range of variations in all the four
institutional variables. The institutional characteristics of the state healthcare
systems vary substantially based on the ownership of the healthcare provision
system, source of financial resources, generosity of state social policies, as well as
the size of public healthcare workforce.
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Table 10: Institutional Characteristics of State Healthcare Systems: Descriptive
Statistics, 1990-2006
Measures Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ownership
Public Hospital 24.209 18.636 0 70.833
Source of Finance
Public Health Insurance 15.086 3.879 5.900 32.750
Public Health Spending 1.148 0.522 0.25 3.38
Policy Generosity
State Medicaid Eligibility 85.433 55.227 17 215
Bureaucratic Resources
Public Health Employee 51.697 23.594 12.193 154.400
Notes:
1. Public Hospital is measured as the percentage of community hospitals that are
owned by state and local government.
2. Public Health Insurance is measured as the share of state Medicare and Medicaid
spending in the total personal care spending (combining government, employer,
and out-of-pocket contributions).
3. Public Health Spending is measured by state government spending in healthcare as
the percentage of state GDP.
4. State Medicaid Eligibility is measured by income eligibility limits for working adults
at application as a percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) by scope of benefit
package.
5. Public Health Employee is measured by the number of public employees in healthcare
and hospitals per 10,000 residential population.
Controls. I include a set of control variables that may affect the decision
to provide public healthcare and thus people’s access to healthcare. First, I
control for economic conditions that may be associated with the uninsured rates.
Specifically, I control for poverty and unemployment. Poverty is measured by
the percentage of the state population, who are under the 100% federal poverty
line. Unemployment is measured by annual state unemployment rate. These
two variables are included as controls for individuals’ economic conditions. If
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public insurance were not available, low-income people would have less access
to healthcare and be more likely to be the uninsured. Unemployment status
also matters as an important economic condition because most private health
insurance provisions are employment-based programs.
I also control for the average education attainment of the population, access
to physicians, the size of aged population, and the size of two minority groups
(Blacks and Latinos). I construct the measure of Education Attainment as a
percentage of the state’s population who have at least a high school diploma.
Access to Physicians is measured by the number of active physicians per 100,000
residential population. Aged Population is measured as a percentage of the state’s
population who are older than 65. Demographic variable for Blacks and Latinos
are also calculated as a percentage of the state population. 75
LaVeist (2005, 136) substantiates that socio-environmental or context theories
attribute inequality in healthcare to the social, economic, and environmental
context in which people live. Inequality in healthcare may be greater in states with
poor socioeconomic conditions. For instance, in states with a large proportion
of poor and less educated people, and in states with poor economic conditions,
state governments may need to compensate large demand on public healthcare
provisions, and thus there might be less money available to spend on each
individual who needs public health insurance coverage.
75Data for Poverty and Education are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau American Community
Survey (ACS). Data for Unemployment are drawn from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Geographic
Profile of Employment and Unemployment. I access the data for Aged population, Black Population,
and Latino Population through the CDC’s database WONDER (Wide-ranging Online Data for
Epidemiologic Research). Data for Access to Physicians are drawn from the Census Bureau Annual
Statistical Abstracts, the Section for Health and Nutrition: Healthcare Resources.
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In addition, I use the Berry et al. (1998) measure of Citizen Liberalism as a proxy
for political ideology and values that may affect governmental involvement in
healthcare provisions. The decision to provide more or less healthcare through
public systems is influenced by different political values. Research has shown
that liberals are more likely to support the public provision of healthcare than
conservatives (Wright et al. 1987; Oliver and Paul-Shaheen 1997). Liberals,
moreover, are more likely to favor and use government solutions to problems
like lack of access to healthcare. Conservatives, in turn, might favor a market
approach. Political ideology can also generate profound social implications in
inequality. In the United States, “ideology differences in economic philosophy
and distributional priorities are especially striking in the realm of taxation policy
(Bartels 2009, 54).” Liberal states may raise higher tax revenues and spend more
on healthcare issues than conservative states. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that
citizen liberalism is negatively associated with inequality in healthcare access.
Method
I estimate an empirical model for inequality in healthcare access, in which I
hypothesize that the percentage of the uninsured population is decreased by the
public ownership of the state healthcare systems, the span of public financing in
health insurance through Medicare and Medicaid, generosity of state Medicaid
eligibility rules, and the size of state healthcare workforce.
Data used to estimate the empirical model combine observations in multiple
units at multiple points in time–so-called panel or cross-sectional-time-series
(CSTS) data. It is essential to evaluate data variations in the two-dimensional
data structure, i.e. within effects (the effects of through-time changes in unit-level
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covariates) and between effects (differences in unit means) (Allison 2009; Baltagi
2008). The dependent variable varies more across states than across time. Based
on the sample, the state-means range from 9.57 to 25.89, with a standard deviation
of 4.03. The across-time means, however, range from 14.21 to 16.90 with a
standard deviation of 0.83.
I then examine if the dependent variable is panel stationary. When testing for
panel unit-root, I find the dependent variable,% uninsured population, to be panel
stationary. Across-state heterogeneity, however, is detected due to extreme values
in some of the institutional variables and the two economic variables. Firstly, as
for the public ownership variable, six states take a value of 0, because all of their
community hospitals are owned by non-governmental entities. These six states
are: Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and
Vermont. These states also have relatively small Latino populations. Secondly,
Louisianan is detected to be an outlier state case due to relatively high poverty
rates. Thirdly, Alaska is an outlier case because of relatively high unemployment
rates. Given that the dependent variable is panel-stationary and heterogeneity
is detected across states, I estimate the empirical model with panel-corrected
standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) and dummy variables for each of the
aforementioned outlier states. 76
The variables for public financial resources and the state healthcare workforce
are computed based on data on government finance and payroll. Because
government decisions in budgeting and hiring are made based on fiscal cycles,
76I also controlled for Hawaii, which is the first state that enacted state mandate on
employer-based health insurance. Massachusetts initiated its health insurance reform act and
introduced mandated health insurance as well. Because the Massachusetts healthcare insurance
reform was introduced in 2006, I did not include a state dummy variable for Massachusetts. The
uninsured rates in Massachusetts dropped from around 10% to 5% after the introduction of its
health insurance reform.
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I take a one-year lag for these three variables. Last, I pool data from various
government archives for the empirical analysis. The data-generating process is
not random. To control for variables (along the time dimension) that have not
been measured, I include fixed-effects dummy variables for each year. The idea is
straightforward: use each year as its own control (Allison 2009). 77
4.6 Determinants of State Uninsured Rates: Empirical Findings
Table 11 reports main findings of the pooled panel-data analysis.78 First of all,
the two economic variables– poverty rates and unemployment rates– are strong
predictors of the uninsured rates. The coefficients of these two variables are both
relatively large.
As for unemployment, a one-unit increase in the unemployment rate (i.e. an
increase by 1%) could lead an average increase in the uninsured rate by 0.457%.
The impact of poverty on the uninsured rate is comparable. States with high
poverty rates have more people who are not covered by healthcare insurance
than states with low poverty rates. This finding makes empirical sense because
in a pay-for-service healthcare system, people live without health insurance
involuntarily either because they are not covered by their employers (due to
unemployment) or because they cannot afford health insurance (due to poverty).
77I controlled for fixed-effects by year also because data variation is mainly driven by cross-
states differences. I compare data variation across years and across states based on the base model
specification for penal data, the within R2 is 0.107 and the between R2 is 0.810.
78Year dummy variables and state dummy variables for AK, DE, HI, LA, MD, NH, ND, RI and
VT are not reported in the Table.
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Table 11: Determinants of the % Uninsured Population in Fifty States, 1990-2006
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Public Ownership
Public Hospital 0.025 (0.017)
Source of Finance
Public Health Insurancet−1 -0.098∗∗ (0.037)
Public Health Spendingt−1 -1.329∗∗ (0.433)
Public Health Employeet−1 -0.004 (0.007)
State Medicaid Eligibilty -0.006∗∗ (0.002)
Control Variables
Citizen Liberalism -0.010 (0.007)
Access to Physicians -0.012∗∗ (0.003)
Unemployment 0.457∗∗ (0.141)
Poverty 0.449∗∗ (0.055)
Education -0.060† (0.034)
Aged Population 0.193∗∗ (0.054)
Black Population 0.103∗∗ (0.013)
Latino Population 0.261∗∗ (0.009)
Intercept 12.220 (3.768)
N 800
R2 0.747
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
State demographics also exhibit significant effects on the uninsured popula-
tion. Both the sizes of Black population and Latino population are positively
associated with the uninsured rates. The Latino population, however, has greater
impact on the uninsured rates. This finding is consistent with the state ranks
demonstrated in Figure 15. The top five states with very high uninsured rates
(TX, NM, LA, FL, and AR) all have relatively large Latino population.
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Turning to the institutional variables, Table 11 shows that the two indicators
for public financial resources have substantive effects on reducing the uninsured
rates. The publicness of state health insurance provisions (through the Medicare
and Medicaid), has a negative marginal effect on the uninsured rates. The slope is
-0.098, meaning that a one percent increase in the proportion of public spending
in health insurance will decrease the uninsured rates by 0.098%. Total public
spending in healthcare and hospitals also has a significant and negative effect
on the uninsured rates. The slope is -1.329, meaning that if the total public health
spending (as a percentage of state GDP) increases by 1%, the uninsured rate would
decrease by 1.329%. The substantive impact of these two spending measures are
relatively comparable, because they are percentage measures based on different
denominators. The mean total healthcare spending (combining government,
employer, and out-of-pocket contributions, i.e., the denominator for the public
health insurance measure) is approximately 11% of the mean state GDP (the
denominator of the total public healthcare spending measure). This suggests that
similar amount of financial resources are needed for decreasing the uninsured
rate through different spending venues. The total public healthcare spending,
nevertheless, has slightly larger impact on the uninsured rates than the public
insurance provisions through Medicare and Medicaid.79
Table 11 also shows that state Medicaid eligibility rules have a moderate
impact on reducing the uninsured rates. States with generous eligibility rules
(i.e. high income caps for defining eligible citizens) have slightly lower uninsured
rates than states with tight eligibility rules (i.e. low income caps for defining
79The statistical correlation between these two spending measures is 0.19. When excluding the
variable for public health insurance, the slope for total public healthcare spending becomes -1.141
(Std. Err.= 0.415). When excluding the variable for total public healthcare spending, the slope for
public health insurance becomes -0.107 (Std. Err. = 0.036).
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eligible citizens). The substantive impact, however, is smaller than the impact
of public financial resources.
The empirical findings provide support for Hypothesis 2 and 3 that both
the financial publicness of a state healthcare system and a generous social
policy institution may increase a state’s ability in providing care and services to
economically marginalized citizens. Table 11, however, does not report significant
statistical associations between public ownership, public healthcare workforce,
and the uninsured rates. One possible explanation to the null findings might
be that, both the ownership of the service delivery system and bureaucratic
resources matter more for the quality of care, rather than access of care. Both the
available primary care facilities (i.e. hospitals) and healthcare professionals may
affect people’s waiting time for getting healthcare services, and patient-doctor
interactions. They might not directly affect how many low-income citizens might
be covered by public health insurance.
Another possible explanation might be that, the impact of healthcare pro-
fessionals may be contingent upon other factors such as their administrative
discretion and available resources. Assuming that states with more street-level
healthcare professionals might be able to enroll more uninsured people into social
insurance programs, whether they actually enrolled more uninsured people may
depend on how much administrative power they have. In states with clear and
tight enrollment rules, street-level bureaucrats might not have much discretion
power in deciding whether certain individuals can get public services or not. It is
also possible that public healthcare employees may not have the same preferences
for reducing healthcare inequality. It is likely that their own social identities might
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affect how they think about the social composition of the uninsured, such as
different gender, race, and age groups.
To further explore the potential links between ownership publicness, public
healthcare workforce, and inequality in healthcare access, empirical data on
other healthcare inequality measures are needed. It is also necessary to consider
other institutional constraints such as discretion power, bureaucratic values, and
representation, etc.
4.7 Conclusion
Exploring state-level healthcare provisions in the United States, I systematically
show that the institutional arrangements in a state healthcare system may be
lined to inequality in healthcare access. Integrating various sub-literatures in
public administration and political science, I conceptualize that how a healthcare
system is designed and organized may have profound implications of inequality
in healthcare. I find that in a regulated-market system, where both public and pri-
vate sectors provide healthcare services to citizens, increasing the span of public
insurance provisions could benefit the eligible poor, who would be excluded by a
pure market system due to lack of personal resources. Formal policy institutions
that define the scope for government responsibilities in healthcare provision
may also contribute to increase healthcare access to economically marginalized
citizens.
Using a timely empirical case of healthcare provisions, I extend the theoretical
focus on comparing how public and private systems differ in their organizational
characteristics by linking these different institutional arrangements to public
outcomes. I demonstrate that inequality in healthcare access maybe partially
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caused by socioeconomic conditions and partially caused by structural factors
embedded in the state healthcare systems. In a pay-for-service system, economic
deprivation may add disproportionate burdens on the poor people. The public
financial resources, in such circumstances, are important social compensations for
individuals who have medical needs, but cannot afford healthcare.
This study also has practical implications for policymakers, healthcare propo-
nents, and citizens concerned with health inequality. I show that public provisions
exhibit a significant effect on reducing the uninsured population. How the public
healthcare provisions are organized and managed through the public sector is
important to achieving and sustaining healthcare equality. Systemic reform in the
provision of healthcare might constitute an essential step for solving the persistent
problem of unequal access to healthcare and may help to address the issue of
social disparities in health status from a long-run.
In this study, however, I only use the overall uninsured population as an
empirical measure of inequality in healthcare access. Although social exclusion
of the poor people in the state healthcare systems is an important reflection of
healthcare inequality, there are other forms of social inequality in healthcare.
For example, racial and ethnic minorities may bear extra burdens because of the
unequal access to healthcare insurance. Immigrants may also have less access to
health insurance due to personal economic conditions and various state eligibility
rules. Beyond inequalities in access to health insurance, healthcare inequality may
also exists based on the quality of care and services. A nature extension of this
study is to further probe a variety of empirical measures for healthcare inequality
and to further examine how institutional arrangements in a state healthcare
system may affect different equity outcomes.
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This research, in addition, does not find statistically significant associations
between the ownership publicness and inequality in health insurance access.
Neither have I accounted for public-private partnerships in the analysis. In many
states, healthcare insurance is financed through public-private partnerships. The
delivery of healthcare services, moreover, is also managed through collaborative
networks. The networking environment and different institutional designs of
the public-private partnerships may also constitute important structural factors
that can be linked to inequality in healthcare. How may public healthcare
administrators and public managers rely on their networks to better serve
underrepresented citizens? How may the non-public sectors affect social equity
outcomes in healthcare? Future research needs to address these questions
by expanding the theoretical scope for identifying important institutional and
organizational characteristics of the state healthcare systems.
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5. CONCLUSION:
SICKNESS, SIN, OR STRUCTURE?
Social inequality in health has been a persistent issue in the United States.
Disparities in health status, preventable health risks, and access to healthcare,
all have detrimental impacts on the American democracy. The evident social
gaps in health impose excessive healthcare costs to the whole population, erode
cohesion in the civic society, and fundamentally challenge the legitimacy of
democracy. While government agencies and scholars from various disciplines
have documented extensive statistics on health disparities, systematic research
investigating political causes and policy solutions is surprisingly lacking. How is
that one of the most advanced democracies in the world has more than 45 million
citizens unprotected from health risks? How is that in the U.S. babies born to
Black mothers are more than two and half times as likely to die in infancy as
those born to white mothers? How is that a more mobilized community comes
along with wider waists among boys and drives girls nuts in weight management
practice? Our knowledge on how health disparities look like is extensive, but our
understanding on why these disparities exist needs to be enriched.
In this dissertation, I take an exploratory effort in trying to find policy and
political explanations for social inequality in health. Using three studies on
effective policymaking for reducing health inequalities, I examine three dimen-
sions of social inequality: racial disparities in health status, gender differences in
preventable health risks, and social exclusion in equal healthcare access. Though
using different empirical cases, these three studies together, produce some general
knowledge on causes of health inequality. The three empirical studies may also
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help us to understand how policy and administrative accommodations could
reduce health inequality, and what might be practical challenges for effective
policymaking in this issue area.
5.1 Explaining Health Inequality: Implications for Theory
The community of public health policy and healthcare administration, in general,
knows very little on policy and political causes of health inequality. Our
mainstream scientific research focuses on people’s incomes, public opinions on
healthcare, and how partisan politics and political ideology shape the landscape
of healthcare provision. The three studies in this dissertation demonstrate that, we
could have a richer theory for explaining health inequality than the rationality of
tracking the intertwinement between the median voter’s position and legislative
mandates.
Needless to say, public preferences on healthcare issues and governmental
mandates are both critical in the American democratic system. The problem of
health inequality, nevertheless, may not simply be solved by delegating powers
to political representatives in a majoritarian system. In many cases, people
who bear disproportionate health burdens belong to a minority camp in the
majoritarian system: racial and ethnic minorities, the unemployed, the working
poor, etc. Sometimes, the most vulnerable groups may not even have a say in
presidential or congressional elections: babies who die in their infancy, children
who are still in elementary schools, and adolescents who are not old enough
to engage formal political participation. How may these people’s needs be
addressed? How could a democratic system mobilize people in the majority
camp to support policies that benefit people in marginalized groups? The three
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studies in this dissertation offer some support to conceptualize policy designs,
bureaucratic resources, and administrative processes as plausible causal variables
for explaining health inequality. These proposed theoretical variables, moreover,
may be complementary to the theories that focus on public attention and policies
produced by elected officials.
Firstly, a particular form of policy designs may be linked to group disparities
in health. The first study on racial disparities in infant mortality rates shows
that, when a policy fails to generate more relative gains to the at-risk group, it
is less likely to be effective in reducing health inequality. The second study on
gender differences in childhood obesity demonstrates that, when a policy fails
to consider systematic differences in risk perceptions and health risk behaviors,
it is less likely to produce desired policy outcomes. Both studies show that
a neutrally-designed policy may produce differentiable social benefits across
groups due to heterogeneity in policy responses.
Secondly, bureaucratic resources in policy implementation are critical. It
is a cliche´ that separating research on policy adoption and research on policy
implementation is unsatisfying. Yet, in the area of social equity research, we
know little about how desired equity values are operated in the practice. Policy
instruments are adopted as the means for solving the problem. No policy pro-
grams, however, are self-executing. All three studies show that implementation
factors such as financial resources and human capital matter for achieving desired
goals in reducing health inequality. States without sufficient healthcare funds are
less likely to reduce minority infant mortality rates, childhood obesity rates, and
provide more health insurance coverage to economically marginalized groups.
Human resources, moreover, may condition the impact of financial capacity.
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Thirdly, macro-level explanations for social inequality in health go beyond
the scope of policy designs. Both the community conditions and institutional
arrangements in a healthcare system are important contextual factors that may
cause group differences in health. The section on social capital and childhood
obesity reports counter-intuitive findings that policy interventions combined with
an active community may reinforce children’s misperceptions on health risks
and lead to unintentional policy consequences. The section on health insurance
access demonstrates that institutional characteristics of a health care system may
be directly linked to how marginalized groups are incorporated into the system.
Though focus on different contextual factors, both studies suggest that the link
between social equity policies and equity outcomes is likely to be altered by
various institutional and contextual constraints.
Findings in this dissertation, however, are far from being conclusive to
explain the complex problem of health inequality. With the effort of integrating
multiple sub-literatures in political science, public policy, public administration,
and sociology, the three studies raise more questions than answers. The three
studies, however, present some suggestive findings that might benefit future
theory-building.
The most important conceptualization issue that needs to be addressed in
future research is how scholars should use empirical measures of health inequality
(or more broadly, social inequality) to map its multifaceted nature. Measuring
inequality is all about how to identify the at-risk group and what outcome
indicators we use to gauge systematic group differences. Group differences in
health may also be generated by a multilevel mechanism, including individual-
level factors, group-attributes, and structural or institutional variables. In this
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dissertation, I use three empirical measures for assessing inequality in health by
different group identities. The infant mortality rate is a population health outcome
representing our classic understanding on healthcare– sickness, i.e. people’s
medical needs. Childhood obesity is a health outcome related to unhealthy
behavior. It represents an alternative policy rhetoric – sin, namely lifestyle
problems and changeable behaviors. Inequality in healthcare access, in the fourth
section, is linked to structural factors embedded in the healthcare systems, i.e.
the structure of risk-sharing in a society. Can we have an integrated, multilevel
framework for assessing the problem of health inequality? Shall we focus
more on the problem of sickness, or the problem of sin? Is health inequality
ultimately caused by institutional discrimination and structural bias? These are
all unanswered theoretical questions. More systematic empirical research using
different equity outcomes may help to converge our theoretical knowledge on
what are good empirical measures for health inequality. Future research, which
employs multilevel ecologic models to connect individual, group, and societal
variables, are also needed for advancing our theoretical understanding on what
causes health inequality.
The second conceptualization issue that needs to be addressed in future
research is how we measure social identities. In this dissertation, different social
group identities are used to create empirical measures for health inequality:
race, gender, and access to health insurance. It is conceivable that these group
identities may not be independent of each other. A multiple identity approach
that examines the intersectionality of different social identities may advance our
understanding on who are the truly disadvantaged.
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The third conceptualization issue that needs to be addressed in future research
is how bureaucratic resources, the policy implementation environment, and the
networks of service delivery systems are managed. In this dissertation, I ex-
plore several administrative variables for making effective social equity policies.
The selected policy cases, nevertheless, are all wicked problems. Healthcare
interventions for reducing racial disparities are challenging because of the group
heterogeneity in policy responses. Reducing and preventing behavioral-related
health risks, such as childhood obesity, are challenging because effective policy
implementation relies on co-production and compliance. To improve equality
in access to care, policymakers need to cope with multiple or conflicting group
interests, regulatory rules, and different targeted populations. How relevant
policy programs are managed by public health administrators and managers?
Future studies should integrate the literatures on organizational theories and
public management and extend the theoretical scope by studying what are
effective management strategies for reducing health inequality.
5.2 Eliminating Health Inequality: Implications for Practice
The empirical focus of this dissertation is to use systematic approaches to explore
what may enhance the effectiveness of public health policies, which are adopted
for reducing health inequality. At both the national and state level, there are efforts
to reduce health inequality. These policy efforts may fall apart unless the complex
relationships among different policy and political factors are better explored.
Because health inequality is a societal-level problem, defined by unnecessary
and systematic differences between social groups, a system-level solution that
addresses a broad range of causes is needed. This dissertation finds more policy
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challenges than solutions. Findings on the social and policy barriers for reducing
health inequality, however, could be valuable for improving the practice of policy
design and policy implementation.
One of the key findings in this dissertation is that inequality may rise from
heterogeneous policy preferences. Public healthcare provisions and health inter-
ventions that target large geographic scales are often designed and implemented
in a standardized manner, such as uniformly imposed eligibility rules, broad
policy programs for enhancing the capacity of state healthcare systems, monetary
compensation for social risks, standardized curriculum on health and nutrition
education, etc. Though designed based on scientific knowledge, these policy tools
may not be effective in providing the most protection to the most damaged. The
three studies in this dissertation find that these policy tools may have an impact
on improving population health, but may not be very effective in closing social
gaps in health. Effective policymaking for reducing social inequality in health
is primarily about how to address the needs for the truly disadvantaged. Policy
designs that incorporate accurate information on different targeted populations
and recognize heterogeneous group responses are more likely to be successful.
The third section on childhood obesity suggests that the concept of social
capital might be a mixed blessing when using it as a policy approach for
reducing health inequality. Public health scholars and healthcare administrators
have paid great attention to building active and supportive communities for
health promotion. Community-based interventions are also viewed as effective
policy designs. The empirical section on childhood obesity and social capital,
nevertheless, indicates that social capital may also be a source that generates
inequality. In practice, it may be linked to unintentional policy outcomes as
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well. One important practical implication is that, efforts to building active com-
munities should combine sound strategies of disseminating quality information
and enhancing interactions between intervention facilitators and the targeted
populations.
The three studies in this dissertation, furthermore, all conceptualize the
important role of the public healthcare workforce. The first and the second
studies find that access to healthcare human resources matters for reducing
inequality in health. They both suggest that building the human capital in public
healthcare is essential for reducing health inequality. The human capital deficits
in some state health systems are likely to be a structural barrier that prevents
effective policymaking in a long run. The fifty states vary substantially in their
healthcare human resources. While many policy mandates and recommendations
are initiated by state legislators, governors, federal agencies, the deficits in
the healthcare workforce may create challenges for service delivery and policy
implementation. It is also possible that the lack of minority representation in the
public healthcare workforce might be a long-run structural barrier for delivering
healthcare services and employing effective health interventions in racial and
ethnic communities.
To conclude, no simple and quick solutions can be developed to eliminate
health inequality that lies between different social groups. As state healthcare
agencies, public managers, and health administrators continue the “muddling-
through” business of making healthcare provisions and delivering healthcare
services, they may face different hurdles for reducing health inequality. There
are both possibilities and challenges for reducing health inequality. To develop
systematic understandings on political and policy mechanisms that are linked to
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health inequality is a much needed agenda for both the research and the practice
of effective policymaking.
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APPENDIX
Table 12: Observed and Imputed Values for Variables with Missing Data
Variable Missing Observed (Std.D) Imputed (Std.D)
Cases Mean Mean
Infant Mortality Rates
- Whites1 55 6.265 (0.978) 6.300 (0.976)
- Blacks1 142 14.925 (3.213) 14.782 (2.830)
- Whites2 55 6.265 (0.978) 6.316 (0.998)
- Blacks2 142 14.925 (3.213) 15.001 (3.139)
Public Health Employees
- State-Level 152 12.432 (12.374) 12.443 (12.365)
- Local-Level 242 16.770 (20.772) 16.942 (19.965)
Physicians 100 232.659 (58.772) 229.342 (58.607)
Education 10 79.863 (7.642) 79.906 (6.718)
Notes:
1. The total number of observations= 850.
2. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
3. The two variables for infant mortality rates are imputed by using mean interpo-
lation and the Multiple Imputation (MI) method implemented by Amelia II in R.
Infant mortality rates imputed by mean interpolation are labeled as Whites1 and
Blacks1. Infant mortality rates imputed by the MI method are labeled as Whites2
and Blacks2. As for using the MI procedure, missing values are imputed for 5
times and the descriptive statistics in the above table are average values based on
the 5 imputed datasets. The MI method produces more consistent and efficient
approximation for missing data than the mean interpolation method when dealing
with the missing data problem in the IMR variables.
4. All other missing data are filled by using mean interpolation.
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Table 16: Principal-Component Factor Analysis for Students’ Weight Control
Activities
Behavior Indicator Overall Index Female Index Male Index
Physical Inactiveness
% Did Not Exercise 0.857 0.934 0.978
% Did Not Eat Less 0.857 0.934 0.978
Eiganvalue 1.478 1.742 1.911
Risky Weight Control Activity
% Fasted to Lose Weight 0.881 0.880 0.832
% Took Diet Pills 0.881 0.875 0.865
% Took Laxative Pills 0.737 0.787 0.797
Eiganvalue 2.09 2.15 2.074
175
Table 17: Robustness Analysis for Table 4: the Interaction Model Estimated
without State-Dummy Variables
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Female Obesity Prevalence Rate
Obesity Policyt−1 0.410∗∗ (0.072)
Social Capital -0.146∗∗ (0.043)
Policyt−1×Social Capital 0.041 (0.066)
Public Health Spendingt−1 -0.025 (0.094)
Public Health Employeet−1 0.003∗ (0.002)
% Uninsured Children -0.053∗∗ (0.009)
Education 0.030∗∗ (0.004)
Poverty 0.177∗∗ (0.015)
∆ Unemployment 0.064† (0.034)
Overweight Infant -0.003 (0.002)
Obesity Prevelancet−1 0.814∗∗ (0.013)
Equation 2 : Male Obesity Prevalence Rate
Obesity Policyt−1 0.307∗∗ (0.092)
Social Capital -0.111∗ (0.051)
Policyt−1×Social Capital -0.041 (0.082)
Public Health Spendingt−1 -0.123 (0.130)
Public Health Employeet−1 0.010∗∗ (0.002)
% Uninsured Children -0.049∗∗ (0.012)
Euducation 0.019∗ (0.009)
Poverty 0.110∗∗ (0.020)
∆ Unemployment -0.144∗∗ (0.040)
Overweight Infant 0.000 (0.003)
Obesity Prevalencet−1 0.641∗∗ (0.020)
N 807
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 18: Robustness Analysis: Linear Model Specification for Male and Female
Childhood Obesity Prevalence Rates Based on Data from 1999 to 2009
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1: Female Obesity Prevalence Rate
Obesity Policyt−1 0.374∗∗ (0.107)
Social Capital -0.189∗∗ (0.070)
Public Health Spendingt−1 -0.242 (0.190)
Public Health Employeet−1 0.003 (0.003)
Education 0.049∗∗ (0.007)
Poverty 0.171∗∗ (0.028)
∆ Unemployment 0.003 (0.051)
Overweight Infant -0.012∗∗ (0.004)
% Uninsured Children -0.117∗∗ (0.019)
Obesity Prevalencet−1 0.823∗∗ (0.019)
Equation 2 : Male Obesity Prevalence Rate
Obesity Policyt−1 0.656∗∗ (0.131)
Social Capital -0.099 (0.086)
Public Health Spendingt−1 -0.399† (0.237)
Public Health Employeet−1 0.017∗∗ (0.004)
Education 0.100∗∗ (0.010)
Poverty 0.193∗∗ (0.032)
∆ Unemployment -0.218∗∗ (0.062)
Overweight Infant 0.003 (0.005)
% Uninsured Children -0.101∗∗ (0.023)
Obesity Prevalencet−1 0.655∗∗ (0.025)
N 463
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Figure 16: Marginal Effects of Public Health Spending on Racial Disparities in
Health (Black-to-White Ratios of Infant Mortality Rates), with 95% Confidence
Intervals
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Figure 17: Correlations Between Putnam’s Social Capital Index and the Dynamic
Social Capital Index (State-Means from 1991 to 2009)
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Figure 18: Distributions of Female and Male Students’ Perceptions on Their Body
Mass Index, CDC Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (1991-2009)
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Figure 19: Correlations between Obesity Policy, Social Capital and the Index of
Physical Inactiveness: Gender Differences
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Figure 20: Correlations between Obesity Policy, Social Capital and the Index of
Risky Weight Control Activity: Gender Differences
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